

Global Master of Arts Program II, Third Term, 2005-2006

The Fletcher School
Tufts University

GMA P240m Security Studies B: The Emerging Security Paradigm

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Course Description

This is the second module in a two-module separately graded course on current issues in international security and the United States national security policy. This module aim to provide an intellectual foundation needed to analyze contemporary security issues.

The assignments during the Reading Period (1-20 August 2005) review some of the key theories and concepts that form the basis of security studies as a distinct area of study in international relations (IR). We will discuss these theories and concepts, as well as debates about U.S. grand strategy, during the mid-term residency in Washington D.C. (21 August to 2 September 2005).

During the internet-mediated period (30 November 2005 to 17 January 2006), we will examine some current security challenges for the United States including: the causes of terrorism and other asymmetric threats; the rise of China and the prospects for great power conflict in East Asia; nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) proliferation; third party intervention in ethnic conflicts; and debates about military transformation and conventional force structure.

We will consider the problem of "nation building" in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the security implications of state failure, epidemics, border controls, and demographic trends during the closing GMAP II residency (12-24 March 2006).

Course Requirements

A portion of the CD ROM and assigned readings will cover each topic. Students should view the CD ROM, complete the assigned readings, and participate in the on-line discussions each week. This course has three requirements:

1. **Mid-term Team Paper (40%):** The mid-term paper will be a 10 to 12-page (2000-2500 words) policy memorandum due on 17 January 2006 (Module & Term Week V). Each team will submit a single memorandum via email or the GMAP II website. The memo should apply the theoretical arguments to a "real world" international security issue of the team's choosing. The objective is to use theory as the basis for policy recommendations.
2. **Class Participation (20%):** This portion of the grade involves quality and regularity of participation in the internet-mediated period. Students who make at last 15 *substantive* on-line contributions during the course will receive full credit for class participation. *Please limit each on-line contribution to no more than 400 words. Also, please make sure your contributions address the questions for that week.* I encourage active participation on the discussion board and I will frequently check and participate on the boards. However, I discourage overly long and "off topic" messages.
3. **Final Exam (40%):** The final exam will be during the final residency period in March 2006. It will be an in-class, two-hour exam. It will be based on all the material covered in this module. The exam will consist of two essay questions, designed to test your knowledge of relevant concepts and your analytical skills in assessing major themes and issues in the field of security studies.

Reading Assignments

Required Books

1. Robert J. Art, *Grand Strategy for America* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002).
2. Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Coté, Jr., Sean M. Lynn Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., *Offense, Defense, and War* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004).
3. Seyom Brown, *Illusion of Control: Force and Foreign Policy in the 21st Century* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2003).
4. Daniel L. Byman and Matthew C. Waxman, *Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
5. James L. Dobbins, et al. *America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2003)
6. G. John Ikenberry, ed., *America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003).

Other Required Readings

All other required readings, mostly drawn from scholarly journals and government documents, appear in the GMA P240m Security Studies B Reading Packet. Alternatively, you can access the them via the GMAP II website under "Courses" or via the Tufts University Libraries website (<http://www.library.tufts.edu/>) under "Electronic Journals."

Average Reading Loads and Reading Strategies

The reading assignments for this course range from 80 to about 140 pages per week. You should be able to complete most weekly reading assignments in two or three hours. Before you begin the assignments during the summer reading period, you might wish to consult the memoranda on "How to Read an Article or Book in IR and Political Science" and "How To Make a Theoretical Argument" in the front of the Reading Packet.

The required readings come largely from the international relations (IR) subfield of political science. Many build upon material you have covered in GMA P202: International Politics and GMA P240 Security Studies A: The Transatlantic Link, but some of them may introduce entirely new theories or concepts. Most of the authors are political scientists who hold faculty appointments at research universities or liberal arts colleges, although a few authors have held appointments in think tanks and in government.

I have tried to select readings that use IR theories to explain "real world" problems in international security and U.S. national security policy. The books, book chapters, and journal articles tend to fall into one of three categories: (1) theory or hypothesis proposing works; (2) hypothesis testing works; or (3) policy prescriptive works that draw upon particular IR theories.

Recommended Readings

For each week during the residencies and the internet-mediated instruction, I have included few recommend readings. I have done so to assist students who are writing team papers or GMAP theses on these topics. Given the time constraints imposed by your work schedules and your other GMAP courses, I advise you not to do the recommended readings unless they are directly pertinent to your team paper and/or your thesis. *Please note that the Reading Packet does not include the recommended readings.* To access the journal articles, you will need to go to the GMAP II website or the Tufts University Library website's electronic journals section. The Ginn Library and the Tisch Library (which serves the Schools of Arts & Sciences and Engineering) at

Tufts have many (although not all) of the recommended books in their collections. Most other university libraries have these titles as well.

READING PERIOD

1-20 August 2005

Please read the following in preparation for the Mid-Year Residency.

Week 1 (1-7 August): Thinking Theoretically about International Security (94 pages)

Stephen M. Walt, "The Relationship between Theory and Policy in International Relations," *Annual Review of Political Science*, vol. 8 (2005), pp. 23-47.

G. John Ikenberry, "Introduction," in Ikenberry, ed., *America Unrivaled* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), pp. 1-26.

Robert Art, *Grand Strategy for America* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), pp. 1-44.

Week 2 (8-14 August): Theory and Practice of Coercion (133 pages)

Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman, *Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 1-85.

Seyom Brown, *Illusion of Control: Force and Foreign Policy in the 21st Century* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2003), pp. 1-48

Week 3 (15-20 August): Security Dilemma, Technology, and Military Power (123 pages)

Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," in Michael E. Brown, et al., eds., *Offense, Defense, and War* (Cambridge: MIT Press), pp. 3-50.

Stephen Van Evera, "Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War," *Ibid*, pp. 227-265.

Charles L. Glaser and Chaim D. Kaufmann, "What is the Offense-Defense Balance and How Do We Measure It?" *Ibid*, pp. 266-304.

THE MID-YEAR RESIDENCY

Washington, D.C.

21 August to 3 September 2005

Session 1: The International System—Constraints and Opportunities

Required Reading

Kenneth N. Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War" in Ikenberry, ed., *America Unrivaled*, pp. 29-67.

William C. Wohlforth, "U.S. Strategy in a Unipolar World," *Ibid*, pp. 98-120.

Seyom Brown, *Illusion of Control* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2003), pp. 49-78.

Recommended Reading

Charles A. Kupchan, "Hollow Hegemony or Stable Multipolarity?" in Ikenberry, ed., *America Unrivaled*, pp. 68-97.

G. John Ikenberry, "Democracy, Institutions, and American Restraint," *Ibid*, pp. 213-238.

John M. Owen, IV, "Transnational Liberalism and American Primacy," *Ibid*, pp. 239-259.

Charles A. Kupchan, *The End of the American Era* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2002).

T. V. Paul, James J. Wirtz, and Michel Fortmann, eds., *The Balance-of-Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004).

Discussion Questions

1. What do international relations scholars working in the realist tradition, such as William Wohlforth and Kenneth Waltz, mean by the term *unipolarity*? How does unipolarity differ from bipolarity and multipolarity? Does the conception of unipolarity found in academic literature differ from the conception found in the national security policy community?
2. Wohlforth argues "No other major power is in a position to follow that depends for its success on prevailing against the United States in a war or an extended rivalry...None is likely to take any step that might invite the focused enmity of the United States." If the costs of balancing against the United States are prohibitive, then what other options are available to second tier great powers (Russia, China, Japan, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) to influence Washington's behavior?
3. How does Seyom Brown define *polyarchy*? If the international system is undergoing a transformation from unipolarity to polyarchy, what might be the implications for U.S. national security?

Session 2: Theory and Practice of Coercion

Required Readings

Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman, *Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 1-85.

Recommended Readings

Alexander L. George, *Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War* (Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993).

Robert J. Art and Patrick Cronin, eds., *The United States and Coercive Diplomacy* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2003).

Robert A. Pape, *Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in Modern War* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996).

Robert A. Pape, Barry D. Watts, and John A. Warden, III, "Theory and Evidence in Security Studies: Debating Robert A. Pape's *Bombing to Win*," *Security Studies*, vol. 7, no. 2 (winter 1997/98), pp. 91-214.

Avery Goldstein, *Deterrence and Security in the 21st Century* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002).

Thomas Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966).

Discussion Questions

1. What is "coercion"? Is it useful to think of coercion and deterrence as separate phenomena or strategies? What are the main assumptions and propositions of deterrence theory?
2. Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman argue, "Classifying a case as a success or failure depends on what behavior an observer thinks the coercer seeks, leading to confusion when different analyses of the same event are compared." Instead of thinking of coercion in binary terms (success or failure), it more useful to think of it in probabilistic terms. The dependent variable (DV) in analyzing coercive threats should be the marginal change in

- the probability of an adversary's behavior. What might be the advantages of measuring coercive "success" in this manner?
3. Byman and Waxman identify several "ideal types" of *coercive mechanisms*—power base erosion, unrest, decapitation, denial, and weakening—triggered by the use of various *coercive instruments*—air strikes, invasion, threat of nuclear attack, economic sanctions and international isolation, or combinations thereof. In designing and then executing coercive strategies, why might an understanding of coercive mechanisms be important? Would you agree that most policy debates about the "effectiveness" of various coercive instruments (e.g., bombing or economic sanctions) really involve debates about coercive mechanisms?

Session 3: Technology and Military Power—the Offense-Defense Theory Debate

Required Readings

- Stephen Van Evera, "Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War," in Brown, et al., eds. *Offense, Defense, and War*, pp. 227-65.
- Charles L. Glaser and Chaim D. Kaufmann, "What is the Offense-Defense Balance and How Do We Measure It?" *Ibid*, pp. 266-304
- Kier A. Lieber, "Grasping the Technological Peace: The Offense-Defense Balance and International Security," *Ibid*, pp. 366-399.

Recommended Readings

- Richard K. Betts, "Must War Find a Way? A Review Essay," in Brown, et al., eds., *Offense, Defense, and War*, pp. 333-365.
- Karen Ruth Adams, "Attack and Conquer? International Anarchy and the Offense-Defense-Deterrence Balance," *Ibid*, pp. 400-438.
- James W. Davis, Jr., Bernard I. Finel, Stacie Goddard, Stephen Van Evera, Charles L. Glaser, and Chaim Kaufmann, "Correspondence: Taking Offense at Offense-Defense Theory," *Ibid*, pp. 305-333.
- Stephen Biddle, *Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004).
- Stephen Van Evera, *The Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999).

Discussion Questions

1. What are the relative merits and problems with the core version of the offense-defense balance (which Charles Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann define as the cost ratio of attacker forces to defender forces) and the broad version (which incorporates additional variables such as Stephen Van Evera's)?
2. Does offense-defense theory (ODT), or at least Van Evera and Glaser and Kaufmann's version of the theory, deliver on its explanatory and predictive claims? Or is ODT deductively and empirically flawed, as Kier Lieber, claims? How might proponents of ODT address the common criticism of the literature: Just about any weapon or doctrine has both offensive and defense applications depending upon one's perspective?
3. What are the advantages and the disadvantages of "operationalizing" the offense-defense balance at the operational level—as Glaser and Kaufmann do—as opposed to the strategic level—as Van Evera and most other offense-defense theory proponents do? Does the distinction between "defense dominance" and "deterrence dominance" help us

understand the circumstances in which great power combatants are more or less likely to attack one another?

Session 4: Debates about U.S. Grand Strategy

Required Readings

Robert J. Art, *Grand Strategy for America* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002), pp. 45-81, 121-170, and 198-248.

Stephen D. Biddle, *American Grand Strategy after 9/11: An Assessment*, Monograph # 603 (Carlisle, Penn.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2005).

Recommended Readings

The National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2002) Available on the White House website: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf>

National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2003) Available on the White House website:
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/counter_terrorism/counter_terrorism_strategy.pdf

National Defense Strategy of the United States (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2005) Available on the Department of Defense website: <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2005/d20050318nds1.pdf>

National Military Strategy of the United States (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2004) Available on the Department of Defense website: <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2005/d20050318nms.pdf>

Colin Dueck, "Ideas and Alternatives in American Grand Strategy, 2000-2004," *Review of International Studies*, vol. 30, no. 4 (October 2004): 511-535.

Stephen M. Walt, "Keeping the World "Off Balance": Self Restraint and U.S. Foreign Policy," in Ikenberry, ed. *America Unrivaled*, pp. 121-155.

Robert Jervis, "Understanding the Bush Doctrine," *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 111, no. 2 (fall 2003), pp. 365-388.

Edward Rhodes, "The Imperial Logic of Bush's Liberal Agenda," *Survival*, vol. 45, no. 3 (spring 2003), pp. 131-54.

Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, "Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy," *International Security*, vol. 21, no. 3 (winter 1996/97), pp. 5-54 [reprinted in Michael E. Brown, et al., eds., *America's Strategic Choices*, rev. ed. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000).

John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001), chap. 7.

Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).

Ivo Daalder and Michael O'Hanlon, *America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2003).

Discussion Questions

1. Robert Art identifies seven possible grand strategies for the United States in the twenty-first century: *dominion* (or primacy), *selective engagement*, *offshore balancing*, *global collective security*, *regional collective security*, *containment*, and *neo-isolationism*. Since the end of the Cold War and particularly after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, the real debate over U.S. grand strategy is between different forms of internationalism (dominion, global and regional collective security, containment, and selective engagement). Why might Art spend such considerable effort to refuting neo-isolation and offshore balancing? Have his warnings against a grand strategy of dominion/primacy come true since the publication of the book?

2. In making the case for *selective engagement*, Robert Art distinguishes among one vital interest (the defense of the U.S. homeland), two highly important interests (the maintenance of deep peace among Eurasian great powers and secure access to Persian Gulf oil), and three important interests (the preservation of economic openness, the spread and the consolidation of democracy and human rights abroad, and the prevention of severe climate change). Yet, as he admits, selective engagement seems to invite abuse through a proliferation of foreign policy commitments. As a practical matter, how could distinguish a grand strategy of "selective" engagement from one of primacy (or dominion)? Would not any president—Republican or Democrat—claim that his or her own administration was selective in the use of force abroad?
3. Stephen Biddle contends that the grand strategy pursued by the Bush administration since the 9/11 terrorist attacks "has combined ambitious public statements with vague particulars as to the scope of the threat and the end state to be sought." As the costs of the ongoing insurgency in Iraq have increased, the ambiguities in the administration's grand strategy are becoming intolerable. What exactly are those ambiguities in U.S. grand strategy? Drawing upon your professional experiences (in government, the military, or the private sector), as well as Art's discussion of grand strategy, do you think that it is possible or even desirable for any great power to have a "coherent" grand strategy? How might ambiguity regarding the "end state to be sought," as well as the means available to achieve those ends, work to the United States' advantage in the global war on terror?
4. To remedy the current strategic ambiguity, Biddle presents two alternative strategies for the U.S. war on terrorism—rollback and containment. Both strategies would aim to reduce the threats to U.S. interests posed by Islamist terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The two strategies, however, identify different operational goals and policy tools, and rest on different assessments of short-term and long-term risks. "Rollback tolerates higher risk in the near term for a possibly lower cumulative risk in the longer term; containment reduces near-term risks but may increase them in the long-run." If you were advising the president, which of three possible strategies—rollback, containment, or the status quo—would you recommend his administration pursue?

INTERNET MEDIATED SESSION

29 November 2005 to 17 January 2006

Module Week I (29 November 2005)

(Third Term Week 1)

Topic: Terrorism and Other Asymmetric Threats

Required Readings

Audrey Kurth Cronin, "Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism," *International Security*, vol. 27, no. 3 (winter 2002/03), pp. 30-58.

Robert A. Pape, "The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism," *American Political Science Review*, vol. 97, no. 3 (August 2003), pp. 343-361.

Barry R. Posen, "Command of the Commons: The Military Foundations of U.S. Hegemony," *International Security*, vol. 28, no. 1 (summer 2003), pp. 5-47.

Recommended Readings

Mia M. Bloom, *Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005).

Robert A. Pape, *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism* (New York: Random House, 2005)

The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on the Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (New York: W. W. Norton, 2004), especially pp. 1-63 (Chaps. 1 and 2).

Jessica Stern, *Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill* (New York: Harper Collins, 2003).

John L. Esposito, *Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).

Discussion Questions

1. Audrey Kurth Cronin argues that the emergence of sacred terrorism is an unintended consequence of globalization, primarily in the Arab world. What exactly is the linkage between globalization and international terrorism? Since the United States and other G-8 member states obviously cannot "reverse" globalization, what policy recommendations follow from Cronin's analysis?
2. According to Robert Pape, suicide terrorism follows a strategic logic specifically designed to force liberal democracies (e.g., the United States, Spain, and Israel) to make significant territorial concessions. Suicide terrorism is an effective coercive strategy largely because it resulted in significant concessions in the 1980s and 1990s. If suicide terrorism is an *asymmetric* form of coercion, then what might be limitations in using military force against terrorist organizations as a counter strategy? Can states diminish the likelihood of suicide terrorism without first addressing the fundamental socio-economic and political factors that breed suicide terrorists?
3. Barry Posen maintains that U.S. military's command of the commons—land, sea, air, and space—has enabled the Bush administration to pursue a strategy of primacy (or dominion). However, the United States will continue to face opposition in so-called contested zones, such as Somalia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. How could the U.S. military establish command in these contested zones in the near to medium term? Do you accept Posen's conclusion that Washington may have greater success in meeting foreign policy goals by adopting a strategy of selective engagement?

Module Week II (6 December 2005)

(Third Term Week 2)

Topic: The Rise of China and the Future of Great Power Politics in East Asia

Required Readings

Michael Mastanduno, "Incomplete Hegemony and the Security Order in the Asia-Pacific," in Ikenberry, ed., *America Unrivaled*, pp. 181-212.

Robert S. Ross, "Navigating the Taiwan Strait: Deterrence, Escalation Dominance, and U.S.-China Relations," *International Security*, vol. 27, no. 2 (fall 2002), pp. 48-85.

Thomas J. Christensen, "Posing Problems without Catching Up: China's Rise and Challenges for U.S. Security Policy," *International Security*, vol. 25, no. 4 (spring 2001), pp. 5-40.

Recommended Readings

David J. Shambaugh, "China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order," *International Security*, vol. 29, no. 3 (winter 2004/05), pp. 64-99.

Michael A. Glosny, "Strangulation from the Sea: A PRC Submarine Blockade of Taiwan," *International Security*, vol. 28, no. 4 (spring 2004), pp. 125-160

Lyle Goldstein and William Murray, "Undersea Dragons: China's Maturing Submarine Force," *International Security*, vol. 28, No. 4 (spring 2004), pp. 161-196.

Michael O'Hanlon, Lyle Goldstein, and William Murray, "Correspondence: Damn the Torpedoes: Debating Possible U.S. Navy Losses in a Taiwan Scenario," *International Security*, vol. 29, no. 4 (fall 2004), pp. 202-206.

Robert S. Ross and Andrew J. Nathan, *The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China's Search for Security* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997).

Harold Brown, Joseph W. Prueher, and Adam Segal, *Chinese Military Power: An Independent Task Force Report* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2004). Available online at <http://www.cfr.org>

Discussion Questions

1. Michael Mastanduno argues that the United States has succeeded in establishing a "partial hegemonic order" in East Asia. American power in the region has served to restrain great power rivals (Japan, China, Russia, and India) from engaging in major conflict and help to reassure smaller states (e.g., South Korea, Taiwan, and Indonesia) that their security and interests will be protected. How does Mastanduno define hegemony? In what ways is this existing hegemonic order in East Asia different from a possible concert of great powers or a balance-of-power regional order?
2. Robert Ross argues that absent a formal declaration of independence by Taiwan, the United States can be very confident that it can continue to deter the use of force by China against the island. He writes, "The United States possesses the capabilities—including a robust war-fighting force and 'escalation dominance'—that even the most cautious analysts argued were necessary for deterring Soviet aggression." How are the current problems of U.S. extended deterrence in the Taiwan Strait similar to the problems of U.S. extended deterrence of a Soviet attack on Western Europe during the Cold War? Under what conditions might Chinese leaders become undeterrable?
3. Writing before the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks and the subsequent improvement in U.S.-China relations, Thomas Christensen offers a less sanguine assessment of the long-term prospects of peace in East Asia. Contrary to Ross, Christensen argues that "certain Chinese military capabilities combined with the political geography of East Asia,

the domestic politics of mainland China, and the perceptual biases of Chinese elites can pose significant challenges for American security strategy in the region." How exactly could China's People Liberation Army (PLA) offset the U.S. nuclear and conventional force advantage? What are the perceptual biases of Chinese elites (especially the officer corps of the PLA)? How might those biases undermine a stable deterrence relationship between China and Taiwan and between China and the U.S.?

Module Week III (13 December 2004)

(Third Term Week 3)

Topic: Ethnic Civil Wars and Third Party Intervention

Required Readings

Chaim Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars," *International Security*, vol. 20, no. 4 (spring 1996), pp. 136-175.

Sarah Kenyon Lischer, "Collateral Damage: Humanitarian Assistance as a Cause of Conflict," *International Security*, vol. 28, no. 1 (summer 2003), pp. 79-109.

Timothy W. Crawford, "Pivotal Deterrence and the Kosovo War: Why the Holbrooke Agreement Failed," *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 116, no. 4 (winter 2001/02), pp. 499-525.

Recommended Readings

Daniel Byman and Taylor Seybolt, "Humanitarian Intervention and Communal Civil Wars," *Security Studies*, vol. 13, no. 1 (autumn 2003), pp. 33-78.

Timothy W. Crawford, *Pivotal Deterrence: Third-Party Statecraft and the Pursuit of Peace* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003).

Stuart J. Kaufman, *Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001).

Barbara F. Walter, *Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002).

Barbara F. Walter and Jack Snyder, eds., *Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999).

Discussion Questions

1. How does the security dilemma exacerbate fears among different ethnic groups and increase the likelihood of violence? In light of the 1995 Dayton peace accords that ended the Bosnian civil war, are Chaim Kaufmann's arguments in favor of partition as the only long-term solution to ethnic civil wars still persuasive?
2. Sarah Kenyon Lischer argues that although humanitarian relief in ethnic civil wars may be neutral in intent, "the effects of humanitarian actions always have political, and sometimes military, repercussions." Drawing upon the cases of the 1994 Rwandan genocide and the ensuing refugee crisis in Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo), how might international relief organizations have better used their resources to influence the actions of the various parties?
3. How does Timothy Crawford's conception of *pivotal deterrence* differ from other types of deterrence encounters between adversaries? In what ways did the Clinton administration's threats of force play into the hands of then-Yugoslav president Slobodan Milosevic and the Kosovo Liberation Army in 1998 and early 1999? Drawing upon the Kosovo case, what dangers might great powers face in seeking serve as third-party mediators in ethnic civil wars?

HOLIDAY BREAK

20 December 2005 to 2 January 2006

Module Week IV (3 January 2005)

(Third Term Week 4)

Topic: NBC Proliferation and Counterproliferation Strategies

Required Readings

Chaim Braun and Christopher F. Chyba, "Proliferation Rings: New Challenges to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime," *International Security*, vol. 29, no. 2 (fall 2004), pp. 5-49.

Ariel E. Levite, "Never Say Never Again: Nuclear Reversal Revisited," *International Security*, vol. 27, no. 3 (winter 2002/2003), pp. 59-89.

Gregory Koblentz, "Pathogens as Weapons: The International Security Implications of Biological Warfare," *International Security*, vol. 28, no. 3 (winter 2003/2004), pp. 84-122.

Recommended Readings

Francis J. Gavin, "Blast from the Past: Proliferation Lessons from the 1960s," *International Security*, vol. 29, no. 3 (winter 2004/05), pp. 100-135.

Derek D. Smith, "Deterrence and Counterproliferation in an Age of Weapons of Mass Destruction," *Security Studies*, vol. 12, no. 4 (summer 2003), pp. 152-197.

Christopher F. Chyba and Alex L. Greninger, "Biotechnology and Bioterrorism: An Unprecedented World," *Survival*, vol. 46, no. 2, (summer 2004), pp. 143-162.

Victor D. Cha and David C. Kang, *Nuclear North Korea: A Debate on Engagement Strategies* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003).

Graham Allison, *Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe* (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 2004).

Victor A. Utgoff, ed., *The Coming Crisis: Nuclear Proliferation, U.S. Interests, and World Order* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000).

Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed*, 2nd ed. (New York: W.W. Norton, 2002).

T. V. Paul, *Prudence versus Power: Why Nations Forgo Nuclear Weapons* (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2000).

Kendall Hoyt and Stephen D. Brooks, "A Double-Edged Sword: Globalization and Biosecurity," *International Security*, vol. 28, no. 3 (winter 2003/2004), pp. 123-148.

Jonathan B. Tucker, *Biosecurity: Limiting Terrorist Access to Deadly Pathogens* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2003).

Discussion Questions

1. Chaim Braun and Christopher Chyba see what they term "proliferation rings," formal and informal networks of second-tier proliferators that exchange nuclear technologies, weapon designs, and delivery systems, as a growing threat to regional and global security. If left unchecked, these proliferation rings could enable second-tier proliferators such as Iran and North Korea to acquire nuclear weapons, and thereby destroy the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Do you agree with Braun and Chyba assessment, namely that the principal problem with the 1970 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) lies in its enforcement mechanisms? Alternatively, do the problems with the NPT lie in the fact that

- it restricts the "legitimate" possession of nuclear weapons to five states (the United States, Russia, China, France, and Great Britain)?
2. Taking a different perspective than Braun and Chyba, Ariel Levite seeks to explain why the "nightmare proliferation scenarios" of the 1960s, which foresaw the emergence of several dozen nuclear weapons states, failed to materialize. Instead of developing and maintaining nuclear arsenals and delivery systems, many states have instead engaged in nuclear reversal, nuclear restraints, and what Levite terms "nuclear hedging." Under what conditions are states more likely to engage in nuclear hedging?
 3. What are the implications of nuclear hedging for deterrence, particularly between states with enduring rivalries? Is the concept of nuclear hedging an accurate description of the strategies pursued by North Korea and Iran in recent years?
 4. Gregory Koblentz writes, "The offense-defense balance in biological warfare strongly favor the attacker because developing and using biological weapons to cause casualties is significantly easier and less expensive than developing and fielding defenses against them." Yet, to date, there have been few cases where states have actually used viral pathogens and bacteria in warfare. Given the relative ease of acquiring viral pathogens, what might explain this paradox? How does the secrecy regarding biological weapons programs weaken deterrence, impede civilian oversight, and complicate threat assessments?

Module Week V (10 January 2005)

(Third Term Week 5)

Topic: Military Transformation and Conventional Force Structure

Required Readings

Seyom Brown, *Illusion of Control*, pp. 78-104 and 142-178.

Thomas G. Mahnken and James R. FitzSimonds, "Revolutionary Ambivalence: Understanding Officers' Attitudes toward Transformation," *International Security*, vol. 28, no. 2 (fall 2003), pp. 112-148.

P.W. Singer, "Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry and its Ramifications for International Security," *International Security*, vol. 26, no. 3 (winter 2001/2002), pp. 186-220.

Recommended Readings

Eliot A. Cohen, "Change and Transformation in Military Affairs," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, vol. 27, no. 3 (September 2004), pp. 395-407.

John Stone, "Politics, Technology, and the Revolution in Military Affairs," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, vol. 27, no. 3 (September 2004), pp. 408-427.

Colin S. Gray, *Transformation and Strategic Surprise*, Monograph # 602 (Carlisle Barracks, Penn.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2005) Available at <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pdf/PUB602.pdf>

Cindy Williams, ed., *Holding the Line: U.S. Defense Alternatives for the Early 21st Century* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001).

P.W. Singer, *Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003).

Stephen Biddle, *Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004).

Discussion Questions

1. Seyom Brown argues that since the early 1990s, there has been an increasing disposition on the part of U.S. administrations (both Republican and Democrat) to threaten or to use military force. Are Brown's eight guidelines for the use of military force, drawn largely from the just war tradition in political philosophy, practical when the primary threats to the United States are likely to emerge from non-state actors or "failed" states?
2. Thomas Mahnken and James FitzSimonds seek to explain why Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and the civilian leadership of the Defense Department have not had greater success in their efforts to fundamentally transform the armed services. According to Mahnken and FitzSimonds, "Broad support of the officer corps is a key element in force transformation." Thus far, however, the officer corps, though open to the idea of change in the abstract, does not appear to support changes that would create new services or devalue currently dominant weapons systems." Drawing upon what you learned in the "Leadership and Management" modules, what are some of the fundamental obstacles to military transformation? Has the "global war on terrorism," including military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, derailed or facilitated military transformation?
3. Peter Singer examines the emergence and growing influence of *privatized military firms* (PMFs), defined as "profit-driven organizations that trade in the professional services intricately linked to warfare." How has the outsourcing of various combat and combat support functions altered the relationship between the sovereign state and warfare? Do you agree with Singer's conclusion that, "consideration of the impact of the broader military outsourcing market would make theories of deterrence, conventional arms races, and conflict formation more reflective of the real world"?

FINAL RESIDENCY

12 to 24 March 2006

Tufts University, Medford/Somerville campus

Session 1: "Nation Building" and Operations Other than War (Iraq and Afghanistan)

Required Reading

James L. Dobbins, et al. *America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2003), pp. 1-55 and pp. 129-222.

Daniel Byman, "Five Bad Options for Iraq," *Survival*, vol. 47, no. 1 (spring 2005), pp. 7-32.

Ivan Arreguín-Toft, "How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict," *International Security*, vol. 26, no. 1 (summer 2001), pp. 98-128.

Recommended Reading

Kimberly Zisk Marten, *Enforcing the Peace: Learning from the Imperial Past* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004).

David M. Edelstein, "Occupational Hazards: Why Military Occupations Succeed or Fail," *International Security*, vol. 29, no. 1 (summer 2004), pp. 49-91.

Conrad C. Crane and Andrew W. Terrill, *Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, Challenges, and Missions for Military Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario* (Carlise, Penn.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2003).

Eric Carlton, *Occupation: The Politics and Practices of Military Conquerors* (New York: Routledge, 1992).

Minxin Pei and Sara Kasper, *Lessons from the Past: The American Record of Nation Building* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003).

Discussion Questions

1. James Dobbins and his co-authors seek to analyze the best practices in "nation-building" from the post-World War II experiences of the United States. Is the term "nation building" even an accurate description of the American occupations of Germany and Japan after World War II and then in Bosnia, Somalia, Kosovo, Haiti, Afghanistan, and Iraq in the 1990s and 2000s? What are the implications of the distinction between "states" and "nations" for the success of U.S. and international intervention?
2. The occupation of Iraq is the United States' sixth major state building effort since 1991. Dobbins and the other authors of the RAND study identify several factors that influence the ease or difficulty of such missions: the target state's prior democratic experience, its level of economic development, and its national homogeneity. However, among the factors that the occupying state controls, the most important determinants of success are amounts of time, troops, and money invested in the task. Short departure deadlines, therefore, are incompatible with nation building. Did the Bush administration, in effect, cripple its nation-building efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq from the start by not deploying sufficient numbers of troops (in both cases) and imposing artificial deadlines (in the case of the latter)?
3. Writing shortly after the January 2005 Iraqi parliamentary elections, Daniel Byman argues that the United States has five "bad" options in dealing with the Sunni insurgency: first, stay the course; second, dramatically expand the U.S. and allied troop presence; third, moderately expand the troop presence and put more emphasis on counter-insurgency operations; fourth, draw down to a smaller force with a more limited mission; and fifth, complete withdrawal. He argues that fourth option—a draw down of U.S. and coalition forces—remains the best (or least bad) option that is also political realistic. Do you agree with Byman's assessment of these options?
4. Ivan Arreguín-Toft offers a theory of asymmetric conflict to explain "how a weak actor's strategies can make a strong actor's power irrelevant." How well do Arreguín-Toft's hypotheses help us explain the dynamics the U.S. occupation of Iraq (post-May 2003)? Are the lessons that Arreguín-Toft draws from U.S. forces' experience in the Vietnam War relevant to low intensity conflict in Iraq and elsewhere?

Session 2: State Failure, Epidemic Diseases, Demography, and International Security

Required Readings

Stephen D. Krasner, "Sharing Sovereignty: New Institutions for Collapsed and Failing States," *International Security*, vol. 29, no. 2 (fall 2004), pp. 85-120.

Stefan Elbe, "HIV/AIDS and the Changing Landscape of War in Africa," *International Security*, vol. 27, no. 2 (fall 2002), pp. 159-177.

Valerie M. Hudson and Andrea Den Boer, "A Surplus of Men: Security and Sex Ratios in Asia's Largest States," *International Security*, vol. 26, no. 4 (spring 2002), pp. 5-38.

Recommended Reading

James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Neotrusteeship and the Problem of Weak States," *International Security*, vol. 28, no. 4 (spring 2004), pp. 5-43.

Robert I. Rotberg, ed., *Why States Fail: Causes and Consequences* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003).

Richard Caplan, *A New Trusteeship? The International Administration of War-torn Territories*, Adelphi Paper No. 341 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).

Valerie M. Hudson and Andrea M. Den Boer, *Bad Branches: The Security Implications of Asia's Surplus Male Population* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005).

Discussion Questions

1. Stephen Krasner contends that the two principal policy tools for addressing the problems of failing and collapsed states—governmental assistance and transitional administration—are inadequate. Since the notion of conventional sovereignty is part of the problem, Krasner calls for the creation of two new international institutions—de-facto trusteeships and shared sovereignty arrangements involving existing international organizations or regional great powers—to address the governance problems of failed or collapse states. Given that many states now labeled as collapsed or failing received independence from European great powers after World War II, what are the political and legal barriers to a system of neo trusteeships? How exactly would shared sovereignty arrangements alleviate security dilemmas within failed and collapsed states and among such states and their neighbors?
2. Stefan Elbe examines the changing nature of warfare in Africa resulting from the rapid spread of HIV/AIDS infection among its armed forces and assesses its impact not only on combatants but also on African societies as a whole. In what ways has HIV itself become a weapon of war? What are the some the implications for armed forces, civilian populations, governments, and PMFs?
3. Valerie Hudson and Andrea Den Boer trace the rise of offspring sex selection in China and India over the past twenty years that has resulted in a "surplus" of young men. They argue that such surpluses of young men increase the potential for internal and external violence, while diminishing the prospects for democracy. What is the hypothesized link between sex ratios in the Chinese and Indian populations and the likelihood of internal and external violence? Historically, how have other states dealt with the "problem" of surplus young men?