

Does Money Buy Power?
Interest Group Resources and Policy Outcomes

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Abstract

Popular accounts of interest group influence in the policy process often focus on organizational budgets and campaign contributions, asserting that these resources lead to outcomes that are most preferred by “special” interest groups. Scholarly work that has attempted to assess this influence, however, has come to no set conclusion – sometimes resources lead to influence, sometimes they do not, and sometimes the results are inconclusive. To address the question of whether increased financial resources leads to preferred policy outcomes, we make use of a set of 98 randomly selected U.S. national policy issues about which we have conducted more than 300 interviews and collected extensive secondary source information on more than 1,200 organized interests. Our data include information on a broad range of indicators of financial resources, as well as non-material resources such as governmental allies and group membership. We find that when resources are considered by group type, businesses and other occupational organizations have the clear advantage, especially for material resources. These findings confirm those of numerous previous surveys of interest groups in Washington. When analyzed at the issue level, however, we find that material resources tend to be fairly evenly split on each side of an issue. Poorer citizen groups often cooperate with more well-to-do business and professional organizations, and the citizen groups bring other resources to the table, including membership numbers and public legitimacy. Resource-rich organizations were no more likely than resource-poor organizations to be on the winning side of the policy debate.

In the early days of 1999, representatives from a large telecommunications company and two large trade associations made a visit to a relatively junior member of Congress.¹ They had an issue that they thought he would be interested in hearing about. It involved cutting taxes in a time of tax surpluses, promoting consumer interests and rolling back a policy that no longer had any reasonable justification. It had the backing of nearly 100 groups, both within the business community and within a wide array of citizen and consumer groups. The backers had money, and their diverse membership seemed to assure that they would have legitimacy in the public eye as well. The issue had no organized opposition and seemed unlikely to develop any, since the issue had no natural enemies. Given all this, would the congressman be willing to serve as the issue's champion in the House? The interest groups would provide the organizing skills and media push outside Congress, but they needed a "horse" inside Congress to bring the issue forward. Would he take on the issue? The primary benefit to the junior member of Congress was a chance to be seen as a person who could get things done—a mover and shaker who led a popular bill through to fruition, later taking credit, perhaps, for saving consumers millions of dollars in taxes. The junior member said yes, and the fight to eliminate the 3 percent federal excise tax on telecommunications began in earnest.

Sometimes a policy proposal seems to have it all, yet still fails to pass. The effort to end the 3 percent excise tax was just such an issue. Telecommunications companies hated the tax

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because it was costly to collect and made their customers irritable, and efforts to eliminate the tax dated back more than 15 years. The tax—which was applied to all phone bills, cell phone bills, and cable television bills—began in 1898 as a luxury tax on a newfangled invention. Its proceeds were to help defray the costs of the Spanish American War. More than a century later, the fund created by the tax was not dedicated to any specific program, and in a time of budget surpluses, it seemed like a good time to let it go. Proponents of eliminating the tax were well connected, gave plenty of campaign contributions, and had hired Jack Quinn, a former White House counsel who headed the prominent lobbying firm Quinn and Gillespie. Their issue was popular with the public, won substantial press coverage, and had no organized opposition. It was “good for the poor and old people” because it eliminated a regressive tax. On May 25, 2000, the bill passed the House with only two members voting against it. Time, however, was not on its side. Postponed on the Senate schedule because leaders had other priorities, the bill languished until the end of August, and with elections approaching the session was essentially over. A last-minute attempt was made in October to attach it to the general Treasury appropriations bill, but that bill was vetoed on other grounds. Supporters hoped to reintroduce the bill and pass it during the 107th Congress. When the next session arrived, however, the federal budget surplus had evaporated—and with it any chance of the excise tax being eliminated.² Resources are important to interest groups hoping to change policy, but even substantial resources do not guarantee a policy outcome. The groups supporting change here had all kinds of resources—staff, budgets,

² Advocates of eliminating the tax finally scored a partial victory six years later – after the official end of our study period – when a series of federal courts ruled that the tax could not legally be applied to long-distance calls as they are billed today. The Internal Revenue Service agreed to stop collecting the tax on long-distance, wireless, and bundled services and to issue a tax credit to individuals and businesses for excise taxes paid over the past three years. The tax on local telephone services remains, but advocates hoped to continue their fight against that portion of the 3% excise tax in Congress.

membership, diversity, bipartisanship, good connections—and they had an issue that was sure to be popular with the public and that no one actively opposed, but they failed nonetheless.

About the same time that the fight was underway to remove the 3 percent federal tax from consumers' telephone bills, another lobbying battle was underway, this one pitting banks against credit unions. In the popular press, advocacy by bankers evokes images of big-buck lobbyists, cozy relationships with members of Congress, millions in campaign contributions and guaranteed results. But in the decades-long effort by banks to limit expansion by credit unions, banks have repeatedly ended up on the losing side. Credit unions traditionally can offer many banking services to employees of certain institutions (for example, federal employees, or employees of a given school district or a university, or a hospital for example), but just what defines the “field of membership” for a given credit union? From the credit union's perspective, they are often happy to take on additional members, even those whose connection with the original group might be tangential at best (e.g., spouses and children of members, or people who formerly were connected with the institution, but who no longer are). As credit unions are non-profit, and offer low-cost services to members, banks see them as rivals and want to make sure that the “field of membership” issue is determined in a more restrictive manner. But many credit unions were merging and opening more branches in multiple communities, which also allowed them to offer more services such as credit cards and major loans, not just checking and savings accounts. Hence the dispute over the expansion of credit union services and membership emerged again in Congress in 1999. On the side stood the American Bankers Association with all of its money, wide contacts in every congressional district, a huge PAC, many lobbyists, and a reputation for getting things done. On the other side, however, stood the credit unions with their consumer-friendly, small-town image. “You have the traditional, small, mom-and-pop type

thing,” a lobbyist for the banking industry said with regret. “That’s the image that people associate with credit unions, like the Bailey Building and Loan in *It’s a Wonderful Life*.”

Besides their hometown popular image, credit unions have another asset money can’t buy: A regulatory agency that exists primarily to ensure the financial stability and viability of their industry. With the Federal Credit Union Administration and public opinion supporting them, credit unions often win their battles against the bankers, both concerning regulatory matters and actions before Congress, in spite of the power and wealth of the banking industry, their natural competitors. The only place bankers have ever gotten a toehold on this issue is in the courts, where rulings favorable to the bankers have served only to kick the issue back before Congress to fix the authorizing legislation. The bankers have long been frustrated by this situation and have tried their best to change it, but to little avail. One banking lobbyist described his organization’s attempts to raise the issue of what they see as the unfair competitive advantage that credit unions enjoy because of their tax-exempt status: “And so what occurred was that we realized that we could not win by going to the public. We decided to try decisionmakers. So what we focused on was newspaper editorial boards, but that didn’t work either, because no one wants to tax mom and pop.” The U.S. banking industry is one of the most powerful, well-connected, and politically savvy actors in national politics; they win many of the battles in which they engage. Why aren’t they able to win all the time? Why were they not able to beat out the credit unions in the issue we studied, limiting the field of membership of growing credit unions as they encroach on a market bankers believe should be rightfully theirs?

Much has been written about the impact of money in politics. In this paper we look carefully at the impact of material resources in achieving policy outcomes. In one sense, it is obvious that the wealthier the group, the more advantages. But policymaking is a continuous

process, with many issues already having been settled in previous rounds. Could the wealthy simply continually accumulate more wealth and policy advantage, winning more and more each time Congress considers their issue, continually expanding the distance between them and the also-rans? In this paper we show that there are many complications to the rich-get-richer story as it relates to the policy process.

Looking Beyond the Money

Popular accounts of the interest-group system often focus on the monetary resources that interest groups have: lobbying staffs, budgets, and campaign contributions. While there certainly is a lot of money in the system—interest groups spend about \$2 billion lobbying the federal government every year and about \$500 million every election cycle in campaign contributions³—the relationship between money and political outcomes is far from simple, largely because where large amounts of money come into play on one side, others often mobilize as well (though certainly not always). Scholars have struggled to document the impact of campaign contributions on policy decisions, but with mixed results. Donations from political action committees sometimes seem to have swayed legislators and equally as often seem to have had no effect. Since most of these studies have been based on one or a handful of issues at a time, and since vote outcomes must be either yes or no, the results could very well be attributable to random fluctuations rather than any systematic effects of donations.⁴ Further, the studies have been

³ Data on PAC contributions and lobbying expenditures provided by the Center for Responsive Politics, <http://www.crp.org/>.

⁴ **For a review of this literature, see Frank R. Baumgartner and Beth L. Leech, *Basic Interests: The Importance of Groups in Politics and in Political Science* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998). Scholars have been more successful in documenting links between PAC contributions and congressional access, activity in committee, and policy expertise, see, e.g., Laura I. Langbein, “Money and Access: Some Empirical Evidence, *The Journal of Politics* 48 (1986), 1052-1062, Richard L. Hall and Frank W. Wayman, “Buying Time: Moneyed Interests and the Mobilization of Bias in Congressional Committees,” *American Political Science Review* 84 (1990): 797–820; Kevin M. Esterling, **Buying Expertise: Campaign Contributions****

bedeviled by the problem that groups often contribute to members of Congress known already to agree with them or to those who have institutional gate-keeping positions related to the issues of interest to the group, so the money could be simply a wise insurance policy, an effort to keep access open and not to antagonize, or an attempt to keep friendly faces in Congress, not an issue-by-issue quid pro quo. After all, there are many issues in any given congressional election cycle, but groups can only contribute a certain amount. If a group wins some of its battles and loses others (as is typically the case), then how can we say that money was helpful or not, if the money typically cannot be connected to one or another of the specific issues? In any case, scholars have found no smoking gun, no systematic relationship between campaign contributions and policy success, a fact that might be surprising to readers of the press, where it seems that campaign contributions are equated with lobbying power across the board.⁵ While no one doubts that money matters, and while there is no question that the wealthy enjoy greater access to policymakers and political leaders than other groups in society, whether this means that they can necessarily write their ticket in Washington, getting the policies they want when they want them, is another question. One reason why it may not be so is that the policy process is so hard to control. Very few government officials have the authority unilaterally to produce the policy changes that lobbyists might desire. Engaging in a lobbying initiative is inherently uncertain.

While it may be true that scholars have not found a systematic link between campaign contributions and policy outcomes, PACs are far from the only sort of political resource an interest group may have at its disposal. There are other material resources, including the size of an organization's budget or the extent of a corporation's assets. There are differences in staff

and Attention to Policy Analysis in Congressional Committees, *American Political Science Review* 101 (2007): 93-109.

⁵ There have been, of course, some prominent issues of corruption, where members of Congress have been prosecuted precisely for this kind of quid pro quo relation between personal gifts or campaign contributions and official actions; outright bribery does sometimes occur.

size, number of lobbyists, and number of members. There are intangibles as well, such as public legitimacy and reputation. Any review of the impact of money in politics should review these factors as well, not just campaign contributions.

Material resources can sometimes be trumped by sheer numbers—organizations with many members may be heeded just as rapidly as organizations able to make large campaign contributions. Large numbers of members not only provide some democratic legitimacy to a cause—“look at how many people are represented by that organization; look at how many constituents agree with this argument”—but also can serve to put pressure on elected officials who are concerned about reelection. The number of members in a group, the degree to which public opinion supports a particular idea, and the number of other organizations that are willing to join a group in a given policy fight all are resources that can be of great help to an organization, even an organization that may not control large financial resources or have a large PAC.

Perhaps most important of all, however, is the degree of support an organization or its cause already enjoys among policymakers. In popular accounts these relationships are often attributed solely to linkages from campaign contributions, but these are far from the only tie that binds in Washington. There is also the simple fact of an organization and a policymaker sharing the same policy goal. Such allies are perhaps the most valuable resource in Washington. Policymakers and organized interests frequently work in tandem to advocate policy goals that they both share. Each can do things that the other cannot; officials within government can set agendas, meet with colleagues, and so on. Organized interests outside of government often have more staff time available, the ability to do research and publicize things, and the luxury of working on just one or a few issues at a time. Both insiders and outsiders share an interest in

getting others to pay attention to their cause, because without widespread interest within government in acting on a policy question, a bill will languish and die. Government officials are themselves central actors in these questions, not mere receptacles for interest group influence, as they are sometimes modeled in the interest-group literature. As a result, most lobbying consists of working with allied government officials rather than only trying to convince them to support some policy option. Virtually all of the applications of the other sorts of resources are made in an effort to increase an organization's supply of these allies.⁶

Groups often work in such close collaboration with friendly government officials that it is hard to see the relation except as one sees the relations between members of a team. The links that bind the team members may be geographical (as in the stereotypical case of legislators who represent, say, corn-growing areas who would naturally work to protect the interests of their constituents, often in concert with the relevant agricultural interest groups); professional (when a legislator's previous profession gives her a particular expertise in the issues relating to that profession); or they can be ideological, crossing professional and geographic lines. (Of course, they also can be partisan, but we can include that with the ideological for our purposes here.) We can get some sense of the importance of close working relations between outside advocates and sympathetic members of Congress from our interviews. The following quotes stem from the same case; one from an outside organization and the next from staff members in Congress. The links here are ideological rather than geographical or professional, and the team-like structure of the process is clear; each member of the team has specific roles based on what they can do better

⁶ See, for example, Raymond A. Bauer, Ithiel de Sola Pool, and Lewis A. Dexter, *American Business and Public Policy: The Politics of Foreign Trade* (New York: Atherton Press, 1963), as well as Frank R. Baumgartner and Beth L. Leech's "Lobbying Friends and Foes in Government" for a more recent look at the tendency to lobby friends rather than foes (in *Interest Group Politics*, 5th ed., Allan J. Cigler and Burdett A. Loomis, eds., pp. 217-33, Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1998). Richard L. Hall and Alan V. Deardorff also provide a useful way of thinking about the efforts of groups to mobilize activity on the part of like-minded legislators ("Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy," *American Political Science Review* 100(2006): 69-84).

than others. This particular example involves an organization with exceptional access (including to the White House), but the strategy of enlisting congressional supporters and legislative leaders (referred to as “whips”) is clear. We have deleted specific names and references to the particular issue:

We always begin [a legislative effort] by breaking members of Congress down in terms of their support for [our policy]. Prior to the effort to get [our policy], we had 223 solidly anti, 131 solid pro, and 81 mixed in the House. ... We give this information to the Whips—usually [Member of Congress A or B], because they need counts. We also want the vote count because the White House will want it. They want to know how much or how little support they can expect on the Hill. If the president is going to veto something, they’ll want to know if there are enough votes to sustain the veto. Then we contact the solidly pro, undecideds, and lean-tos to see where people are. Then we re-sort and then there are member-to-member conversations. [We get our key supporters and the whips to contact others in the House.] There’s lots of feedback about who needs what to be supportive. Then there is communication to members of Congress from our boss. We also have conversations not with staff but with members—sometimes staff don’t know where their member is on our issues. We talk to the members to say what we want from you is x.

Now, most interest groups certainly cannot walk into the office of a member of Congress and say: “What we want from you is x” (or if they do they may not get the response they hope). But this group is obviously working closely with allies and if they share the same goal and the group is asking the member to assist the larger coalition by targeting three specific colleagues and finding out what it might take to move their vote then the reception might be quite different. A lobbyist on another high-profile issue described his group’s close relations with his legislative allies this way: “Each member has a different take on the issue and we always tried to tailor our arguments. This is the type of information where [the member’s] whipping operation was so important: We traded information every day about who was leaning, which arguments to use with them, and the like.” Coalitions thus sometimes involve very close working relations among groups inside and outside of Congress, each playing a different role making best use of their staff, resources, and contacts.

Here is how the same process looks from inside the Congress, according to the lead staff person of Member A from the quote above: “[My boss] was a natural to take the lead, it’s right within her value system and she takes the lead on most [issues in this area].” Said a staff member from another legislative whip on the same issue: “A lot of people consider him *the* Republican in the House [on this issue]. He takes a lot of stands on issues related to [this topic], ... so he was viewed by a lot of outside groups as the person to go to on this.” The legislators here are clearly ideologically committed to the issue—it corresponds to their idea of good public policy. When there is the opportunity for a major legislative push, with substantial outside support, they are more than happy to play a leading role inside Congress.

This same staff member continues on the tactics and close working relationships they had with the outside organization. The outside group provided target lists and the member of Congress and his staff did much of the direct lobbying: “We worked with [the outside group] to develop a list of members that [my boss] met with and talked to and I specifically met with the staff and said your boss [supports this issue] and this would be a good issue for you.”

Another staff member, this one in the House Democratic leadership, described the whipping operation relating to another issue, Permanent Normal Trading Relations with China, a case we have also discussed in previous chapters. The members-only whip meetings might start with a presentation from an outside expert who would focus on one aspect of the issue:

So we’d have the presentation, we’d hand out assignments for members to talk to some of their colleagues and so they’d go out and talk to five or six of their colleagues and find out how they were going to vote on this, or what issues mattered to them so we could tailor strategy to a particular member. Say there was a member from New Jersey who was undecided who had a pretty big labor presence in their district but also had a tech presence as well and was really split on what to do but you kind of talk to them—“What kind of information do you need, what would be helpful to you?” “Well, the thing that would be helpful for me would be to talk to people from China about this,” and so knowing that, we tried to get Wei Jing Sheng in to see that member and give them help that way.

Lobbying sounds quite different than the popular conception when the target is a congressional staffer, the lobbyist is a staff member from a congressman of the same party and when the message is: Here is an issue that will make your boss look good. Groups with the resources, connections, and allies to make this kind of thing happen may well see different outcomes than groups without these connections. Coordinating with high-level allies inside government, especially a House or Senate party whipping organization, certainly helps. Is internal member-to-member lobbying really lobbying? Surprisingly, the literature is ambivalent on this point, but it certainly is advocacy, and in the advocacy process outsiders and insiders often work together.

Of course, where there are congressional allies there can be opponents as well. Here is how one staff member also quoted above describes this process:

The mastermind behind everything bad that happens to me on the Hill is the office of [Representative X] and we never talk to anyone there and they never talk to us. I don't even know who the staffer would be. But in every respect, even if you see another member in front of you, it's the hand of [Representative X]. He is a most sincere and tireless opponent. He's the one we most often see coming towards us. Sometimes we see [Representative Y] and sometimes we see [Representative Z] but most often it's [Representative X]. And I don't mean this in a derogatory way, he's the brains of the operation, he's the strategist...in terms of leading the charge and making strategy.

We don't want to make too much of examples drawn from one or two cases; there are other issues in our sample where we saw few such close ties between outside lobbyists and members of Congress. Still, the quotes we provide above give a sense of how close these working relations can be in certain issues (especially high-profile ones, as these were). They also suggest the possibility of counter-mobilization as well. If working with allies within government is an important determinant of what happens in Washington (and we believe that it often is), then one important question is who can get high-level government allies. Perhaps large

corporations can do this but citizens groups cannot. We will look at all these questions in the next sections, attempting to map out as completely as possible who controls what resources and how this affects a group's ability to gain the policy outcomes that it seeks.

Examining Group Resources

A common view of Washington lobbying is that money can buy almost anything, but relying primarily on newspaper stories or considering only the most prominent issues and most notorious examples leads to a skewed vision of the process; our random sample of issues allows us better to generalize beyond the Abramoffs and the scandals and the highly paid consultants to see systematically, across the board, how much money matters. Certainly high-profile cases and scandals are part of the picture, but they are not the whole picture. Newspapers write about man bites dog; we hope to tell the more quotidian version of the story. Day-in and day-out, what role do interest groups play in the advocacy process and to what extent is whatever influence they wield based on their financial resources?

As we analyze these resources, we compare efforts by organized interests and government officials not only as individual actors, but also as part of their policy perspective. After all, groups rarely lobby alone; they have friends to help them both inside and outside of government. Incorporating the collective nature of lobbying as we do allows us to evaluate whether certain groups systematically are able to take advantage of access to powerful government allies, for example. Our use of the concept of a perspective rather than only looking at groups individually also allows us to incorporate the actions of rivals. Strangely, this is relatively unusual in studies of lobbying. But lobbyists are certainly aware that they often face opposition, so it makes sense to include the competitive nature of lobbying in our analysis. We can ask: Which side wins? Was it the side with greater resources? Greater access to

government allies? Larger memberships? More Fortune-500 corporations? More large membership groups? In sum, we can lay out the distribution of material resources across each of our issues and then evaluate whether the individual organizations and the perspectives controlling more resources of various types are more successful in getting what they want. (Of course, getting what you want depends also on who is working against you; we look at the effects of the structure of conflict in other work related to our larger project .)

The data that we use to investigate the resources of organized interests and the resulting outcomes have been collected as part of a broad, collaborative research project on advocacy and public policymaking. The primary data being collected for the project comes from more than 300 interviews with Washington, DC-based policy advocates (e.g., representatives of organized interests, congressional staff, agency personnel) active on 98 randomly selected policy issues.

The issues included in the study were identified by a set of organizational advocates who we call *issue identifiers*. These issue identifiers were selected at random from the list of organized interests registered to lobby Congress, weighted by lobbying activity. During the interviews, the issue identifier was asked to select the most recent issue he or she had spent time on, and to describe what he or she had done and what the organization was trying to accomplish on the issue. Specifically:

Could you take the most recent issue you've been spending time on and describe what you're trying to accomplish on this issue and what type of action are you taking to make that happen? The issue we talk about doesn't have to be associated with a particular bill, rule, or regulation, and it doesn't have to be an issue that's been receiving coverage by the media—whatever issue you've most recently spent a significant amount of time on is fine so long as it involves the federal government.

The use of this question means that the issues included in the study need not be part of or prominent on the public agenda. This makes possible an observation of issues that may differ from those typically described in the literature since existing studies most often select issues based on prominent debates in Congress or in the media. Interviewees also were asked to narrate the appeals and arguments they make

when they speak with others about the issue, to specify with whom they are talking about the issue, to describe the type of opposition they face, and to provide a variety of other information about their organizations.

Subsequent interviews were conducted with the main actors representing each of the distinct perspectives on the identified issues. Although some issues (e.g., policies about funding for graduate medical education) involve as many as six additional interviews, most issues involve about three (the information in subsequent interviews quickly became repetitive).

As we analyze these resources, we compare efforts by organized interests and government officials as part of a perspective. We define a policy perspective as a group of actors attempting to achieve the same policy outcome. Note that these advocates may or may not be working together as part of a coalition. Typically, however, most of the members of a given perspective do indeed coordinate their efforts informally or through a formal coalition. Perspectives include anyone attempting to promote the same goal, whether those advocates are within or outside of government. So a perspective may include private corporate actors, lobbyists, trade groups, executive branch officials, members of Congress, or even the president himself. While members of a given perspective typically work together, there may be important advocates working to achieve the same goal, but with no coordination or even communication with the others. For us, then, a perspective is broader than a coalition. It includes anyone playing a significant role in the policy process who is actively attempting to achieve a given goal. Those distinct goals on an issue define the perspectives. Policy advocates who share a goal – who are seeking the same outcome on an issue – are part of a perspective. Across our 98 issues, we identified a total of 214 distinct perspectives, or just over two per case, on average. Table A.1 in the appendix lists these perspectives by issue.

Our measures of resources come from numerous sources, and include information on the following indicators: Lobbying expenditures; number of former government officials employed by the organization as lobbyists; campaign contributions; government allies; membership size; and two indices of overall financial resources (one for organizations and one for business corporations). Finally, we use two measures of outcomes, one assessing whether the group achieved what it wanted with respect to changing or maintaining the status quo and the other reflecting a broader range of goals that the group may have had. All these measures are more fully explained in the appendix.

The Distribution and Effects of Resources

Table 4.1 shows the distribution of the types of interest groups in our study. Groups included here are those we call “major participants” and they consist of all those identified in interviews or through searches of publicly available information as playing an active and important role in advocating one of the perspectives on the issue. There were more actors involved in our issues at large than the major participants, but our lists represent those who were especially active and visible to others.

(Insert Table 4.1 about here)

Of the 2,221 major players identified through this process as playing major advocacy roles in the various perspectives on our issues, more than half are interest groups of some type, including citizens groups, unions, religious organizations, corporations, associations of corporations, institutions, associations of institutions, and coalitions that are mixed sets of these previous types. The table shows a distribution in which organizations that can be categorized as citizens groups—including membership organizations like the Sierra Club or the National Rifle Association as well as non-membership organizations like Boys and Girls Town USA—are the

most frequently cited type of major participant in these policy debates.⁷ About 26 percent of the groups in our study were citizens groups or organizations representing an issue or cause without any direct connection to a business or profession. Trade associations, which represent groups of businesses from a particular industry, and business associations like the Chamber of Commerce, which represent groups of many different types of businesses, were next with 21 percent of the total mentions. Individual businesses lobbying on their own behalf made up 15 percent of the total; professional associations, which represent individuals in a particular profession (such as the American Medical Association or the American Political Science Association), were 11 percent of the total.

Formal coalitions specific to the issue at hand made up seven percent of the total. Although unions are one of the most often cited “special interest groups” in the popular press, here (as in virtually all previous studies of advocacy in Washington) they make up a relatively small part of the total interest-group community: just six percent. Think tanks and foundations similarly represented six percent of the total. Two other types of groups each represented less than three percent of the total: governmental associations such as the National Governors Association; and institutions such as hospitals and universities, combined with associations of such institutions. The catch-all “other” category includes churches, individual experts, international NGOs, and two advocates whose type could not be determined.

The most striking thing about this distribution is the predominance of citizens groups in these debates. The lobbying disclosure reports are weighted toward businesses; more than 40 percent of lobbying registrants are businesses, and those businesses tend to spend more and

⁷ Following Jeffrey Berry (*The New Liberalism: The Rising Power of Citizen Groups*, Washington, DC: Brookings, 1999), we define citizens groups as those organizations that lobby or advocate around issues not linked to occupational or business interests. These groups either have interested citizens as members or claim to act on behalf of these citizens’ interests.

lobby more than other types of organizations as well. Since our sample was weighted by activity, businesses were much more likely to appear as issue identifiers in our initial interviews than were citizens groups. As we conducted interviews and researched the issues named by the businesses and others, however, citizens groups were routinely named as central actors in many issues. Citizens groups are thus more important to policy debates than simple numbers would indicate. Kay Schlozman and John Tierney's 1986 study, which weighted its sample by how active the organizations were in Washington, painted a picture of the Washington advocacy community that showed 30 percent businesses, 26 percent trade associations, and 18 percent citizens groups.⁸ The 1996 federal lobbying disclosure reports, from which we drew our sampling frame for this study, showed that businesses make up more than 40 percent of the registrants, with trade associations second in number, and citizens groups a distant third, comprising only about 14 percent of the registrations. We were therefore far more likely to interview a lobbyist for a business or business organization in our initial issue-identification interviews than we were to interview a citizens group. And yet Table 4.1 shows that citizens groups were nearly twice as likely to be named in our interviews as major participants in these debates as individual businesses. Citizens groups may spend less on lobbying and lobby less frequently than business organizations, but when they do lobby they are more likely to be considered an important actor in the policy dispute; they are only 14 percent of the registrants in our sampling frame, but 26 percent of the important players in our sample of issues. Jeffrey Berry, in his book *The New Liberalism*, found a similar pattern. Citizens groups—in particular

⁸ Kay Lehman Schlozman and John T. Tierney, *Organized Interests and American Democracy* (New York: Harper and Row, 1986).

liberal citizens groups and the issues they promoted—were dominant actors in the congressional issues and media coverage he examined.⁹

These findings are good and bad news for citizens groups. On the one hand, they show that the groups are active, recognized by other players in Washington as playing a fundamental role in a great variety of our sample of issues. Further, they may indicate the degree to which other players in Washington take these groups seriously. They know they are under-funded and must therefore limit the number of issues in which they can be involved, so when they do get onboard and play an important role, other policy actors take that seriously. The groups often have great public legitimacy. Further, as journalists like to find a controversy in any story, or to tell the drama of the underdog who comes out on top, citizens groups may provide the divergent perspective on the issue that gives the issue some punch.

On the other hand, with fewer resources than those coming from the business community, citizens groups are often spread thin. Like labor unions, they are often requested to become involved in many more issues than they have the resources to cover deeply. And when they do get involved in, say, an issue relating to consumer credit practices by banks, or an environmental dispute relating coal-mining practices, or automobile emissions standards, they often find themselves in a David and Goliath position, with a few staff members on their side facing sometimes hundreds of industry lobbyists or researchers who work on nothing but that one particular issue year-in and year-out. So there is reason for citizens groups to be very discouraged and one might expect them to lose most of the time. But, as we will see, organizations rarely lobby alone. Citizens groups, like others, typically participate in policy debates alongside other actors of many types who share the same goals. For every citizens group opposing an action by a given industrial group, for example, there may also be an ally coming

⁹ Berry, *The New Liberalism*.

from a competing industry with which the group can ally. Further, ideological or public policy agreements can give citizens groups powerful allies within government, at least on some issues. Thinking of our lobbying perspectives as teams, it is clear that putting together a good team roster often involves recruiting some major citizens groups to come along. They play a much larger role than simple numbers would imply. Of course, different types of groups have vastly different levels of financial, material, staff, and membership resources. We look at this question next.

Resources by Group Type

When we compare the level of resources that different types of organizations enjoy, we confirm the results of virtually every previous survey of U.S. interest groups by noting that occupational interests, especially businesses and trade associations, are the wealthiest in terms of material resources and lobbying staff. Table 4.2 compares citizens groups, unions, trade associations, professional associations and businesses to assess how commonly, on average, they register to lobby or hire a lobbyist, how many of them have a lobbyist who was recently a decision-making government official, and how much they spend on lobbying and campaign contributions.

(Insert Table 4.2 about here)

Under the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, organizations that spend at least \$20,000 on lobbying during any six-month period must register with the House and Senate as a lobbying organization.¹⁰ In this biannual lobbying report, organizations must disclose the amount they spent on lobbying (including salaries paid to employees who regularly contacted government officials), the issue areas in which they lobbied, and lists of specific bills and regulations on which they lobbied. Grassroots lobbying—the contacting of citizens and asking them to contact

¹⁰ The amount was adjusted first in 1997 and then every four years afterward to keep up with inflation. As of 2005, organizations that spent at least \$24,500 in a six-month period were required to register; those who spent less were not.

their members of Congress—is not included under the definition of lobbying, nor is testifying at public hearings or providing information under formal procedures such as filing a comment with an agency during Notice and Comment. Table 4.2 shows that unions were most likely to have filed a lobbying report; 89 percent of them did so, compared to only 61 percent of citizens groups. (Note that our list of groups is limited only to those identified by other policy actors as having played a major role in one of our 98 issues, so there is reason to expect these numbers to be uniformly close to 100 percent. However, clearly some groups, especially citizens groups, avoid engaging in what the Lobby Disclosure Act defines as lobbying.)

The Lobbying Disclosure Act also requires each organization to list the names of all of the employees who acted as lobbyists on behalf of the organization, and to indicate whether any of these lobbyists previously had jobs as members of Congress, congressional staff members, or high-level agency officials during the past two years. These so-called “covered officials” are people who themselves likely were lobbied just a short time ago. We created a count of these covered officials to track the effects of the revolving door that often connects government jobs to lobbying jobs. These revolving door benefits are another resource in which businesses are especially well endowed. Table 4.2 shows that the average business in our sample has one recent former covered official working on its behalf. This former official may be on staff in the corporation’s Washington office, but more likely he or she has been hired by one of Washington’s many lobbying firms, and that lobbying firm in turn has been employed by the corporation. The frequency with which corporations employ outside lobbying firms also leads to an increased frequency for those corporations to have friends in high places. Unions are the least likely to have such hired friends. Businesses, on average, employ six times more covered officials than labor unions do and four times more than citizens groups.

The general imbalance in resources in favor of business is clear when we look at lobbying expenditures: Corporations, trade, and professional associations all average about \$1 million in lobbying expenditures, whereas labor unions report about half that number, and citizens groups less than one-fifth the amount.

We have very precise figures for campaign contributions, since the Federal Election Commission provides full figures; the figures shown here represent the mean of all of the campaign contributions and all of the soft money contributions to parties that each type of organization gave during two successive two-year election cycles just before and during our study. In the electoral arena, unions far outspend all other types of actors, but there are many fewer unions active in Washington than there are businesses. While unions on average have donation totals that are quite large, the sum of all of those totals does not approach the sum totals of all of the business PACs because there are so many more businesses. Citizens groups donate much less than the occupationally based groups. One reason for this—beyond a simple lack of resources—is that many of them have 501(c)(3) tax status. Such tax status allows gifts to the organization to be deducted by the donor as a charitable donation, but such tax status also prohibits an organization from becoming directly involved in elections or promoting a specific candidate for office. Many nonprofit groups shy away from politics altogether for fear of running afoul of the IRS.¹¹

In all, we can see that groups of different types show distinctly different patterns of control over the most important material resources. Taken as a group, corporations, trade, and professional associations are very well endowed compared to others. Labor unions have substantial resources of certain kinds, and they play a major role in electoral politics as reflected

¹¹ See Jeffrey M. Berry and David F. Arons, *A voice for nonprofits* (Washington, D.C. : Brookings Institution Press, 2003).

in their large average campaign contributions. Citizen groups are active on a great many issues (see Table 4.1) but support this work with fewer resources overall.

We have seen so far that groups of different types control substantially different levels of material resources. How does this affect their ability to get what they want? We begin looking at this question in Table 4.3, which looks at the ability of groups of each type to work with government allies.

(Insert Table 4.3 about here)

The table shows that while citizens groups on average have higher levels of low-level allies (rank-and-file members of Congress and bureau-level agency officials), the tables are turned when it comes to high-level allies (including party leadership and White House officials).

Businesses are more likely to have a friend in a high place than other types of groups. The table makes clear that unions and citizens groups are quite successful in working with the rank and file, but rarely get to take advantage of the highest level of government support. Businesses enjoy much greater access and cooperation at this level, more than twice the level of the citizens groups.

Resources and Policy Success

The tendency of resources to pool so much with occupational groups and business groups is potentially troubling in terms of representation, but less so if those resources do not increase those groups' chances of political success. A first cut at this question is simply to see whether groups with more resources are more likely to win their policy disputes. To measure success in these policy debates, we rely on two different measures of success, and consider them at two different points in time. The first measure assesses whether the policy actor in question got all of what it wanted, part of what it wanted, or none of what it wanted as this relates to changing the status quo policy. An organization that was trying to prevent any changes to existing law would

be coded as getting all of what it wanted if there were no changes in the law. This variable is coded both for the end of the initial Congress in which we conducted our interviews, and then again after the next two-year Congress immediately following our interviews. The second measure asks essentially the same question—did the actor in question get all, some, or none of what it sought—but weights this consideration in terms of how extensive a change was sought. The measure is an additive index of a series of questions about possible changes to: 1) the federal budget; 2) state and local budgets; 3) costs assessed to private actors; 4) existing law or policies; 5) the creation of new law or policies; or 6) the scope of government authority. The more of these types of goals an actor sought and managed to achieve, the greater the actor's score on this index of policy success. This measure also is assessed at the end of the Congress in which we conducted our interviews, and then again after the following Congress, two years later. Table 4.4 shows the correlation between these different outcome measures and the level of resources an interest group enjoys.

(Insert Table 4.4 about here)

The table shows the simple bivariate correlation between the various resources listed in the column headings with the four different measures of policy success. In the first row, we look at whether the group achieved what it wanted with respect to changing the status quo, and we look only at the period of the initial Congress when our interviews were conducted. At the end of that period, the status quo was either changed or not, so each group can be scored for whether it was pleased or displeased with this outcome. The correlations with various resource measures range from $-.09$ to $+.08$. None is substantially very far from zero and, although three of the coefficients in that row are statistically significant, one of those is negative. The other rows present the results for a broader range of outcomes (see the Appendix for a full description), and

we show the results both for the initial round of policymaking (e.g., in the two-year Congress when we initially did our interviews) and in the subsequent period after that as well.

For the most part, resources have no significant correlation with a positive policy outcome. The exception to the general pattern is the case of business assets, at least for the outcome measures that make the most general assessment of whether the advocate got what it was seeking. Businesses with high levels of resources are slightly more likely to achieve their preferred policy position. Of course, there are only 185 businesses in the sample. Is the finding that business assets matter really just a reflection of a preferred position of business? The final column of Table 4.4 provides a partial answer. Looking simply at whether the advocate was a business or not a business (that is, no matter what its level of assets), we consider the correlation with outcomes. Indeed, businesses as a group—regardless of their level of assets—were slightly more likely to achieve their policy goals than other types of interest groups, and the correlations here are roughly the same in magnitude as that which reflects the assets controlled by the business. This implies that businesses as a group gain in the process, not only the wealthiest corporations. It is important to note, however, that these correlation coefficients are quite low. The advantage they indicate may be statistically significant, but substantively their impact is small.

Just as we find a slight relation between business status and gaining one's preferred outcomes, we find a slight *negative* relationship between membership size and outcomes. This implies that organizations with larger memberships were actually slightly *less* likely to get what they wanted in the issues we studied. In both cases, even where the correlations we observe are statistically significant, they are substantively so small that it is best to think of Table 4.4 as a wash. In all, this review of the bivariate relations between financial assets and lobbying success

suggests that the relationships are systematically close to zero, almost across the board. No matter which measure of resources we use and across four different measures of policy success, we find very low correlations. Some of these reach levels of statistical significance, but none reaches even the level of 0.10 correlation. We find virtually no linkage between money and outcomes.

Strange Bedfellows and the Creation of Lobbying Perspectives

Considering the characteristics and resources of individual advocates and their correlations with outcomes is a first step, but advocates do not work alone in policy debates. The resources of an individual organization are much less important than the aggregated resources of the perspective of which they are a part; after all, all members of the perspective will get the same outcome, by definition, and few groups work alone in Washington. In fact, we find that the perspectives we identified in our 98 issues were often quite diverse. Large corporations sometimes worked with representatives of ethnic minorities. Huge pharmaceutical companies sought out patients' rights groups or others who have a more favorable public image. Citizens groups often were part of coalitions with more financially wealthy organizations of different types.

It has often been noted that politics makes strange bedfellows. The financial arrangements of such partnerships and the implications for studies of who wins in Washington are less often discussed. Interest groups that would not normally work together may come together because each holds a resource that the other lacks. As mentioned above, constructing a successful team implies recruiting players who have complementary, not duplicative, skills. The monetary and staff resources of large corporations paired with the membership and representational legitimacy of citizens groups and charities can be a powerful combination. In the case of the 3 percent excise tax, dozens of citizens groups were recruited to join the coalition formed by the telecommunication companies and trade associations: "It was a very important

decision at the beginning of this whole process, that for it to be successful you have to put a human face on this,” a member of the excise tax coalition told us. “And it can’t be transparently thin that this is just for your own self interest. This is for consumers.” That is, according to this advocate, the creation of a broad and diverse coalition cannot be simple window-dressing with a few “consumer” groups bought and paid for by powerful industrial lobbyists. Reputable consumer would not lend their names to such efforts, and policymakers would see through it. Many of the issues that we studied really did mobilize diverse and sometimes surprising mixtures of consumer, business, and professional groups on various sides of the issue. Government officials were also involved in different elements of the same debates.

To continue with the excise tax example, the telecommunication companies that spearheaded the push to abolish the tax (and paid for it in its entirety) asked a series of citizen and consumer organizations to sign on with their coalition, add their names to the letters being sent to members of Congress, and to show up at the press conferences. The organizations included consumer groups and several representing Mexican-Americans—because Mexican-Americans say they have among the highest long-distance bills of any demographic and are disproportionately affected by the tax. Those organizations that were recruited and agreed to participate were not simply dupes; they also agreed that it was a good idea to eliminate the tax and that doing so would help their constituents. The citizens groups brought a public face to the issue that the phone companies could never rival. On the other hand, the phone companies had the money. It was a good combination, a strong team.

Even groups that often find themselves on opposite sides of the debate in their area can sometimes find common ground on particular issues; when this happens members of Congress often take note. In the annual allocation for the AIDS Drug Assistance Program (ADAP),

pharmaceutical companies and AIDS activist organizations joined forces to convince Congress to provide funds for drugs for those who don't have adequate insurance (or any insurance at all). In terms of public policy, the AIDS groups and the pharmaceutical companies are usually on opposite sides of the fence, with the activists campaigning for lower drug prices and the pharmaceutical companies hoping for longer patents and limited government regulation. Here, however, there was a shared goal, and the two sides overcame their differences to cooperate on the issue. The pharmaceutical companies each contributed \$5,000 for coalition lobbying expenses; the activist groups each contributed \$500, and the case was made to the Appropriations committees. Even the powerful combination of money, members, and a lack of explicit opposition does not automatically equal success, however. In the case of the AIDS funding, the efforts to gain additional funding were ultimately successful, while the efforts to end the excise tax were not.

In this section we look at whether those perspectives that put together the greatest *combined* resources achieve their policy goals. We've already seen that with the exception of business resources, a bivariate correlation shows only the slightest linkage between an individual organization's resource levels and whether that organization will be successful. Table 4.5 shows the correlation between resources and getting one's preferred outcome.

(Insert Table 4.5 about here)

As in Table 4.4, the numbers in Table 4.5 represent the correlation between the resource listed in the column heading with the measure of policy success listed in the row. None of the measures of financial resources or membership is statistically significant. Only one type of resource has a statistically significant relationship with outcomes at the perspective level: The number of mid-level allies who are a part of a perspective. These allies seem to matter, but

levels of all other types of resources tend to cancel each other out across the perspectives. The ability to recruit or work together with either low-level (rank-and-file) government officials or government allies at the highest levels of the political system shows no systematic correlation with policy success. The most fundamental result of our initial review of the linkages between money and power is that there is not much to talk about; the links, to the extent we see any in this bivariate analysis, simply are not there. Or whatever ones do appear are extremely weak.

Those simple correlational analyses are interesting in part because they demonstrate what political scientists and Washington insiders know, but the stories of scandal sometimes make us forget: The relationship between money and power is not simple, and the richest perspective does not always win. We need to delve deeper, however, to answer our broader question about money and political outcomes, in part because the structure of policy conflict is so complex. For one thing, on some types of issues—health care, for example—there typically are multiple perspectives that all enjoy fairly high levels of resources. Other issues, such as questions of social justice, might have fewer perspectives and all of them might have limited funds. The proper method of analysis, therefore, is to compare the perspectives within each issue, to see whether perspectives with more resources were more likely to succeed with their policy goals compared to perspectives with fewer *on the same issue*. To do this, we took each perspective and compared its levels of resources to the other perspectives on the same issue. Table 4.6 shows the percentage of cases where the perspective with the greatest amount of resources got what it wanted in terms of changes to the status quo.¹²

¹² The number of cases in the table is lower than our 98 issues because 17 of our cases had no active conflict, eight resulted in the same outcome for all perspectives (either they all agreed, no one got what they wanted, or all got part of what they wanted), and eight cases involved one perspective made up of organized interests and a second perspective made up of government officials (which means that we can't directly compare the resources controlled). The number of cases in each row differs because we delete those cases where no perspective on the issue controlled any of the resource in question.

(Insert Table 4.6 about here)

Table 4.6 presents the simplest way of thinking about the question of resources and success. Comparing the sets of actors active on the same issue, we just ask whether the perspective with the most resources won. (As resources can be measured in several different ways, we look at each one separately in each of the rows). The results are striking in that the table shows that none of these relationships is statistically significant. The percentage of times the wealthy side won ranges from 45 to 56, which means that the weaker side won with about the same probability as the stronger side. That is, at the issue level, there seems to be no relationship between the level of resources a perspective enjoys and whether it obtains its preferred outcomes. It is clear from glancing at the percentages in Table 4.6 that the rich sometimes win and they sometimes lose. Things are 50/50. If we were to believe that money buys influence, then the numbers there should be more like 80/20, or at least 60/40, which we simply do not observe.

One reason why resources may not translate directly into outcomes is that lobbying is so competitive. For example, earlier in the paper we quoted from our interviews in two high-profile cases where outside lobbyists worked closely with members of Congress, including in one case where the entire Democratic House whipping organization was fully engaged in the issue. Surely, one might think, with these kinds of high-level allies, lobbyists could get what they want. But in fact they did not in that case. The reason? The other side had the White House, three former Presidents, large numbers of business interests, and the Republican Party caucus in both the House and the Senate. Both sides benefited from high-level allies, close connections with important government officials who shared their views. If the issue had not gained so much high-level attention, then *neither side* may have been able to get so much time on the calendar of

such high-level government officials. But once the issue engaged, and it was clear that there would be a major fight, each side mobilized their natural allies within and outside of government. The competitive nature of lobbying, and the ability of groups to expand the conflict when they see that their rivals are successfully mobilizing, may be one of the most important sources of structure in the process. It provides one of the best explanations of the power of the status quo (since people may mobilize to defend it only in those cases where challenges to it pass some threshold of likely success) and of the lack of clear relations between material resources and policy success. The number of resources devoted to a battle depends on the battle: Is there a chance of success? Is the other side broadly mobilized? Answers to these two questions help explain the mobilization of resources in Washington. Resources are therefore endogenous to the policy dispute; that is the decision to devote resources to an issue, or to get involved in it in the first place, to make it a priority, depend on the likelihood of success and the actions of rivals.

A second reason for the surprisingly low correlations between resources and outcomes is the heterogeneity of the perspectives active on our sample of issues. As we mentioned above, if the wealthy allied only with the wealthy, it might be statistically possible to observe a correlation between wealth and policy success. (Whether the wealthy-only coalition would win, or whether it might generate a counter-mobilization from other actors is a different question.) Where the wealthy often ally with the weak, however, and where all the members of a given perspective achieve the same outcome, then it is logically impossible to observe a strong correlation between wealth and success. So a key question, and a key missing link in previous studies of lobbying success, is the relative homo- v. hetero-geneity of lobbying perspectives. A simple way to look at this is to compare the resources of each interest group in our study with the aggregated resources of all of their allies. That is, if a group is a member of a perspective with 20 members,

we can correlate the control of material resources for each individual member with those of the 19 others. If the wealthy allied with the wealthy and the poor with the poor, we would find high correlations in this way.

We have identified 13 distinct measures of material resources that an organization or a corporation might control. For corporations we know their total annual sales, annual income, and number of employees; for organizations, their membership size, annual budget, number of staff, total organizational assets, and total annual income; for both organizations and corporations we also know the size of their PAC contributions, the total amount spent on lobbying, and the number of recent former covered officials lobbying on behalf of the organization. As described above, we also calculate an overall index of material resources, separately for corporations and for organizations. (More detail on all these measures is available in the appendix.) In sum, we have identified 13 different measures of material resources, so this allows us to compare each individual's control of these resources with the same resources as controlled by their lobbying allies. If the rich lobby in concert with the rich, then these correlations should all be quite high. Table 4.7 shows the results.

(Insert Table 4.7 about here)

Correlations range from .054 to .302. Most of the correlations are statistically significant, and all are positive. So there is some tendency for the wealthy to work with the wealthy and the poor with the poor. However, as statistical correlations go, these numbers indicate that there is great heterogeneity in the lobbying coalitions we have identified. A correlation on the order of .2 implies that about 96 percent of the variability in lobbying resources controlled by allied is *unaccounted* for by the resources controlled by an individual group. Even our highest correlations, those associated with our index of corporate resources, is only .302. Given the low

correlations among the resources controlled by the lobbyists who work together, and given the fact that all of them will achieve the same level of success in gaining what they want out of the policy process (since they are part of the same lobbying perspective), it is logically and statistically impossible to observe a high relation between resources and outcomes.

All in all, we have shown surprising results in this chapter. Little established work would have led us to expect that money does not matter in Washington, and even now we would not say that it does not matter. But it certainly seems clear that money alone does not buy policy outcomes. The reasons for this are complex but we believe they fundamentally have to do with the structure of political conflict. The construction of lobbying perspectives does not bring together only similar organizations; groups work with a diverse collection of allies. Similarly, as lobbying is a competitive process, the mobilization of one side can lead to the counter-mobilization of rivals. It remains to be seen whether the tendencies we see here will hold true as we add political factors into the mix: Was the perspective arguing to change something, or to keep the status quo? Changing something is always more difficult than working to prevent change. Also, how did partisanship factor in? Our study provides a chance to observe how policies can change as administrations shift from Democrats to Republicans. As these contextual variables are added into consideration, they may serve to intensify the effects of resources on outcomes or to erase them entirely.

Why Resources Matter but Appear Not To

This paper has shown some surprisingly low correlations between resources and policy outcomes. In fact, across a range of issues, we are hard pressed to find much of a relationship between wealth and outcomes. These findings do not suggest that it is better in politics to be poor than rich; a large membership, an ample staff, sufficient budget to organize large events,

and established linkages with policymakers that come from multiple contacts are the fundamentals of effective lobbying day-in and day-out. Rather, the findings in this chapter may suggest that the impact of resources alone, without considering the issues on which groups are working, who else is active on those issues, and the construction of like-minded coalitions on the issue, is limited. This is not because resources are unimportant in politics, but rather because these other factors are so fundamental to the very structure and organization of politics. Of all the findings here, it is perhaps the heterogeneity of perspectives that is the most striking. If the well endowed worked only with similar groups, they might win. But if a perspective were to consist only of such organizations it might well raise the eyebrows of others monitoring politics, or the concerns of equally wealthy groups from a rival industry, so it is not certain even when the wealthy get together that they would prevail. But in fact, our analysis of the composition of over 250 perspectives across all 98 issues suggests that these tend to have substantial diversity of membership. This political imperative must inevitably dilute any impact of resources on outcomes, since all the members of a given perspective benefit or suffer from the identical outcome at the end of the day.

Mark Smith (2000) conducted an intensive study of the policy impact of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, one of the most powerful business organizations in American politics. He came to the surprising conclusion that the Chamber was largely unable to get what it wanted. The reason, Smith demonstrated, was the selection of issues on which the Chamber lobbied extensively. With its diverse membership including large and small businesses and those involved in a great number of different industries, the issues on which the Chamber could take a strong position without alienating large percentage of its own members were truly “business-wide” questions such as those related to health-care costs, labor issues, workplace safety, or

others where one might expect a united business perspective. But any issue that unites and allows the mobilization of the entire U.S. business community likely also unites and mobilizes rival groups such as consumers, environmentalists, and labor officials, and it probably also has high ideological and partisan overtones. In sum, these are big, high-profile, issues. When political disputes erupt on such broadly mobilizing issues, of course, having more resources is better than having fewer. But even the substantial lobbying resources of a group like the U.S. Chamber of Commerce (which spent \$31 million on lobbying in 2006) cannot guarantee results if the issue mobilizes dozens or hundreds of other equally well endowed organizations each with their own powerful political backers. So the links between money and power depend strongly on the nature of the issue and the competitive nature of the lobbying process.

Another reason for the apparent lack of impact of resources is that policy disputes almost always revolve around what we call a “continuing issue”—that is, issues are not created out of whole cloth, with no history. Rather, there is a long history and usually an established federal program which itself reflects the results of lobbying in previous years and decades. Changing policy from the status quo involves justifying a *shift* in the allocation of resources, moving it from a status quo position to a new position. But the status quo position was already the object of the mobilization of interest groups, members of the public, and political leaders in previous years. So to see that money cannot automatically purchase shifts in the status quo does not mean that the status quo might not already reflect important biases in politics.

Finally, it is important to note that many issues never get raised in the first place. Or, similarly, one of the most important questions for a lobbyist is whether they can count on their allies in government to make “their” issue the number-one priority, really to push it. Of course, the prioritization of issues and the allocation of time and attention across all the issues that could

potentially merit attention is a difficult issue. Government leaders and interest groups have to allocate their attention partly based on their own preferences, but partly based on what others are doing around them. Still, let us close with a quote from one of our interviews where the interest group official we interviewed was essentially complaining about the lack of commitment from one of his own closest allies, and the lobbyist attributed this set of misplaced priorities to fund-raising concerns:

In the end he did vote against the bill [that is, in accord with the lobbyist's wishes], but he did not twist arms. Why not? I can't say exactly, but let me say that he is just so focused on [national electoral concerns] that he wants some business support, especially in the high-tech industries. So this was sacrificed for his bigger agenda. And if you think money doesn't matter in politics and lobbying, here is an example where it does. His desire to raise lots of money from the business, and the high-tech community in particular, made him unwilling to lead this fight.

Money matters in politics, there is no question. But other things matter as well and the direct correlation between money and outcomes that so many political scientists have sought simply is not there. The reason for this is that lobbying perspectives are heterogeneous, that groups mobilize on the basis of what they see their rivals doing, and because different issues show different constellations of conflict. Many issues where the most impressive resources are devoted on one side also see substantial resources invested on the other side.

Table 4.1. Major Interest Group Participants.

Group type	Number	Percent
Citizens groups	329	26
Trade and business associations	271	21
Business corporations	185	15
Professional associations	144	11
Coalitions specific to the issue	91	7
Unions	74	6
Foundations and think tanks	74	6
Governmental associations	41	3
Institutions and associations of institutions	24	2
Other	31	2
Total	1,264	100

Note: The table excludes 957 government officials who were also major participants in our sample of issues; see Table A-1 for the complete list of 2,221 participants by type.

Table 4.2. Average Resources by Group Type.

Group type	Percent registered to lobby	Percent with hired lobbyist	Average number of covered officials	Average spending on lobbying	Average PAC spending	N
Business corporations	70	77	.94	\$1,040,105	\$946,160	185
Trade associations	73	69	.53	\$1,191,986	\$386,437	271
Professional associations	66	44	.18	\$955,035	\$886,676	144
Unions	89	46	.15	\$490,987	\$4,406,355	74
Citizens groups	61	25	.24	\$177,274	\$187,354	329
All others	20	28	.10	\$137,111	\$112,510	261
Total	59	46	.36	\$619,790	\$651,885	1,264

Cell entries are means for the listed type of organization.

Table 4.3. Average Number of Governmental Allies by Group Type.

Group type	Number of Government Allies:			N
	Low-level	Mid-level	High-level	
Business corporations	2.37	2.66	0.72	185
Professional associations	3.06	3.64	0.54	144
Trade and business associations	2.25	2.82	0.52	271
Unions	3.20	2.32	0.47	74
Citizens groups	3.20	2.30	0.33	329
All others	2.84	2.70	0.38	216
Total	2.79	2.70	0.47	1,264

Cell entries reflect the mean number of governmental allies who shared a perspective with an organization. Low-level allies are rank-and-file Members of Congress or agency officials; mid-level allies include committee and subcommittee leaders (chairs and ranking minority members and their staffs) and department-level political appointees and cabinet officials; high-level allies include congressional party leadership and the White House.

Table 4.4. Money and Power: The Correlation between Advocate Resources and Outcomes.

Correlation of resources with outcomes	PAC \$	Lobby spending	Covered officials	Ass'n Assets	Members	Biz Assets	Biz?
Initial status quo win	-.03	-.02	.03	-.05	-.09*	.07*	.08*
Initial outcomes index	-.04	-.03	.05	-.02	-.05	.06	.06
Status quo win in subsequent Congress	.01	.01	.06*	-.01	-.08*	.07*	.07*
Outcomes index in subsequent congress	-.01	-.01	.03	-.01	-.04	.05	.05

N=1,242 * = p< .05. Cells entries are Spearman's rho coefficients.

Table 4.5. Money and Power II: The Correlation between Perspective Resources and Outcomes.

Correlation of resources with outcomes	PAC \$	Lobby \$	Covered officials	Members	Ass'n Assets	Biz Assets	Low- level allies	Mid- level allies	High- level allies
Initial status quo win	.05	.04	.07	.07	.10	.07	-.13	.14	.11
Initial outcomes index	.05	.03	.13	.06	.11	.08	-.08	.12	.06
Status quo win in subsequent Congress	.08	.07	.11	.01	.10	.09	-.08	.17*	.12
Outcomes index in subsequent Congress	.07	.06	.06	.04	.10	.10	-.05	.16*	.04

N=191 * = p< .05. Cells reflect Spearman's rho correlation coefficients.

Table 4.6. Issue Outcomes: The Rich Do Not Always Prevail.

Type of Resource	Percent of issues where the perspective with greater control of this resource gained its preferred outcome	Number of issues
Mid-level government ally	56% ns	55
# of covered officials lobbying	55% ns	40
Association financial resources	55% ns	64
Membership	53% ns	64
Lobbying expenditures	52% ns	64
Business financial resources	48% ns	37
Campaign contributions	47% ns	64
High-level government ally	45% ns	31

ns = not statistically significant

Cell entries are the percent of issues in which perspective with the greatest amount of that type of resource achieved its policy goals. N varies because not every issue had multiple perspectives and in some issues, none of the perspectives used that type of resource. Cases are included in the table if *at least one* perspective controlled the resource. For example, there were 31 issues in which at least one of the perspectives had high-level government allies, and the perspective that had more of them got the outcome it wanted 45 percent of the time. Issues where no side had any high-level government allies are missing.

Table 4.7. Correlations Among Individual Resources and Those of Allies

Type of Resource	Correlation between Individual and Allied Resources
Annual Sales+	.258**
Annual Income+	.239**
Number of Employees+	.230**
Lobbying expenditures+^	.159**
Number of former covered officials+^	.127**
PAC Contributions+^	.221**
Membership Size^	.054
Organizational Assets^	.109**
Organizational Income^	.125**
Annual Budget^	.223**
Total Staff Size^	.216**
Index of Organizational Resources^	.144**
Index of Corporate Resources+	.302**

*** $p < .01$; + measure available for corporations; ^ measure available for organizations. N = 1,258 for all correlations.

Note: The table shows the correlation among each of 12 separate indicators of material resources controlled by each individual organization or corporation with the aggregated resources of the same time controlled by all other organizations in the same perspective.

Appendix Table A1. Variables and Indices

Lobbying expenditures	Total lobbying expenditures during the last six-month period of the congressional session in which the issue was raised. Data come from federal lobbying disclosure reports.
Covered officials	Total number of officials lobbying on behalf of the organization who in the prior two years held a “covered position” as a policymaking official in the federal government. Covered positions are positions that are named (“covered”) in the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995. It includes all congressional staff members, all elected officials, and management-level executive-branch officials. Data come from federal lobbying disclosure reports.
Campaign contributions	Total campaign contributions to Republicans and Democrats, including soft money contributions to parties, during the election cycle prior to and the election cycle concurrent with the policy issue in question.
Low-level allies	Rank-and-file members of Congress and bureau-level executive branch personnel who are actively working to further a particular policy perspective. These are not simply officials who agree with the perspective or who might vote in favor of a policy advocated by the perspective, but officials who are prominent advocates of the perspective in their own right.
Mid-level allies	Committee and subcommittee leadership within Congress and executive branch officials at the agency or department level who are actively working to further a particular policy perspective. These are not simply officials who agree with the perspective or who might vote in favor of a policy advocated by the perspective, but officials who are prominent advocates of the perspective in their own right.
High-level allies	Congressional party leadership and White House officials who are actively working to further a particular policy perspective. These are not simply officials who agree with the perspective or who might vote in favor of a policy advocated by the perspective, but officials who are prominent advocates of the perspective in their own right.
Membership	Total membership size as listed by Associations Unlimited. Missing values in these data were imputed using Amelia II software by James Honaker, Gary King, and Matthew Blackwell.

Organizational resources	A measure of overall financial resources of associations (including citizen groups, professional and trade associations, unions and others). This index includes the organization's annual budget and staff size, coded from Associations Unlimited, and the organization's assets and annual income, coded from IRS documents. Cronbach's alpha for the index was .913. It has been standardized to vary between 0-1.
Business resources	An index of overall business resources, based on annual net income (in millions), annual sales, and overall employees. Data comes from Fortune 500 company profiles for large companies and Dun and Bradstreet's Million Dollar Database for small companies. Missing values in these data were imputed using Amelia II. Because of the highly skewed nature of the sales and employees variables, the index was created using the square root of those variables. Cronbach's alpha for this index was .82. It has been standardized to vary between 0-1.
Initial status quo outcome	Measures whether the perspective got what it wanted in terms of changes to the status quo before the end of the congressional session in which we began studying the issue (i.e., the date of our first interview on the topic). Status quo is defined as the policy that existed at the time of the initial interviews on the topic. Coded as "2" if the perspective got the outcome it preferred (either the policy changed as it wanted or it didn't change (if that's what the perspective wanted)). Coded as "1" if the perspective got part of what it wanted, and 0 if the perspective did not succeed in achieving its policy goal.
Initial outcomes index	This index takes six measures of outcomes, all coded as the status quo variable described above, and combines them to provide a measure that assesses whether the perspective got what it wanted in terms of the federal budget, state and local budget, changes to existing programs, creation of new programs, effects on private actors, and changes in government authority or jurisdiction. It varies between 0 and 12.
Status quo outcome in subsequent Congress	Coded in the same way as the initial status quo win, except that this variable tracks outcomes for the congressional session subsequent to our initial interviews.
Outcomes index in subsequent Congress	Coded in the same way as the initial outcomes index, except that this index tracks outcomes for the congressional session subsequent to our initial interviews.

Table A.2: Issues and Perspectives

1. Managed Care Reform

- 1 Proponents of a Patient's Bill of Rights
- 2 Opponents of a Patient's Bill of Rights that contains employer mandates

2. Patent Extension

- 1 Proponents of granting patent extension to pipeline drugs
- 2 Opponents of granting patent extension to pipeline drugs

3. Infant Hearing Screening

- 1 Proponents for funding hearing screenings

4. Risk Adjuster

- 1 Decision maker who supports the imposition of a risk adjuster to limit overpayments (opposed to 3, 4)
- 3 Oppose the imposition of a risk adjuster as currently envisioned by HCFA (opposed to 1, 5)
- 4 Oppose the imposition of a risk adjuster but believe there are bigger Medicare & Choice problems to address (opposed to 1, 5)
- 5 Support the idea of a risk adjuster but believe there are bigger Medicare & Choice problems to address (opposed to 3, 4)

5. PAP Screening

- 1 Proponents for increased Medicare payments for PAP screenings
- 2 Opposed to changing status quo

6. Parity for Coverage of Mental Illness

- 1 Proponents of coverage parity for the treatment of mental illness under Medicare (and generally)

7. Clinical Social Workers

- 1 Proponents of excluding CSW's from the bundled payment rules

8. Appropriations for AIDS Drug Assistance Program

- 1 Proponents of funding ADAP at the level of ADAP Working Group estimate
- 2 Proponents of funding ADAP but not necessarily at the level of ADAP Working Group estimate

10. Providing Health Insurance for the Uninsured

- 1 Proponents of a refundable tax credit for individuals (between 100 and 150 percent of poverty) that is large enough to purchase health insurance coverage (no direct opponents)
- 2 Proponents of refundable tax credits for individuals (who work but lack insurance) that would not cover the full cost of health coverage (no direct opponents)
- 3 Proponents of income-related refundable tax credits for everyone to purchase health insurance (no direct opponents)
- 4 Proponents of single-payer, universal health insurance coverage (no direct opponents)

11. Grad-med

- 1 Proponents of maintaining or increasing funding for specific segments of the allied health professions either through the status quo or other funding plan (no direct opponents)
 - 2 Proponents of changing the rationale/conceptualization of GME from training to enhanced patient care but still funding GME through the status quo funding mechanism (opposed to 3, 4)
 - 3 Proponents of an all-payer (or Medicare and all-payer) trust fund to support GME (opposed to 2, 4)
 - 4 Proponents of funding GME through an annual appropriation from general
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revenues (opposed to 2, 3)

12. Chiropractic Coverage

- 1 Proponents of coverage of Chiropractic services
- 2 Opponents of changing regulations to include Chiropractic services

13. Contraceptive Coverage

- 1 Proponents of mandating contraceptive coverage by insurance companies
- 2 Opposed of mandating contraceptive coverage by insurance companies

14. Medical Devices

- 1 Proponents of revising Medicare coverage policies (for procedures, devices, etc.) to increase physician input (no direct opponents)
- 2 Proponents of revising the Medicare review process for assessing coverage of medical devices, imposing non-cost review criteria, and instituting an appeals process (opposed to 3)
- 3 Proponents of imposing a cost-related criteria for the Medicare coverage reviews of medical devices (opposed to 2)

15. Disinfectant Byproducts

- 1 Proponents of decreasing disinfectant byproducts in drinking water (opposed to 2, 3)
- 2 Opposed to (significantly) decreasing disinfectant byproduct levels in drinking water/opposed to switching to alternative (non-chlorine) disinfectants (opposed to 1, 3)
- 3 Proponents of minimizing disinfectant byproduct levels/opposed to major changes in treatment or disinfectant technology (opposed to 1, 2)

16. Funding for CH-47

- 1 Proponents of increased funding for the CH-47 Chinook Helicopter

17. Mine Waste Disposal

- 1 Proponents of limiting the number of mill sites at mine sites
- 2 Opponents of limiting the number of mill sites at mine sites

19. Broadband Deployment

- 1 Proponents of revising the 1996 Telecommunications Act to give regional/local phone companies access to other service markets without their opening access to the local service market (opposed to 2)
- 2 Opponents of revising the 1996 Telecommunications Act (opposed to 1)
- 3 Position on 1996 Telecommunications Act unclear; proponents of policies designed to encourage deployment of broadband (no direct opponents)

20. Compulsory Licensing

- 1 Proponents of vaccine R&D tax credit, opposed to compulsory licensing provision/executive order (opposed to 2, 4)
- 2 Proponents of vaccine R&D tax credit, proponents of compulsory licensing provision/executive order (opposed to 1)
- 3 Proponents of vaccine R&D credit, no formal or known position on compulsory licensing provision/executive order (no direct opponents)
- 4 Proponents of compulsory licensing provision/executive order, no formal or known position on the vaccine R&D tax credit (opposed to 1)

21. Postal Service Reform

- 1 Proponents of modernizing the postal service (opposed to 2, 3)
- 2 Opponents of modernizing the postal service (opposed to 1)
- 3 Proponents of modernizing the postal service in theory but refuses to allow the proposal of perspective one to move forward (opposed to 1)

22. Modifying the Food Quality Protection Act

- 1 Proponents of modifying the FQPA of 1996 in a way that further regulates how & when the EPA releases and presents safety information about chemicals used in food preparation & production
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- 2 Opponents of modifying the FQPA of 1996.
- 23. CAFE Standards**
- 1 Proponents of increasing the Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards for light trucks and vans
 - 2 Opponents of increasing the standards
- 24. Low Sulfur Gasoline**
- 1 Proponents of Low Sulfur Regulations
 - 2 Opponents of Low Sulfur Regulations
- 25. Low Power FM Licenses**
- 1 Proponents of granting Low Power FM Radio Licenses
 - 2 Opposed to granting Low Power FM Radio Licenses
- 27. Estate Tax**
- 1 Proponents of repealing the estate tax (opposed to 2)
 - 2 Opponents of repealing the estate tax (opposed to 1)
 - 3 Advocates of various alterations to the tax, not repeal (not opposed to 1 or 2)
- 28. WEP and GPO**
- 1 Proponents of repealing or reducing the government pension offset & windfall elimination provision.
- 29. Conservation and Reinvestment Act**
- 1 Proponents of permanent and mandatory funding of conservation programs via CARA/Lands Legacy Initiative with restrictions on how coastal impact funds are used (opposed to 2, 4)
 - 2 Proponents of permanent and mandatory funding of conservation programs via CARA/Lands Legacy Initiative but with no restrictions on how coastal impact funds are used (opposed to 1, 4)
 - 3 Proponents of permanent and mandatory funding of conservation programs via CARA/Lands Legacy Initiative, generally (opposed to 4)
 - 4 Opponents of permanent and mandatory funding of conservations programs via CARA/Lands Legacy Initiative (opposed to 1, 2, 3)
- 40. China Trade (PNTR)**
- 1 Proponents of normalized trade with China
 - 2 Opponents of normalized trade with China
- 41. Defense Line Item**
- 1 For
 - 2 Against
- 42. Predator Control**
- 1 Proponents of ending funding for federal control of predators on private lands
 - 2 Opponents of ending funding for federal control of predators on private lands
- 43. 3% Excise Tax**
- 1 Proponents for cutting the 3% excise tax
- 44. Regulation of Internet Prescriptions**
- 1 Proponents of developing increased regulations for internet prescriptions (opposed to 4, 5)
 - 2 Proponents of increased federal regulations for internet Prescriptions—disclosure only of pharmacy licensing sought (opposed to 4, 5)
 - 3 Proponents of increased federal regulations for internet Prescriptions—FDA licensing of internet pharmacies sought (opposed to 4, 5)
 - 4 Opponents of increased federal regulations for internet prescriptions—it is a state issue and additional state laws are needed (opposed to 1, 2, 3)
 - 5 Opponents of increased federal regulations for internet prescriptions—existing laws need to be better enforced and voluntary efforts encouraged (opposed to 1, 2, 3)
 - 6 Agrees that illegal prescriptions are a problem, but wants to make sure
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- Congress knows that this actor is not to blame. Wants to make sure that any new regulations don't hurt its business. Wants better enforcement of existing laws but is vague on what other solutions are needed (no direct opponents)
- 7 Wants better patient education about internet prescriptions, but is neutral regarding how this is done (no direct opponents)
- 45. Credit Union Membership**
- 1 Proponents of making it easier to have broad credit union membership
 - 2 Opponents of making it easier to have broad credit union membership
- 46. Bankruptcy Reform**
- 1 Proponents of bankruptcy reform legislation
 - 2 Opponents of bankruptcy reform legislation
- 47. Needlestick Injuries**
- 1 Proponents of a federal law requiring OSHA to draft a regulation requiring hospitals to use "safe" needles so that needlesticks are avoided.
 - 2 Opponents of a federal law requiring OSHA to draft a regulation requiring hospitals to use "safe" needles so that needlesticks are avoided.
- 48. Commuter Rail Subsidies**
- 1 Proponents of giving favored treatment to all commuter rail authorities throughout the country.
 - 2 Opponents of giving favored treatment to commuter rail other than Amtrak.
- 49. Criminal Justice Reform**
- 1 Proponents of changes to the criminal justice system
- 50. Electric Utility Deregulation**
- 1 Private utilities, which want to minimize the capital gains taxes for selling off part of their businesses as part of deregulation/restructuring. They want to minimize the benefits public power receives, since they are in competition now.
 - 2 Public power, which wants greater control over how bond money can be used. They only support tax breaks for private utilities if the spun-off electrical generation is sold to a public entity.
- 51. Nuclear Waste**
- 1 Proponents of releasing funds that Congress has already collected from nuclear power plants to pay for developing a permanent disposal site.
 - 2 Opponents of releasing the funds.
- 60. Aviation Trust Fund**
- 1 Proponents to mandate aviation trust fund be spent completely on aviation
 - 2 Opposed to changing status quo
- 61. Reauthorization of ESEA, Title I**
- 1 Proponents for reauthorization of ESEA (no direct opponents)
 - 2 Proponents for funding through a block grant (opposed to 3)
 - 3 Proponents for funding through categorical grants (opposed to 2)
- 62. Ergonomics Standards**
- 1 Proponents of Ergonomic Regulations
 - 2 Opponents of Ergonomic Regulations
- 63. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act**
- 1 Support IDEA w/ full mainstreaming, access (no direct opponents)
 - 2 Support IDEA, general (no direct opponents)
 - 3 Support strengthening of rights to discipline kids (no direct opponents)
 - 4 Want greater funding of special ed to help schools (no direct opponents)
- 64. Legal Services**
- 1 Support Legal Services
 - 2 Against Legal Services
- 65. Religious Licenses**
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- 1 Proponents of providing educational broadcast licenses to religious organization rather than more expensive standard licenses
 - 2 Opponents of providing educational broadcast licenses to religious organization rather than more expensive standard licenses
- 66. Nuclear Repository**
- 1 For Yucca Mountain Nuclear Repository
 - 2 Against Yucca Mountain Nuclear Repository
- 67. Rise in Gasoline Prices**
- 1 Against government intervention to lower gas prices (opposed to 2)
 - 2 Support increase in CAFÉ standards (opposed to 1, 3)
 - 3 Against Increase in CAFE standards (opposed to 2)
- 68. Roads in National Forests**
- 1 Proponents of a moratorium on new road building in national forests (opposed to 2)
 - 2 Supports status quo, allowing new road building in national forests (opposed to 1)
 - 3 Want Access to forest roads maintained (no direct opponents)
- 69. WTO Membership**
- 1 Support renewed membership in the WTO
 - 2 Oppose renewed membership in the WTO
- 70. Airline Merger**
- 1 Proponents of US Air - United Airlines merger
 - 2 Opponents to US Air - United Airlines merger
- 80. Internet Sales Tax**
- 1 Allow states to collect sales taxes on purchases over the Internet
 - 2 Oppose any taxation of Internet commerce
- 81. Physician Anti-trust Waivers**
- 1 Proponents of physician antitrust waivers
 - 2 Opponents of physician antitrust waivers
- 82. Internet Expense Rules**
- 1 Proponents of changing the tax treatment of interest expenses for foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies
- 83. Class Action Reform**
- 1 Proponents of class action reform
 - 2 Opponents of class action reform
- 84. Prevailing Wage Rules**
- 1 Wants to maintain prevailing wage laws like Davis-Bacon
 - 2 Wants to move toward repeal of Davis-Bacon law
- 85. Computer Depreciation**
- 1 Wants to reduce depreciation period for computer equipment (opposed to 2)
 - 2 Opposes changes in depreciation because of loss of federal revenue (opposed to 1, 3)
 - 3 Wants to overhaul depreciation schedules for all industries (opposed to 2)
- 86. Right to Carry**
- 1 Favors right-to-carry bills as well as broader gun rights laws (opposed to 2, 3, 4)
 - 2 Wants to allow off-duty and retired police officers to carry a concealed gun (opposed to 1, 3)
 - 3 Opposes right-to-carry law for officers (opposed to 1, 2)
 - 4 Favors gun control but neutral on right-to-carry for police officers (opposed to 1)
- 87. Late-term Abortions**
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- 1 Opposes a ban on late-term abortions
 - 2 Supports a ban on late-term abortions
- 90. Export Controls**
- 1 Computer industry against export controls
 - 2 National security types for export controls
- 91. Airline Age 60 Rule**
- 1 Opponents of raising mandatory retirement at 60 for commercial airline pilots—airlines, pilots union, younger pilots
 - 2 Proponents of raising mandatory retirement at 60 for commercial airline pilots—older pilots
- 92. C-130 Procurement**
- 1 Opponents of procuring new C-130 aircraft vessels
 - 2 Proponents of procuring new C-130 aircraft vessels
- 93. OBD Service**
- 1 Proponents of new regulations governing on-board diagnostic service information, tools, and training
 - 2 Opponents of new regulations
- 94. Right to Know**
- 1 Opponents of parental consent for non-emergency health service in school setting
 - 2 Proponents of parental consent—pro-life advocates
- 95. Cuba Sanctions**
- 1 Proponents of complete repeal of trade sanctions with Cuba (opposed to 3)
 - 2 Proponents of partial repeal trade sanctions with Cuba for food and medicine (opposed to 3)
 - 3 Opponents of repeal of trade sanctions with Cuba—support status quo (opposed to 1, 2)
- 96. Newspaper Crossownership**
- 1 Proponents of new rule to allow newspapers and TV stations to be owned by the same company, in the same market—repeal status quo rule banning crossownership
 - 2 Opponents of new rule to allow newspapers and TV stations to be owned by the same company, in the same market—maintain status quo rule banning crossownership
- 97. Steel Safeguard**
- 1 Proponents of steel safeguard investigation and increased tariffs—Domestic steel manufacturers/suppliers
 - 2 Opponents of steel safeguard investigation and tariffs—Domestic consuming industries that purchase raw steel for manufacturing
- 100. NAFTA Foreign Investment Reform**
- 1 Proponents of re-negotiating Chapter 11 of NAFTA
 - 2 Opponents of re-negotiating Chapter 11 of NAFTA
- 101. Medicare Prescription Drug Coverage**
- 1 Proponents of new Medicare prescription drug coverage, to be administered by private insurance companies (that would not institute price controls) (opposed to 2)
 - 2 Proponents of new Medicare prescription drug coverage, to be administered by HCFA/state Medicare agencies (that would have authority to institute price controls) (opposed to 1)
 - 3 Proponents of new Medicare prescription drug coverage, with concerns about solvency of overall Medicare program—service providers do not want to lose income source to new program (no direct opponents)
- 102. Terrorism Re-insurance**
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- 1 Opponents of creating terrorism reinsurance program
 - 2 Proponents of creating terrorism reinsurance program
- 103. Outsourcing Reform**
- 1 Proponents of status quo government contract practices
 - 2 Opponents of status quo government contract practices
- 104. Military Property Movement**
- 1 Proponents of status quo competition for military personnel movement and storage services
 - 2 Opponents of status quo competition for military personnel movement and storage services
- 105. Predatory Lending**
- 1 Proponents of reforming RESPA, requiring more disclosure of fees/costs; opposed to “bundling” realty/mortgage services
 - 2 Proponents of reforming RESPA by “bundling” realty/mortgage services
- 106. Open Access 2**
- 1 Proponents of requiring owners of broadband infrastructure to give access to Internet service providers/other media—ISPs, phone companies, consumer groups
 - 2 Opponents of requiring owners of broadband infrastructure to give access to Internet service providers/other media—cable companies
- 107. Maritime Security Act**
- 1 Proponents of increased funding for Maritime Security Fleet
- 108. Food Allergen Labeling**
- 1 Proponents of status quo voluntary food allergen labeling
 - 2 Opponents of status quo voluntary food allergen labeling
- 109. Bear Protection**
- 1 Proponents of prohibiting trade of black bear viscera
 - 2 Opponents of prohibiting trade of black bear viscera
- 110. TANF Employment Training Services**
- 1 Proponents of raising years of vocational education training allowed during TANF eligibility to from 12 to 24 months, reducing “priority activities” from 24 hours/week to 20 hours/week
 - 2 Opponents of raising years of vocational education training allowed during TANF eligibility to from 12 to 24 months, reducing “priority activities” from 24 hours/week to 20 hours/week
- 115. Derivatives**
- 1 Proponents of SEC regulation of Over-the-Counter derivatives
 - 2 Opponents of SEC regulations of Over-the-Counter derivatives
- 116. WI and RSF**
- 1 Proponents of increasing funding for water infrastructure through state revolving funds
 - 2 Opposed to funding water infrastructure through federal funds
- 117. Effluent Limitation**
- 1 Opponents to strict EPA effluent limitation guidelines for transportation equipment cleaning
- 118. Optometric Funding**
- 1 Proponents of graduate medical clinical education training for optometry
- 119. Student Visas / Lab Security**
- 1 Proponents of stricter regulations concerning national security and terrorism
 - 2 Opposed to strict regulation, support moderate regulations concerning foreign students or laboratory security
- 120. Disabled TANF**
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- 1 Proponents of special measures to aid disabled recipients of Temporary Aid to Needy Families, (including more moderate time requirements, lower maximum number of work hours, and including treatment time and care of disabled individuals as working hours)
- 121. Human Cloning**
- 1 Proponents of a ban on all forms of human cloning
 - 2 Opponents of a ban on all forms of human cloning (but may support ban on reproductive cloning specifically)
- 122. EA-6B Prowler**
- 1 Proponents of increased funding of development and research for an alternative the the Electronic Attack aircraft - the EA-6B Prowler
- 123. Farm Bill**
- 1 Proponents of Price supports (opposed to 2, 3)
 - 2 Opponents of Price supports (opposed to 1, 3)
 - 3 Proponents of provisions protecting smaller (alternative) farmers (opposed to 1, 2)
 - 4 Proponents of environmental and animal welfare provisions within Farm Bill (no direct opponents)
- 124. Wind Energy**
- 1 Proponents of renewing the tax credit for producers of wind energy
 - 2 Opponents of renewing the tax credit for producers of wind energy
- 125. Smart Growth & Transportation**
- 1 Proponents of funding “SMART” transportation programs in the Transportation reauthorization
 - 2 Proponents of funding all, and especially large, transportation programs
- 126. CAFE Standards 2**
- 1 Proponents of increased CAFÉ standards
 - 2 Opponents of increased CAFÉ standards
- 127. Basic Education**
- 1 Proponents of increasing funding for international basic education programs
- 128. PURPA**
- 1 Proponents of maintaining PURPA protections for co-generation facilities
 - 2 Opponents of maintaining PURPA protections for co-generation facilities
- 129. Recreation Marine**
- 1 Proponents of excluding recreational marine facilities from longshoreman insurance requirements
- 130. Public Safety Officers**
- 1 Proponents of extending federal housing programs to federal public safety officers
- 131. Affiliate Relationships**
- 1 Proponents of proposed FERC regulation of affiliate relationships between members of corporate families, in both the natural gas and electricity industries (opposed to 2)
 - 2 Opponents of increasing regulation of affiliate relationships between members of corporate families, in both the natural gas and electricity industries (opposed to 1)
 - 3 Not opposed to all aspects of the FERC regulations but seeking a special exemption (no direct opponents)
- 132. Math / Science Funding**
- 1 Proponents of increasing funding for Math and Science partnerships program, regardless of government body overseeing the program (no direct opponents)
 - 2 Proponents of increasing funding for Department of Education's Math and Science partnerships program (opposed to 3)
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- 3 Proponents of increasing funding for NES Math and Science program (opposed to 2)

133. Cystic Fibrosis Research

- 1 Proponents of increasing funding for Cystic Fibrosis Clinical Trials Network

134. Stock Option Expensing

- 1 Proponents of requiring companies to report stock options on their end of the year financial statements; to expense them not just to foot note them
- 2 Opponents of requiring companies to report stock options as an expense on end of the year financial statements

135. Title IX

- 1 Proponents of efforts revise the application of Title IX regulations to athletics
- 2 Opponents of efforts revise the application of Title IX regulations to athletics

136. Aviation Security

- 1 Proponents of giving the airlines compensation for enhanced security efforts, access to carrying the mail, access to war risk insurance at capped prices, and more time to implement security deadlines who are opposed to allowing pilots to carry guns on planes and to required self-defense training for flight attendants (opposed to 2, 3)
 - 2 Proponents of giving the airlines compensation for enhanced security efforts, access to carrying the mail, access to war risk insurance at capped prices, and more time to implement security deadlines who support allowing pilots to carry guns on planes and to requiring self-defense training for flight attendants (opposed to 1)
 - 3 No position on giving the airlines compensation for enhanced security efforts, access to carrying the mail, access to war risk insurance at capped prices, and more time to implement security deadlines but supportive of allowing pilots to carry guns on planes and to requiring self-defense training for flight attendants (opposed to 1)
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Notes: The table lists the perspectives identified for the 98 study issues. In addition to the perspectives shown here, an additional 34 perspectives identified “neutral” actors who were typically government decisions makers who played important roles in the issue but who did not actively advocate a given proposal to others.