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Identity choices and perceptions of discrimination: How "becoming American" affects trust and obligation

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Abstract:
This paper tests claims of immigration critics who fear that immigrants and their descendants fail to adopt an American identity and who warn of the negative political consequences this failure will bring. It examines whether one's primary identification with a panethnic group, a national origin group, or as American affects one's trust in government, trust in law enforcement, and one's sense of obligation to the United States. I show first that fears of widespread rejection of an American self-identification are overblown. Then I show that among Americans of all backgrounds, one's primary self-identification largely fails to influence trust and obligation. Instead, perceptions of group-level and individual discrimination are more damaging. In some cases, the damaging effects of discrimination can be mitigated by identifying with the aggrieved group. Absent perceptions of discrimination, one's primary self-identification is often of little consequence. When such perceptions are present, a non-American identification can be beneficial with regard to trust, less so with obligation. These findings raise important questions about when – and whether – the adoption of an American self-identification is desirable.

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Recent debates about immigration reform have focused on many topics, including the economic impact of illegal immigration, national security, guest worker programs, and amnesty. One other prominent concern has been assimilation. On the one hand, immigrants and their supporters at rallies have been praised as showing native-born Americans what active citizenship is all about (Meyerson 2006). But they have also been chastised for not "becoming American." Theses charges were most vocal when a group of musicians released a Spanish interpretation of the national anthem. As one newspaper columnist wrote, the recent developments signaled "an invitation to separatism and a fractured national identity now finding voice among Mexican illegal immigrants and their advocates," (Farmer 2006). One editorial noted that, "the mere fact that [the anthem] is in Spanish is a protest against assimilation."[1] Critics also pointed to the presence of Mexican flags at immigration rallies to underscore their concerns. Some critics blame activists or the federal government rather than immigrants themselves. As one conservative columnist wrote, "New immigrants are not expected to learn our history, master our common language, or even demonstrate loyalty and commitment to the United States" (Wilson, 2006). The cause may lie with institutions, but the consequences appear first among immigrants – in the form of this attitudinal alienation – and second in the nation as a whole, which will suffer if commitment and loyalty disappear. The goal of this paper is to assess the claims that newer Americans and their descendants shun an American identity and that this lack of identification promotes alienation from the American political community in the form of reduced trust and a diminished sense of obligation. It examines whether self-identification affects trust and obligation broadly, by comparing respondents from a variety of racial and ethnic backgrounds.

[1] From an online editorial at *Investor's Business Daily*, "Star Spanglish," posted 5/1/06, available at http://www.investors.com/editorial/IBDArticles.asp?artsec=20&artnum=3&issue=20060501, accessed on 5/24/06.

In short, this paper asks: How much do we need to be concerned about identity choices? Does a person of Latino descent who primarily identifies as Latino, or as Mexican, feel more alienated from law enforcement or the federal government than a person of Latino descent who primarily identifies as American? Does that same person feel less of a sense of obligation to the United States and to the American people? First I show that fears of widespread rejection of an American self-identification are overblown. Then, using insights from research on group mobilization, ethnic politics, and social identity theory, I show that the impact of identity choices on trust and obligation is conditional on how people feel they or their group is treated. I show that among Americans of all backgrounds one's primary self-identification largely fails to influence attitudes. Instead, perceptions of group level and individual discrimination are more damaging. In some cases, the damaging effects of discrimination can be mitigated by identifying with the aggrieved group. In other cases, the damaging effects of discrimination are actually activated by such identification. Absent perceptions of discrimination, one's primary self-identification is often of little consequence. When such perceptions are present, a non-American identification can be beneficial with regard to trust, and detrimental with regard to obligation. These findings raise important questions about when – and whether – the adoption of an American self-identification is desirable.

TRUST, OBLIGATION, AND IDENTITY

Trust in political institutions is generally defined as a belief that leaders will do (or are doing) right by the community and its interests (Smith 2003) and the extent to which people think the government's performance is living up to their expectations (Hetherington 2005). It has been shown that trust affects compliance with political and legal processes, particularly in cases

where people dislike the outcomes of those processes (Tyler and Huo 2002; also see Tyler 2006). Trust affects whether people support policies aimed at reducing inequality (Hetherington 2005). And it is argued that trust plays a role in sustaining our willingness to take risks on behalf of the community (Smith 2003).

Obligation refers to the duties of citizenship, what we "owe" to our compatriots and to our political institutions in exchange for the privileges and rights conferred by membership in the political community. It is generally agreed that compliance with the law is where our obligations start, though many Americans also feel that we have a duty to devote some of our time and resources to the common good. Indeed, some argue that fulfilling such obligations is necessary in order to protect the ability of a self-governing society to provide rights and privileges in the first place. William Galston (2003), for instance, argues that a sense of obligation is essential in a society that provides people with so many individual-level benefits, such as freedom, prosperity, and stability. He writes that these benefits "do not fall like manna from heaven; they must be produced, and renewed, by each generation…There remains an injunction to do one's fair share to uphold the institutions that help secure these advantages" (p. 179). Likewise, Wellman (2001) writes that "the state cannot exist and perform its functions without the collective sacrifice of its citizens" (p. 233; also see Epstein 1984; Miller 1995). In more practical terms, people with a greater sense of civic duty are more likely to participate in politics and thus embody the ideal of the active citizen (Campbell et al. 1960; Abramson, Silver, and Anderson 1987).

Concerns about whether immigrants develop a sense of obligation lead observers to center their attention on identity choices and national attachment as essential ingredients. And it is not just conservative or nativist observers who voice such concerns. Noah Pickus (1998), for example, advocates a strong sense of national attachment and warns that "a shared national

identity that is capable of binding citizens requires more than just a commitment to abstract and general principles. It requires some felt sense of communal obligation, some feeling of responsibility derived in part from a perception of a shared history and fate" (p. 111). He promotes a naturalization process that acknowledges the nation's failures and that highlights the role citizens themselves have played in challenging the country to live up to its ideals (2005). Doing so, he argues, would cultivate their psychological attachment to the United States, which would, in turn, enhance commitment. This perspective is hardly extreme or nativist. Indeed, he warns against a "brittle and timid" defense of American identity (2005, p. 160). But both Pickus and more extreme observers, like Huntington (2004) and the columnists quoted earlier, are all animated by worries that commitment and obligation are getting short shrift among today's newcomers. Commentators therefore center on identity choices for instrumental purposes. Without seeing themselves as American, they argue, people will not trust the American political system nor will they be loyal or committed to it.

Such rhetoric, however, is often devoid of empirical analysis (Weaver 2003). What, if anything, does social science research tell us about these matters? As it turns out, not a whole lot. For the most part, the role that race, ethnicity, and identity play in shaping trust and obligation has been somewhat neglected. Studies of trust among the American population have tangentially mentioned that blacks are sometimes less trusting than whites or simply include racial dummy variables as controls, but fail to comment further (Richardson, Houston, & Hadjiharalambous, 2001; Owen & Dennis, 2001; Keele 2005). Unlike trust, opinions about the obligations of citizenship have not received much attention at all from empirical social science scholarship, let alone with respect to identity and diversity. And when they have, the focus has generally been on

whether people feel they have a duty to vote or to pay taxes, but not on whether they feel they have other obligations, such as volunteerism or serving in the military.[2]

Some of the main investigations into the impact of identity choices and attachments on political outcomes have come from scholars of group mobilization (e.g., Miller et al. 1981), who contend that identities need to get politicized before they can influence political behavior. Politicization can involve the perception of discrimination against one's group and against oneself individually (Schildkraut 2005a). It can involve perceptions of deprivation relative to other groups in society along with the view that the political system – and not individual attributes – is to blame for such deprivation (Miller et al. 1981). It can also involve feelings of linked fate (Dawson 1994), or a sense that the group is worth fighting for (Bedolla Garcia 2005). When politicized, an identification with one's ethnic group can generate political activity or it can minimize the otherwise alienating effects of perceptions of discrimination. Much of this work to date, however, has examined behavior, such as voting, and not trust or other measures of attitudinal engagement. Schildkraut (2005a) examines trust in government in addition to voting and finds that panethnic and national origin identifications among Latinos mitigate the alienating effects that discrimination have on voting more than they do on trust.

When it comes to the relationship between identity choices and trust, government at the federal and local levels is not the only appropriate target. Law enforcement authorities are also relevant due to the entrenched presence of racial profiling, to controversies regarding the role of race, religion, and immigration in post-9/11 anti-terrorism efforts, and to the fact that trust in law enforcement yields compliance. But again, research is scarce. Studying California residents who had experience with police and the courts, Tyler and Huo (2002) found that, "ethnic group identification is not generally an important influence on people's reactions to legal authorities"

[2] See Theiss-Morse (2006) for a notable exception.

(p. 173). To my knowledge, this study and Schildkraut's are the only ones to examine the impact of identity attachment on trust. Both conclude it is relatively innocuous.

Other factors related to identity have been examined with respect to trust. These include descriptive representation, acculturation, and perceptions of discrimination. Studies find, for example, that trust among blacks in their local government increases when their city has a black mayor (Howell and Fagan 1988; Rahn and Rudolph 2005). Contrary to the concerns of immigration critics, Weaver (2003) found that Mexican Americans had more confidence in the executive branch and Congress than non-Hispanic whites. Michelson's (2003) research suggests that Weaver's findings might be conditional on acculturation. Mexican Americans might start out with higher levels of trust, but acculturation, she argues, can actually dampen trust rather than boost it. She finds that both assimilation (measured through language use) and perceptions of discrimination (both against oneself and against Mexicans generally) reduce trust. On the one hand, she concludes that Mexicans simply become just like other Americans when they assimilate, as the low levels of trust among native-born whites have troubled social scientists for years. Being distrustful, she notes, "is part of being American" (p. 928). On the other hand, acculturation can promote more familiarity with discrimination, which also reduces trust.

Schildkraut (2005a) likewise found that perceptions of personal discrimination (but not group level discrimination) reduce trust in the federal government among Latinos, as does English use. Lien, Conway, and Wong (2004) also found that reports of personal experiences with discrimination diminish trust in local government among Asian Americans.[3] Perceptions of discrimination also reduce trust in law enforcement. Weitzer and Tuch (2004) found that reports of mistreatment by the police (regardless of one's race) reduced trust, and they found that

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[3] More objective measures of acculturation, such as language use and proportion of one's life spent in the United States, do not affect trust in local government in their study.

personal mistreatment mattered more than vicarious mistreatment, where family or friends are the victims. Yet they also found that racial differences in trust remain even after controlling for experience. Likewise, Tyler and Huo (2002) found that Californians who report having had positive or "procedurally fair" interactions with police and the courts are more likely have favorable views of law enforcement. Non-whites, however, were found to be less likely than whites to report positive or fair experiences.

With regard to obligation, studies of social identity theory suggest that immigrants or non-whites might indeed be less likely to carry out the duties of citizenship – or even feel like they have obligations in the first place – if they do not think of themselves as part of the American ingroup. Scholars have shown that ingroup bias with respect to helping behavior exists and is enhanced by the perception of group threat (Hornstein 1976; Flippen et al 1996; Dovidio and Morris 1975; Hayden, Jackson, and Guydish, 1984). As Theiss-Morse writes (2006), "people tend to view ingroup members as more attractive and more similar to themselves than outgroup members, and they feel a stronger sense of empathy and responsibility toward ingroup members" (p. 4). She finds that whites who identify strongly with "the American people" are more likely than whites who identify weakly with the American people to think that they have various obligations, such as donating to charity and volunteering in their communities. Adding stress to the mix can enhance this tendency to look out for one's own group but not for others (Dovidio and Morris 1975).[4] In this sense, a politicized panethnic or national origin identity might remove people from the broader American political community rather than propel them into it, as it has been shown to do with voting. Prioritizing a subgroup identity on its own might not affect obligation, but adding the stress of discrimination could make people reject the idea that they

[4] Using panel data, Putnam (2003) found that the 9/11 terrorist attacks led to a short-lived increase in civic behavior, such as volunteering and working on a community project.

owe their time and resources to their American compatriots. Thus, there may be some validity to the concerns that Pickus and others raise. Yet we know little about how these processes play out among other groups in society.[5] Is mere self-identification with a panethnic or national origin identity enough to reduce a sense of obligation to the United States? Or does a person need to feel like American society is a threat to that identity before it becomes consequential? How much do we really need to be concerned about people who don't identify primarily as American? More specifically, under what conditions do we need to worry?

In sum, existing scholarship on how identity choices, ethnicity, and discrimination shape trust and obligation, though small in volume, is united in finding that perceptions of threat or mistreatment are powerful. Both group-level and individual-level discrimination have been shown to matter, though individual-level discrimination is generally more influential. Yet studies of group mobilization have shown us that self-identification, the concept animating immigration critics, is often innocuous and can even neutralize the negative effects of discrimination. Studies of social identity, on the other hand, find self-identification to be more consequential and that the interaction between identity and discrimination might exacerbate alienation rather than mitigate it. The goal of the present study is to provide more clarity to this collection of findings. The studies described thus far each rely on different, often regional or group-specific, datasets; they measure both independent and dependent variables differently, rendering comparisons across studies difficult; and they are inconsistent in the extent to which they account for individual-level discrimination or group-level discrimination. Moreover, they rarely *interact* identification with discrimination even though modeling such interaction is essential for determining the conditions under which identification matters and the conditions under which it does not. Finally, they lack the means to distinguish between types of non-American identifications, generally contrasting an

[5] Sidanius et al. (1997) found that an ethnic identity reduced levels of patriotism for blacks but not for Latinos.

American identification with *only* a panethnic or a national origin identification. Whether panethnic or national origin identifications play the same role in shaping attitudinal engagement is largely unstudied, yet a panethnic identity might be a more politically potent form of identification than enduring ties to one's country of origin (Garcia 2003; Schildkraut 2005a).

The present study is able to address these limitations through use of the 21st Century Americanism Survey (21-CAS), a national random-digit-dial (RDD) telephone survey of adults, supplemented with oversamples of blacks, Latinos, and Asians.[6] Data collection was funded by the Russell Sage Foundation, and was conducted from July 12 – October 8, 2004 by the Social and Economic Sciences and Research Center (SESRC) at Washington State University (WSU). The sample has 2800 respondents (1,633 white, non-Hispanic; 300 black; 441 Latino; 299 Asian).[7] It includes new questions designed to measure the relative prioritization of American, panethnic (e.g., Latino) or national origin (e.g., Mexican) identifications. It also has measures aimed at capturing perceptions of discrimination that each type of group faces. Moving forward, I test whether the expectations of group mobilization theory or social identity theory play out with respect to trust and obligation. I highlight the factors that do and do not shape one's relationship with the American political community, and I show where we should direct our attention if we want immigrants and their descendants to be trusting of, and committed to, American society and institutions.

[6] Any resident of the U.S. over 18 years old and living in a household with a telephone was eligible for selection in the sample. Participants were selected through RDD, a standard technique for recruiting participants in telephone surveys. Counties with higher percentages of black, Latino, and Asian residents were targeted more heavily with RDD in order to create the oversamples. Such targeting is a common technique for including larger numbers of people from groups that are traditionally underrepresented when RDD is used alone.

[7] The remaining respondents identified as mixed, Native American, or answered the race question in a way that could not be incorporated into this breakdown (e.g., "human."). The cooperation overall rate was 31.2%. A Spanish version of the survey was available and was used by 137 respondents. The average interview length was 26 minutes.

MEASURING SELF-IDENTIFICATION, PERCEPTIONS OF DISCRIMINATION, TRUST, AND OBLIGATION

Self-identification

To gauge self-identification, respondents were asked a series of questions that followed initial questions on ancestry, race, and ethnicity. First, respondents were asked, "What countries did your ancestors come from?" They were allowed up to 3 mentions. If they mentioned more than one, they were then asked, "Which of those countries do you identify with most?" Their answer to this question was used to identify their national origin throughout the rest of the study. Later, respondents were asked three yes/no questions to see if respondents ever describe themselves in terms of (a) their national origin, (b) their panethnic group, and (c) being American: they were asked, "Do you ever describe yourself as _______?" The blank was first filled with the respondent's national origin. For example, if a respondent said her ancestors were from Italy, Ireland, and Poland, and if she said she identifies with Italy most, she was asked, "Do you ever describe yourself as Italian?"[8] Next, the blank was filled with the respondent's racial or panethnic group. For example, if a respondent said she was white or Caucasian, she was asked, "Do you ever describe yourself as white?" Finally, all respondents were asked, "Do you ever describe yourself as American?" If a respondent said "yes" to more than one of these three questions, she was then asked, "Which one of those best describes how you think of yourself most of the time?" The response to this question is used to measure a respondent's primary identity.[9]

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[8] For a respondent that only named one country of origin, that ancestry was used to fill in the blank.

[9] Respondents who said "yes" to only one of the three yes/no questions were still asked which term describes how they think of themselves most of the time. The only respondents skipped were those who did not answer questions about their ancestry and/or race.

Thirty-six percent of respondents said they describe themselves in all three terms, just under half (47%) said they use two of the three, and 10% said they use only one.[10] Of the entire sample, 78% chose American as their primary identity, 14% chose their racial or panethnic group, and 8% chose their national origin group. Of the 22% of respondents that did not choose "American" as their primary identity, 73% still sometimes describe themselves as American. Table 1 shows bivariate breakdowns on identity choices, and it shows few surprises. Whites, American citizens, people whose families have been American for generations, and people who mainly speak English in the home are overwhelmingly likely to identify primarily as American. All other groups are less so, though in no case does a panethnic identification achieve plurality. Moreover, a majority of Latinos and a plurality of Asians and first-generation respondents adopt "American" as their primary identity. The only groups that are unlikely to see themselves primarily as American are people who speak a language other than English at home and people who are not citizens. In both of those cases, a national origin identification is most likely. Thus, most people in the United States describe themselves as American most of the time. And with time, immigrants and their descendants seem increasingly likely to do so as well.

[Table 1 About Here]

Perceptions of discrimination

Three types of discrimination perceptions were measured in the 21-CAS: against one's panethnic (or racial) group, against one's national origin group, and against oneself individually. For the each type of group-level discrimination, respondents were asked three questions: "In general, do you think discrimination against _______ is a major problem, a minor problem, or not a problem in schools? What about in the workplace? What about in preventing _______ in general from succeeding in America?" A respondent whose ancestors are from Japan would be

[10] Unless otherwise noted, all figures refer to weighted results, using population weights provided by the SESRC.

asked the questions with "Asian" filled in the blank to gauge panethnic discrimination, and then with "Japanese" to gauge national origin discrimination.[11] Respondents' answers to the questions were combined to form one summated rating scale measuring the perception of panethnic discrimination ($\alpha = 0.84$), and one measuring national origin discrimination ($\alpha = 0.91$). Then respondents were asked three questions about individual-level discrimination: "Do you think you have ever been denied a job or promotion because of your racial or ethnic background? Do you think you generally receive worse service than other people at restaurants or stores because of your racial or ethnic background? Do you think your racial or ethnic background has made it difficult for you to succeed in America?" The wording states "racial or ethnic background" in order to rule out other attributions for mistreatment – such as gender or social class – but does not distinguish between one's panethnic or national origin background, as the more theoretically important distinction to investigate here is discrimination at the individual level versus at the group level. Again, respondents' answers to all three questions were combined to form a summated rating scale of individual level discrimination ($\alpha = 0.64$). All three scales were then constrained from 0 (no discrimination) to 1 (feels all scenarios in question are a major problem or have been personally experienced).[12] Exploratory factor analysis (not shown) confirms three distinct dimensions among the nine discrimination items.

The data show that perceptions that one's group is mistreated are more common than perceptions that one is personally a victim of discrimination, a phenomenon known as the personal-group discrepancy (Schildkraut 2005a; Kessler, Mummendey, and Leisse 2000; Fuegen and Biernat 2000; Crosby 1984). The mean level of panethnic discrimination overall is 0.37

[11] These questions were adopted from the 2002 Survey of Latinos conducted by the Kaiser Family Foundation and the Pew Hispanic Center, which asked about the panethnic group (Latinos) only.
[12] If a respondent answered only 2 of the 3 items on the discrimination scale in question, his answers to those two questions were summed and then divided by 2 instead of by 3.

(standard deviation = 0.33); the mean level of national origin discrimination is 0.25 (s.d. = 0.33); and the mean level of personal discrimination is 0.15 (s.d. = 0.27). Table 2 shows bivariate breakdowns, and again, it shows few surprises. The disjuncture between group-level and individual-level discrimination holds for all categories, and in every case, panethnic discrimination is seen as more common than national origin discrimination. Across all three types of discrimination, non-whites perceive more discrimination than whites, and non-citizens perceive more discrimination than citizens. Discrimination seems to level off after the first generation, and people who speak a language other than English in the home perceive more discrimination than people who speak only English.

[Table 2 About Here]

In sum, panethnic identities are the least common, though that is the group people think is mistreated the most. Acculturation seems to increase the likelihood of adopting an American identity and decrease the likelihood of perceiving mistreatment. Together, these patterns suggest that concerns that newer Americans – and their non-white descendants – fail to think of themselves primarily as American are overblown. Yet they also suggest there may still be cause for concern, especially if panethnic discrimination is a serious impediment to political trust. Perceptions of panethnic discrimination are most common – even among the acculturated – yet few non-black respondents identify primarily with their panethnic group. This combination reduces the likelihood that people with high levels of political alienation are finding solace with the aggrieved group.[13]

Trust and obligation

[13] Ongoing analyses (Schildkraut, in progress) find that acculturation drives identity choices for Latinos and Asians more than perceptions of discrimination, though for blacks and Asians, perceiving individual-level discrimination diminishes the likelihood of adopting an American identity.

Trust in government and law enforcement is gauged by asking respondents, "How much of the time do you think you can trust [the government in Washington/law enforcement] to do what is right…just about always, most of the time, some of the time, or never?" "Just about always" is coded as 1, "never" as 0. Most respondents said they trust government only some of the time (57%) and that they trust law enforcement most of the time (53%). Obligation is measured by offering respondents a list of possible obligations and asking them to indicate if they think each one is an obligation they owe to other Americans. "Yes (1)," "no (0)," and "it depends (0.5)" were accepted responses. The obligations under investigation here are: giving money to charities, volunteering in your local community, and serving in the military.[14] Overall, Americans feel that they have all three obligations: charity = 57%; volunteer = 72%; military service = 45% (a plurality).[15]

Table 3 shows bivariate breakdowns of the mean level of trust and the percentage of respondents saying "yes" to the obligation questions. It shows that American identifiers are more trusting of law enforcement than non-American identifiers but not of government, and that American identifiers are more likely to say they have obligations to other Americans. It shows that all three forms of discrimination reduce trust in government and law enforcement, with the largest impact seen in the role of panethnic discrimination on trust in law enforcement. Panethnic and national origin discrimination seem to reduce obligations slightly, while personal discrimination is curiously associated with an increased belief that one should volunteer in the local community. Latinos are most trusting of government, whites are most trusting of law enforcement, and blacks are least trusting of both. Blacks are most likely to say they have an

[14] Questions about obligations were adopted from Elizabeth Theiss-Morse's Perceptions of the American People Survey, 2002.
[15] "It depends" was a volunteered response. For donating to charity, volunteering, and serving in the military, the percentage of respondents who said "it depends" was 9.6%, 6.4%, and 11.8%, respectively.

obligation to donate and volunteer while Latinos are most likely to say they have an obligation to serve in the military. Conversely, Latinos are least likely to say they have an obligation to donate and volunteer while blacks are least likely to say they have an obligation to serve in the military. And consistent with earlier research, all three measures of acculturation (citizenship, generation, and language use) seem to reduce both types of trust. Acculturation is associated with a greater sense of obligation to donate and volunteer but a lower sense of obligation to serve in the military.

[Table 3 About Here]

Table 3 suggests that self-identification might indeed affect trust and obligation. But bivariate patterns, though interesting, do not isolate relationships nor do they reveal the power of conditional relationships. We still know little about whether self-indentification has any independent influence, whether it mitigates – or exacerbates – the impact of perceptions of discrimination, or whether acculturation is the predominant factor. Moreover, we know little about which type of discrimination is more potent or whether panethnic and national origin attachments operate the same way. Multivariate analyses are needed to examine these questions.

PREDICTING TRUST AND OBLIGATION

Trust

Over the years we have learned that trust is affected by one's level of generalized trust (beliefs about whether people tend to be fair and trustworthy or whether they tend to look out for themselves and take advantage of others), approval ratings of congress and the president, beliefs about the fairness and equity of the political process, and partisanship, with people being more trustful of government if their own political party is in the majority (Brehm and Rahn 1997;

Citrin and Luks 2001; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2001; Keele 2005). As far as factors related to ethnicity, identity, and immigration are concerned, the main factor affecting trust has been perceptions of discrimination. Non-American identities are therefore not expected to generate antagonism, despite the pattern shown in table 3. On the contrary, a non-American identity might mitigate the mistrust generated by perceptions of discrimination, as predicted by group mobilization theory.

Three ordered probit models were run to predict each form of trust: whites only, blacks only, and Latinos and Asians. Latinos and Asians were analyzed together for several reasons. First, together these groups comprise well over a majority of contemporary immigrants. Second, studies have shown minimal differences among Asians of different national origins with respect to trust (Lien, Conway, and Wong 2004), that "Hispanics from different national origin backgrounds express relatively similar political views," (Claassen 2004, p. 617; also see Garcia 2003), and that Latinos and Asians "bear similar underlying structures of ethnicity" (Lien 1994, p. 252). Third, analyzing Latinos and Asians together yields more precise standard errors due to the increased sample size. Except where noted, running the models for Asians and Latinos separately yields similar results.

Each model has five sets of independent variables. The first set consists of standard demographic and attitudinal measures: education, age, partisanship, and generalized trust.[16] The second set captures acculturation: generation (first, second, third, or more), and whether the respondent primarily speaks English in the home. The third set consists of identity choices, with "American" as the omitted category. The fourth set consists of perceptions of discrimination. The fifth set consists of interactions between each type of identity choice and each type of

[16] I did not include household income because of the high refusal rate on that question. The 21-CAS does not have measures of approval ratings of Congress or attitudes about the fairness of the political process. See appendix for question wording not described in the main text.

discrimination. For the model with black respondents, only identity and discrimination measures relating to panethnicity were included, and for blacks and whites, speaking only English was dropped due to its failure to achieve significance in earlier tests. In all cases, the model for whites is considered to be the baseline, as most of what we know about trust and obligation comes from studying whites. The particular role of identity and discrimination in shaping the opinions of whites is of less theoretical interest in this paper, but merits its own separate inquiry due to the historical and continuing associations between whiteness and Americanness (e.g., Devos and Banaji 2005; also see Miller et al. 1981; Wong and Cho 2005).

Trust in government

The results for trust in government appear in table 4. Trust in government for whites works much like most existing research on trust would expect: Republicans and people with more generalized trust are more trusting of government, and people with higher levels of education are less trusting. No measures of identity choice or perceptions of discrimination are significant. For blacks, generalized trust promotes trust in government and individual-level discrimination diminishes trust in government. Identifying primarily as black has no impact absent perceptions of discrimination, but it mitigates the damaging effects of discrimination. In other words, discrimination hurts trust in government *only* for blacks who identify primarily as American.

[Tables 4 About Here]

To get a better sense of the magnitude of the relationship between individual-level discrimination and self-identification, it is useful to examine the results in terms of predicted probabilities. Table 5 shows the probability that a black respondent would exhibit each level of trust as his identification changes from American to black and as his perception of individual

level discrimination changes from 0 to 1.[17] In all cases, a black respondent is most likely to trust government "some of the time." But the likelihood of "never" trusting government changes dramatically as self-identification and perceptions of discrimination change. It rises from 0.08 to 0.23 when a black respondent who identifies as American goes from perceiving a low level of discrimination to perceiving a high level of discrimination, and then it diminishes to 0.13 when that same respondent identifies primarily as black.

[Table 5 About Here]

Latinos and Asians share more similarities with whites than blacks do. Education and being a Democrat lower trust while generalized trust raises trust in government. The model also shows that Latinos are slightly more trusting of government than Asians. And as Michelson found, acculturation seems to lower trust, as indicated by the negative coefficients on generational status and language use.[18] But like blacks, discrimination and identity also play a complicated role. Here, panethnic discrimination diminishes trust rather than personal discrimination. But as with blacks, this effect only applies to people who identify primarily as American. Identifying as Latino or as Asian neutralizes the damaging effect of discrimination.

Predicted probabilities of each level of trust for Latinos and Asians are displayed in tables 6a and 6b.[19] These tables show that among American identifiers, perceptions of discrimination increase the likelihood of trusting government "some of the time" (0.37 → 0.57, for Latinos) or "never" (0.02 → 0.06) while decreasing the likelihood of trusting government "most of the time" (0.45 → 0.32) or "just about always" (0.15 → 0.05). It is important to note as well that a

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[17] Predicted probabilities are calculated using CLARIFY, holding all other variables constant at their means for blacks (see King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000).

[18] Running models for Latinos and Asians separately indicates that the impact of generational status is driven entirely by Latinos.

[19] Predicted outcomes are calculated using CLARIFY, holding all other variables constant at their means for Latinos and Asians, with "speaks English at home" held constant at 1, while changing panethnic discrimination from 0 to 1.

panethnic identification for Latinos and Asians does in fact reduce trust government when perceptions of discrimination are absent, indicating that the concerns of immigration critics cannot be dismissed completely.

[Tables 6a and 6b About Here]

Clearly, the role that self-identification plays in shaping trust is more complicated than it is typically cast. For blacks, Latinos, and Asians, having an American identification is only beneficial if perceptions of discrimination are absent. Unfortunately, such perceptions are not absent. Twenty-two percent of black respondents both score at or above the midpoint on the personal discrimination scale and identify primarily as American. Likewise, 25% of Latino and Asian respondents score at or above the midpoint on the panethnic discrimination scale and identify primarily as American. Thus, a non-trivial portion of the population would have its level of trust in government raised if it were to identify primarily with their panethnic group instead of as American.[20]

Trust in law enforcement

The results of the ordered probit analyses for trust in law enforcement appear in table 7. They show that the complicated relationship between identity and discrimination described above for blacks, Latinos, and Asians *does not* apply when our attention shifts from government to law enforcement. Perceptions of personal discrimination diminish trust for blacks, Latinos, and Asians, and self-identification does nothing to alter this effect. Likewise, the perception of panethnic discrimination diminishes trust for whites, but identifying as white does nothing to

[20] In separate analyses (not shown), I used the PNAAPS (Pilot National Asian American Political Survey) to predict trust in *local* government. Using the original model by Lien, Conway, and Wong (2004) as a starting point, I added measures of self-identification (American, Asian American, Asian, national origin) and interacted them with perceptions of individual-level discrimination. In that model, the interaction between an Asian identification and discrimination was positive and significant, confirming that this panethnic identification can help to overcome the negative impact of discrimination on trust for Asian Americans.

mitigate that impact. In terms of predicted probabilities (table not shown), a black respondent who identifies as American and perceives no discrimination will trust law enforcement only "some of the time" (as opposed to "most of the time" or "just about always") with a probability of 0.46. When that same respondent perceives discrimination, the likelihood jumps to 0.64. And the probability of "never" trusting law enforcement jumps from 0.09 to 0.15. Likewise, the probability that a Latino respondent who identifies as American will trust law enforcement "just about always" drops from 0.21 to 0.08 when the perception of personal discrimination changes from 0 to 1 (for Asians, 0.12 to 0.04). Changing one's primary self-identification has no impact.

[Table 7 About Here]

Other results in table 7 show that for whites and blacks, age promotes trust in law enforcement, and for whites, Latinos, and Asians, so do high levels of generalized trust and being Republican. Latinos are again more trusting than Asians, and both measures of acculturation again reduce trust.[21] Whites who identify as with their national origin group instead of as American are less trusting of law enforcement, but this effect goes away if those same respondents think they have personally been mistreated due to their race or ethnicity. Exploring the dynamics of self-identification and discrimination among whites clearly merits further investigation, but is beyond the scope of the present inquiry.

In sum, perceptions of both personal discrimination and panethnic discrimination are powerful. When it comes to trust in government, the expectations of group mobilization theory are borne out: identifying with the aggrieved group can be empowering and can inoculate people against alienation. But the impact of discrimination on trust in law enforcement is too powerful; identifying with the aggrieved group offers no protection for blacks, Latinos, or Asians.

[21] As before, the main substantive difference when running models for Latinos and Asians separately is that the effect of generationational status is driven entirely by Latinos. In this case, the impact of generalized trust is also being driven by Latinos.

Obligation

Although there is little research on public opinion about the obligations of membership in the American political community, there is research on whether people actually fulfill varied obligations, on the factors that distinguish volunteers from non-volunteers, and on community-level characteristics that might promote volunteerism (e.g., Eckstein 2001). Scholarship on whether we fulfill the duties of citizenship have blossomed in recent years thanks to a surge of interest in social capital (Putnam 2000), and these studies tell us that people often fall short of the ideal. Some studies suggest that people who say they have obligations are likely to carry those obligations out (Lee, Piliavin, and Call 1999), while others show that most people acknowledge the duties of citizenship while also admitting that they shirk (e.g., Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002). Yet for the most part, examinations of people's thoughts about obligations, regardless of whether they live up to them and regardless of whether race, ethnicity, and identity matter, are rare.[22]

The types of obligation under investigation here are to donate to charity, to volunteer in one's community, and to serve in the military. Group mobilization scholarship would lead us to expect that perceptions of discrimination would reduce one's sense of obligation to the United States but that identifying with the aggrieved group could neutralize this effect. Social identity scholarship, on the other hand, suggests that panethnic or national origin identifications, when paired with perceptions of discrimination, would make obligation less likely. I again use ordered probit analysis to examine if the results favor either expectation. The models are identical to the models used to predict trust but with three changes. First, generalized trust is removed. Second, gender is added because of scholarship suggesting that women are more sympathetic to the

[22] One related exception is de la Garza, Falcon, and Garcia (1996), which shows that ethnic consciousness among Mexican Americans does not make them less patriotic than other Mexican Americans or Anglos.

disadvantaged than men and possess an "ethic of caring" (Conover 1988), and because men are more likely to serve in the military.[23] Third, a variable called "civic republican American identity" is added. This measure captures the belief that "true Americans" should do volunteer work in their community, should be informed about local and national politics, and should be involved in local and national politics ($\alpha = 0.62$). It is expected that people who think American identity is uniquely defined by active citizenship are more likely to feel that they personally have obligations to the United States and to the American people.[24] The results appear in tables 8 (donate to charity), 9 (volunteer in one's community), and 10 (serve in the military).

[Tables 8, 9, and 10 About Here]

The strongest and most consistent relationship revealed across all columns in all three tables is the power that a civic republican understanding of the meaning of American national identity plays in shaping whether people feel that they personally have obligations to other Americans. In other research (Schildkraut 2005b), I show that Latinos, Asians, and non-English speakers are as likely as English-speaking whites to define the meaning of American identity in civic republican terms, that blacks are slightly more likely, and that the foreign born are slightly less likely. In other words, to the extent that most Americans are more or less equally likely to that think being American means living up to an ideal of active citizenship, they also share a similar attitude structure when it comes to whether they feel they personally have specific obligations.

With regard to the main causal variables of this study, self-identification on its own only matters twice: whites who identify as white are less likely to say they should volunteer in their

[23] According to the U.S. Census Bureau, the membership of the armed forces in the United States is 15% female. See: http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/releases/archives/facts_for_features_special_editions/006232.html, accessed 6/9/06.

[24] Bivariate correlations between this civic republican definition of American identity and obligations to donate, volunteer, and serve in the military are 0.22, 0.32, and 0.25, respectively.

communities, and blacks who identify as black are less likely to say they should serve in the military. For whites, however, this effect goes away in the presence of panethnic discrimination. Whites who identify as white and think whites are mistreated are more likely than whites who identify as white but who do not perceive discrimination to say they have an obligation to volunteer. As group mobilization theory might expect, the politicization of the identity generates support for involvement.

Perceptions of discrimination on their own are likewise relatively inconsequential. Blacks are more likely to say they should volunteer in their communities when they feel they personally have been mistreated due to their race, and they are less likely to say they should serve in the military when they feel that blacks have been mistreated. Identifying primarily as black instead of as American does nothing to mitigate – or exacerbate – these relationships. Perceptions of discrimination on their own do not affect whether Latinos or Asians feel they personally have obligations to donate, volunteer, or serve, but such perceptions *do* become consequential when paired with a Latino or Asian identity, and contrary to the positive impact that politicized identities have on trust, the joint presence of discrimination and a non-American identity here *reduces* one's sense of connection to the American ingroup. Latinos and Asians who identify as Latino and Asian *and* who think their panethnic group is mistreated are less likely than other Latinos and Asians to say they have an obligation to donate to charity.

In terms of predicted probabilities, a Latino respondent who identifies as Latino but does not perceive discrimination has a 62% chance of saying she has an obligation to donate to charity. When the same respondent thinks Latinos are mistreated, that probability drops to 31% -- a drop of 31 percentage points. Likewise, Latinos and Asians who identify with their national origin group *and* who think their national origin group is mistreated are less likely than other

Latinos and Asians to say they have an obligation to volunteer in their communities. An Asian respondent who identifies with his national origin group but does not think that the group is mistreated has an 85% chance of saying he has an obligation to volunteer in his community. When the same respondent thinks his national origin group is mistreated, that probability drops to 54% -- again, a drop of 31 percentage points. Rather than shielding them from the perceptions of discrimination, the politicized non-American identity turns Latinos and Asians away from the American community. Twelve percent of Latino and Asian respondents both identify primarily as Latino and Asian and score at or above the midpoint on the panethnic discrimination scale. Likewise, 23% of Latino and Asian respondents identify primarily with their national origin and score at or above the midpoint on the national origin discrimination scale. Thus, the magnitude of this phenomenon is arguably large enough that it should not be ignored.

Other results from tables 8 through 10 show that acculturation can be a mixed blessing. For Latinos and Asians, the longer one's family has been in the United States, the more likely he is to say he has an obligation to donate to charity, but the less likely he is to say he has an obligation to serve in the military. Gender works largely as previous scholarship would expect: white women are more likely than white men to say they have an obligation volunteer and donate, but white men more likely to say they have an obligation to serve in the military. Likewise, black women more likely than black men to say have an obligation to volunteer, and black men more likely than black women to say they have an obligation to enlist. There are no significant gender differences among Latinos and Asians.[25]

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

[25] There are no substantive differences between Latinos and Asians when the obligation models are run separately for each group, though some relationships fall just short of significance at the 95% or 90% levels.

The goals of this paper were to see which groups, if any, reject an American self-identification, to see if adopting a non-American identity reduces trust and obligation, and to see if group mobilization theory and social identity theory help us to understand the conditions under which identities become consequential. On the first point, I have found little evidence that non-whites or descendants of immigrants shun an American identity. The immigrant generation holds on to its national origin attachments, but these attachments shrink considerably with each generation and with English acquisition. When the national origin attachment fades, an American self-identification becomes common, not a panethnic self-identification. And even black respondents were more likely identify primarily as American than as black.

On the second point, I found that identity choices on their own (absent perceptions of discrimination) are rarely a problem when it comes to trust and obligation. The concerns of immigration critics on this score are validated in only two cases: A panethnic identity can make Latinos and Asians (who do not perceive discrimination) less trusting of government and can make blacks less likely to say they have an obligation to serve in the military. Otherwise, whether a person sees herself primarily as American or as a member of a panethnic or national origin group appears to be inconsequential, but only if she does not perceive discrimination – the big caveat. Perceptions of discrimination indeed cause a fair amount of alienation. Adopting a non-American identity can mitigate the effects of discrimination with respect to trust in government. Panethnic identities are more likely to exhibit this power than national origin identities. But they can also activate the alienating power of discrimination with respect to one's sense of obligation to the American people. And in some cases, such as trust in law enforcement, one's self-identification does nothing at all. Thus, I find that group mobilization theory is a useful framework for understanding how identity choices affect trust in government while social

identity theory is a useful framework for understanding how identity choices affect one's thoughts about the obligation to donate one's time and money to the American community. Neither approach provides much help when examining trust in law enforcement or the obligation to serve in the military.

Why does a politicized identity enhance trust in government? We know that identifying with the aggrieved group can create a sense of empowerment and can promote political activity (e.g., Miller et al. 1981; Schildkraut 2005a; Bedolla Garcia 2005). Perhaps this empowerment also produces a greater faith that the political system *can* produce just outcomes, but only if the people themselves use their power to make demands. If so, Pickus's call for infusing the naturalization process with examples of how ordinary citizens have played a central role in reducing the gap between institutions and ideals (Huntington 1981) might indeed help to create empowerment, trust, and commitment.

This empowerment, however, does not seem to cultivate a greater sense of connection to one's fellow Americans or the American community in general. For blacks, identifying as black plays no role in shaping their sense of obligation. And for Latinos and Asians, the politicized identity is a source of alienation. Social identity theorists argue that the perception of threat leads people who identify with the threatened group to close ranks, and that is exactly what I find here. For Latinos and Asians, it is neither discrimination nor a non-American identity that reduces obligation, but rather the combination of the two.

For both trust and obligation, the ideal advanced by immigration critics – having all people in the United States identify primarily as American – is ideal only if people do not feel that they or their group is mistreated. Once perceptions of discrimination are added to the mix, the normative question of whether we should or should not want people to see themselves

primarily as American becomes a lot more complicated. As Bedolla Garcia (2005) warns, feeling stigmatized while lacking a positive attachment to the aggrieved group leads to disengagement, and "for members of stigmatized groups, establishing a positive attachment to their social group may be a necessary first step toward their attachment to the political community as a whole" (p. 190). My research here suggests she is right with respect to trust, but not with respect to obligation. In both cases, however, my findings underscore the need to focus our attention on perceptions of mistreatment more so than on identity choices.

The good news, then, is that prioritizing a non-American identity is often innocuous or even beneficial. But there is some bad news. First, the perception of panethnic discrimination is common among Latinos and Asians, and though a panethnic identity can neutralize discrimination's power, a panethnic identity is the least likely identity to be prioritized. Second, the perception of personal discrimination is also quite powerful, and although this type of discrimination is not as common, identity choices rarely condition its power. Third, people arguably interact with law enforcement more than with the federal government, and their view of the former is not helped by self-identification. In other words, many people fail to benefit from the empowering potential of a panethnic or national origin identity. Fourth, politicized identities can have contradictory effects – bolstering trust while reducing obligation – which means that we cannot have it all; one might come at the expense of the other. My findings also highlight that as the United States continues to debate changes to its immigration policies, it is important to keep assessing the empirical claims made by vocal critics, and it is important for those critics to recognize that the way in which they voice their concerns could in fact bring about the very alienation and lack of commitment that they fear.

APPENDIX: Item wording and coding

Level of education

What is the highest grade of school or year of college you have completed? (recoded to run from 0 – 1)

1 = less than high school diploma
2 = high school graduate
3 = trade/vocational school
4 = some college
5 = BA or BS
6 = some graduate school
7 = graduate level degree

Partisan identification

Generally speaking, do you consider yourself a Republican, an independent, a Democrat, or something else? (if R or D) Would you call yourself a strong Republican/Democrat or a not very strong Republican/Democrat? (if something else) Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican or Democratic party? (recoded to run from 0 – 1).

1 = strong Democrat
2 = Democrat
3 = leans Democrat
4 = Independent
5 = leans Republican
6 = Republican
7 = strong Republican

Generalized trust

Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?

0 = You can’t be too careful
1 = Most people can be trusted

Civic republican understanding of American identity:

I’m going to read a list of things that some people say are important in making someone a true American. The first one is ________. Would you say that it should be very important, somewhat important, somewhat unimportant, or very unimportant in making someone a true American? (1 = very unimportant, 4 = very important; all items recoded to run from 0 to 1 then combined into summated rating scale)

Doing volunteer work in one’s community
Being informed about local and national politics
Being involved in local and national politics

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Table 1: Identity prioritization: "Which one best describes how you think of yourself most of the time?"

	Panethnic	National origin	American	n (raw)
White	7.8	2.8	89.4	1,589
Black	41.6	6.1	52.3	281
Asian	16.7	36.0	47.3	276
Latino	18.2	28.2	53.6	422
U.S. citizen	13.1	4.6	82.4	2,435
Not U.S. citizen	26.2	56.1	17.8	249
1st generation	20.2	38.0	41.8	530
2nd generation	11.6	11.8	76.6	166
3rd generation	5.9	2.6	91.5	175
4th generation or more	13.6	2.2	84.2	1,765
Speaks primarily English at home	12.8	3.7	83.6	2,281
Speaks another language at home	23.6	43.9	32.5	404

note: n = unweighted

Source: 21st Century Americanism Survey, 2004.

Table 2: Percpetions of discrimination, mean

	Panethnic	National origin	Personal	n (raw)
White	0.29	0.11	0.07	1,589
Black	0.74	0.61	0.46	281
Asian	0.47	0.42	0.24	276
Latino	0.57	0.49	0.25	422
U.S. citizen	0.39	0.26	0.15	2,435
Not U.S. citizen	0.55	0.47	0.28	249
1st generation	0.52	0.43	0.24	530
2nd generation	0.47	0.33	0.14	166
3rd generation	0.32	0.19	0.15	175
4th generation or more	0.38	0.23	0.14	1,765
Speaks primarily English at home	0.38	0.24	0.15	2,281
Speaks another language at home	0.56	0.48	0.27	404

note: n = unweighted

Source: 21st Century Americanism Survey, 2004.

Table 3: Trust and obligation

	Trust in:		Obligation to:			
	gov't	**law**	**donate**	**volunteer**	**serve in miliary**	**n (raw)**
Panethnic identity	0.42	0.55	56	69	33	384
National origin identity	0.46	0.59	52	69	44	295
American identity	0.42	0.63	57	74	48	2,007
Panethnic discrim (bottom third)	0.46	0.65	57	71	45	1,429
Panethnic discrim (middle third)	0.46	0.61	57	74	51	819
Panethnic discrim (top third)	0.40	0.52	54	73	41	552
Nat'l origin discrim (bottom)	0.46	0.64	57	73	47	1,489
Nat'l origin discrim (middle)	0.44	0.59	55	76	46	495
Nat'l origin discrim (top)	0.42	0.57	54	69	44	816
Personal discrim (bottom)	0.47	0.63	56	72	46	2,415
Personal discrim (middle)	0.39	0.49	60	73	42	234
Personal discrim (top)	0.41	0.49	54	78	43	151
White	0.46	0.65	56	72	46	1,589
Black	0.35	0.45	65	78	39	281
Asian	0.45	0.59	54	75	45	276
Latino	0.51	0.61	49	68	48	422
U.S. citizen	0.44	0.61	57	73	45	2,435
Not U.S. citizen	0.55	0.66	51	65	47	249
1st generation	0.50	0.63	54	71	52	530
2nd generation	0.42	0.58	56	72	45	166
3rd generation	0.44	0.61	56	71	48	175
4th generation or more	0.44	0.58	57	73	43	1,765
Speaks primarily English at home	0.44	0.61	57	73	44	2,281
Speaks another language at home	0.51	0.63	54	71	50	404

note: n = unweighted; cell entries for trust = mean (0 - 1), cell entries for obligation = % saying yes

Source: 21st Century Americanism Survey, 2004.

Table 4: Trust in Government, by race, ordered probit

	White		*Black*		*Asian and Latino*	
Independent variable	*b*	*s.e.*	*b*	*s.e.*	*b*	*s.e.*
Education	-0.28**	0.13	-0.14	0.25	-0.33*	0.19
Age	0.23	0.17	0.45	0.38	0.02	0.26
Republican	1.13**	0.10	-0.19	0.33	0.74**	0.16
Generalized (interpersonal) trust	0.23**	0.08	0.46**	0.18	0.04	0.12
Generation (1 to 4+)	0.04	0.14	0.21	0.34	-0.53**	0.16
Speaks primarily English at home	--	--	--	--	-0.21*	0.13
Latino	--	--	--	--	0.44**	0.13
National origin self-identification	-0.23	0.22	--	--	-0.08	0.21
Panethnic self-identification	0.25	0.18	0.02	0.44	-0.58*	0.34
National origin discrimination	0.31	0.21	--	--	0.19	0.24
Panethnic discrimination	-0.17	0.16	-0.43	0.48	-0.59**	0.24
Individual-level discrimination	-0.05	0.27	-0.69**	0.34	-0.12	0.25
Nat'l origin x nat'l origin discrim.	-0.89	1.02	--	--	-0.11	0.37
Nat'l origin x individual discrim.	1.50	1.05	--	--	0.07	0.37
Panethnic x panethnic discrim.	-0.60	0.42	-0.88	0.63	1.19**	0.53
Panethnic x individual discrim	-0.90	0.84	1.03**	0.50	-0.36	0.47
Cutpoint 1	-1.14	0.21	-1.41	0.45	-1.89	0.24
Cutpoint 2	0.93	0.20	0.66	0.44	0.01	0.23
Cutpoint 3	2.32	0.21	1.69	0.47	1.32	0.24
Chi-square	165.35		32.46		75.66	
N	1006		228		463	

**p<0.05; *p<0.1

All non-dummy variables coded 0 to 1. Unweighted data.

Source: 21st Century Americanism Survey, 2004

Table 5: Predicted trust in government for Blacks, by identity choice and perceptions of personal discrimination

	Level of trust in federal government			
	Just about Always	*Most of the time*	*Some of the time*	*Never*
American identity, discrimination = 0	0.05	0.22	0.65	0.08
American identity, discrimination = 1	0.01	0.09	0.67	0.23
Black identity, discrimination = 0	0.01	0.10	0.68	0.21
Black identity, discrimination = 1	0.03	0.16	0.68	0.13

Source: 21st Century Americanism Survey, 2004.
Cell entries = probability of offering that response

Table 6a: Predicted trust in government for Latinos, by identity choice and perceptions of panethnic discrimination

	Level of trust in federal government			
	Just about Always	*Most of the time*	*Some of the time*	*Never*
American identity, discrimination = 0	0.15	0.45	0.37	0.02
American identity, discrimination = 1	0.05	0.32	0.57	0.06
Latino identity, discrimination = 0	0.05	0.30	0.57	0.08
Latino identity, discrimination = 1	0.14	0.43	0.41	0.02

Table 6b: Predicted trust in government for Asians, by identity choice and perceptions of panethnic discrimination

	Level of trust in federal government			
	Just about Always	*Most of the time*	*Some of the time*	*Never*
American identity, discrimination = 0	0.07	0.37	0.53	0.05
American identity, discrimination = 1	0.02	0.20	0.64	0.14
Asian identity, discrimination = 0	0.02	0.19	0.63	0.16
Asian identity, discrimination = 1	0.07	0.34	0.54	0.06

Source: 21st Century Americanism Survey, 2004.

Cell entries = probability of offering that response

Table 7: Trust in Law Enforcement by race, ordered probit

	White		*Black*		*Asian and Latino*	
Independent variable	*b*	*s.e.*	*b*	*s.e.*	*b*	*s.e.*
Education	0.05	0.13	0.38	0.27	-0.23	0.20
Age	0.35**	0.17	0.83**	0.39	-0.03	0.28
Republican	0.81**	0.09	-0.10	0.30	0.28*	0.17
Generalized (interpersonal) trust	0.23**	0.08	0.11	0.18	0.37**	0.11
Generation (1 to 4+)	-0.09	0.14	0.02	0.31	-0.51**	0.17
Speaks primarily English at home	--	--	--	--	-0.21*	0.13
Latino	--	--	--	--	0.36**	0.13
National origin self-identification	-0.65**	0.20	--	--	0.02	0.19
Panethnic self-identification	-0.22	0.18	-0.22	0.49	-0.31	0.41
National origin discrimination	-0.16	0.21	--	--	0.02	0.27
Panethnic discrimination	-0.42**	0.17	-0.77	0.50	-0.20	0.26
Individual-level discrimination	-0.37	0.27	-0.87**	0.35	-0.62**	0.28
Nat'l origin x nat'l origin discrim.	-1.43	0.92	--	--	-0.04	0.37
Nat'l origin x individual discrim.	2.88**	0.85	--	--	-0.04	0.39
Panethnic x panethnic discrim.	0.27	0.51	0.42	0.69	0.014	0.62
Panethnic x individual discrim	0.14	0.62	0.09	0.47	0.13	0.53
Cutpoint 1	-2.19	0.23	-2.05	0.50	-2.39	0.27
Cutpoint 2	0.38	0.21	-0.15	0.47	-0.68	0.24
Cutpoint 3	1.35	0.21	1.27	0.47	0.86	0.24
Chi-square	126.54		33.79		57.60	
N	1010		229		468	

**p<0.05; *p<0.1

All non-dummy variables coded 0 to 1. Unweighted data.

Source: 21st Century Americanism Survey, 2004

Table 8: Obligation to give money to charities, by race, ordered probit

	White		*Black*		*Asian and Latino*	
Independent variable	*b*	*s.e.*	*b*	*s.e.*	*b*	*s.e.*
Education	0.31**	0.13	0.10	0.27	0.26	0.18
Age	0.54**	0.17	0.15	0.38	0.67**	0.27
Male	-0.18**	0.07	0.04	0.17	-0.11	0.10
Generation (1 to 4+)	-0.26*	0.15	-0.30	0.33	0.38**	0.16
Speaks primarily English at home	--	--	--	--	-0.34**	0.15
Civic republican American identity	1.75**	0.21	1.54**	0.45	0.79**	0.30
Latino	--	--	--	--	-0.17	0.13
National origin self-identification	-0.16	0.23	--	--	0.02	0.20
Panethnic self-identification	-0.02	0.19	0.38	0.48	0.41	0.31
National origin discrimination	0.04	0.19	--	--	-0.05	0.24
Panethnic discrimination	-0.14	0.15	0.17	0.45	0.02	0.24
Individual-level discrimination	-0.07	0.23	0.22	0.30	0.05	0.27
Nat'l origin x nat'l origin discrim.	0.57	1.06	--	--	0.07	0.36
Nat'l origin x individual discrim.	0.19	1.10	--	--	-0.32	0.35
Panethnic x panethnic discrim.	-0.20	0.47	-0.25	0.72	-0.86*	0.47
Panethnic x individual discrim	2.10**	0.91	-0.09	0.53	0.58	0.43
Cutpoint 1	0.92	0.25	0.80	0.61	0.38	0.32
Cutpoint 2	1.20	0.25	0.99	0.61	0.69	0.32
Chi-square	116.40		15.01		35.23	
N	1168		271		604	

All non-dummy variables coded 0 to 1. Unweighted data.

Source: 21st Century Americanism Survey, 2004

Table 9: Obligation to volunteer, by race, ordered probit

	White		*Black*		*Asian and Latino*	
Independent variable	*b*	*s.e.*	*b*	*s.e.*	*b*	*s.e.*
Education	-0.02	0.15	-0.43	0.32	0.23	0.20
Age	-0.001	0.19	0.34	0.51	0.41	0.31
Male	-0.21**	0.08	-0.32*	0.19	0.004	0.11
Generation (1 to 4+)	0.01	0.16	-0.22	0.39	0.21	0.18
Speaks primarily English at home	--	--	--	--	-0.13	0.15
Civic republican American identity	2.51**	0.22	2.29**	0.53	1.51**	0.32
Latino	--	--	--	--	-0.19	0.14
National origin self-identification	-0.24	0.27	--	--	0.27	0.24
Panethnic self-identification	-0.55**	0.21	-0.60	0.52	-0.06	0.33
National origin discrimination	0.18	0.23	--	--	-0.16	0.27
Panethnic discrimination	0.03	0.17	-0.41	0.46	0.14	0.27
Individual-level discrimination	-0.05	0.27	0.90**	0.37	0.26	0.28
Nat'l origin x nat'l origin discrim.	-0.11	0.99	--	--	-0.80**	0.4
Nat'l origin x individual discrim.	0.79	1.06	--	--	-0.11	0.38
Panethnic x panethnic discrim.	1.05**	0.54	1.24*	0.77	0.17	0.53
Panethnic x individual discrim	-0.41	0.94	-0.71	0.57	0.39	0.47
Cutpoint 1	0.85	0.26	0.55	0.69	0.48	0.35
Cutpoint 2	1.12	0.26	0.66	0.69	0.66	0.35
Chi-square	157.69		29.83		46.75	
N	1167		272		605	

All non-dummy variables coded 0 to 1. Unweighted data.

Source: 21st Century Americanism Survey, 2004

Table 10: Obligation to serve in the military, by race, ordered probit

	White		*Black*		*Asian and Latino*	
Independent variable	*b*	*s.e.*	*b*	*s.e.*	*b*	*s.e.*
Education	-0.71**	0.14	-0.50*	0.30	-0.54**	0.19
Age	1.81**	0.18	2.62**	0.41	1.43**	0.29
Male	0.26**	0.08	0.78**	0.17	0.15	0.10
Generation (1 to 4+)	-0.33**	0.15	-0.11	0.28	-0.44**	0.17
Speaks primarily English at home	--	--	--	--	0.02	0.14
Civic republican American identity	1.11**	0.21	1.53**	0.44	1.51**	0.31
Latino	--	--	--	--	-0.07	0.13
National origin self-identification	-0.22	0.25	--	--	-0.03	0.21
Panethnic self-identification	-0.26	0.19	-0.77*	0.50	0.06	0.36
National origin discrimination	-0.07	0.19	--	--	0.09	0.24
Panethnic discrimination	0.25*	0.15	-0.95**	0.45	-0.22	0.24
Individual-level discrimination	-0.10	0.23	-0.14	0.31	0.07	0.27
Nat'l origin x nat'l origin discrim.	0.63	0.93	--	--	-0.35	0.37
Nat'l origin x individual discrim.	-0.21	1.05	--	--	0.01	0.38
Panethnic x panethnic discrim.	0.20	0.49	0.39	0.73	-0.13	0.54
Panethnic x individual discrim	0.48	0.76	-0.26	0.52	0.11	0.47
Cutpoint 1	0.84	0.25	1.01	0.60	0.86	0.33
Cutpoint 2	1.18	0.25	1.31	0.60	1.14	0.34
Chi-square	218.39		91.28		95.70	
N	1157		268		598	

All non-dummy variables coded 0 to 1. Unweighted data.

Source: 21st Century Americanism Survey, 2004