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Wilfrid Sellars famously distinguished the manifest image from the scientific image, and said that the task of philosophy is to understand how things in the broadest possible sense of the term hang together in the broadest possible sense of the term. I endorse this perspective, and it permits me to answer your question compactly: minds are elements in good standing in the manifest image, along with voices, colors, opportunities, dollars, promises, songs, and poems, among other things (in the broadest possible sense). All these things are hard to put in registration with the things of the scientific image; "identity" doesn't work; "reduction" doesn't work; and "elimination" is not helpful: telling people that colors don't really exist, and neither do voices or dollars or words, is a popular fallback position of some scientists and philosophers, but more a surrender than a positive view. Minds are to brains roughly as colors are to electromagnetic radiation in the visible spectrum—visible to us. The task of saying, precisely, in metaphysically bulletproof terms, what kind of things minds (or voices, or words, or dollars) are has always struck me as an ill-motivated task, an intellectual exercise for otherwise unoccupied philosophical minds to practice on, if they have the taste for it, but nothing that anybody needs to know.