Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Logic, Philosophy of
Mathematics, Philosophy of Science
Jody Azzouni was born in NYC. Apart from the philosophy he does,
he has a degree in mathematics. As a result, his first philosophy
book, Metaphysical Myths, Mathematical Practice: The
Ontology and Epistemology of the Exact Sciences, is in
philosophy of mathematics. His second book in philosophy of science
is Knowledge and Reference in Empirical Science. His third
and fourth books, Deflating Existential Commitment: A Case for
Nominalism and Tracking Reason: Proof, Consequence, and Truth,
appeared with Oxford University Press.
His new book, Talking about Nothing: Numbers, Hallucinations, and
Fictions, is forthcoming with Oxford University Press.
Jody also publishes fiction and poetry. Some of this work is
Ph.D. in Philosophy, C.U.N.Y. Graduate Center
M.S. in Mathematics, New York University
1994 Metaphysical Myths, Mathematical Practice. Cambridge University Press.
2000 Knowledge and Reference in Empirical Science. Routledge.
2004 Deflating Existential Consequence: A Case for Nominalism. Oxford University Press.
2006 Tracking Reason: Proof, Consequence and Truth. Oxford University Press.
2010 Talking about Nothing: Numbers, Hallucinations, and Fictions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
2013 Semantic Perception: How the illusion of a common language arises and persists. Oxford University Press.
Forthcoming in Oxford Handbook of Truth, edited by Michael Glanzberg. Oxford University Press.
"A New Characterization
of Scientific Theories". Forthcoming in Synthese.
Published Downloadable Papers
The following papers are available in pdf form:
Proof and Ontology in Euclidean Mathematics.
In Tinne Hoff Kjeldsen, Stig Andur Pedersen, and Lise Mariane Sonne-Hansen, New trends in the history and philosophy of mathematics, Denmark: University Press of Southern Denmark, 117-133.
Is there still a sense in which mathematics can have
foundations? In G. Sica, ed., Essays on the Foundations of Mathematics and Logic.
The compulsion to believe: Logical inference and normativity.
ProtoSociology 25: 69-88.
Evading truth commitments: The problem reanalyzed.
Logique & Analyse 206, 139-176.
The Rule-Following Paradox and the Impossibility of Private Rule-Following.
The Baltic International Yearbook. Cognition, Logic and Communication.
Volume 5: Meaning, Understanding and Knowledge, October, 2010.
Nominalistic content. In Carlo Cellucci, Emily Grosholz and Emiliano
Ippoliti, ed., Logic and knowledge. Newcastle upon Tyne:
Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2011.
Can science change our notion of existence? In ProtoSociology:
An International Journal and Interdisciplinary Project, 2011.
The following papers are available in either offprint form or as
copies. Please send Prof. Azzouni an email
with a postal address and a list of which papers from among these that you would like.
||"That we see that some diagrammatic proofs are perfectly rigorous,"
Philosophia Mathematica (3) 21, 323-338.
||"Inconsistency in natural languages," Synthese 190:5, 3175-3284.
||"Nonexistent objects," Oxfordbibliographies.com
||"Hobnobbing with the nonexistent." Inquiry
||"The relationship of derivations in
artificial languages to ordinary rigorous
mathematical proof," Philosophia Mathematica
(3) 21, 247-254.
||"Taking the easy road out of Dodge," Mind
121-484, October, 951-965.
||"Summary of Talking about Nothing," and "Responses to Gabriele Contessa,
Erin Eaker, and Nikk Effingham." In (Anthony Ellis, ed.)
Analysis Reviews 72/2, 327-29, 366-379.
||"Simple metaphysics and 'ontological independence." In (Fabrice Correia
and Benjamin Schnieder, ed.) Metaphysical grounding: Understanding the
structure of reality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 234-253.
||"Referring to what is and to what isn't." In (William P. Kabasenche,
Michael O'Rourke, and Matthew H. Slater, ed.)
Reference and referring. The MIT Press, 253-269.
||"Singular thoughts (objects-directed thoughts)."
In (Mark Eli Kalderon, ed.) Aristotelian Society
Supplementary Volume LXXXV. Great Britain: The
Aristotelian Society, 45-61.
||"Ontology and the word 'exist': Uneasy relations."
Philosophia Mathematica (III) 18:1, 74-101.
||"Partial ontic fictionalism." In John Woods, ed.,
Fiction and models: New essays. Munich: Philosophia
Verlag GmbH, 289-324.
||"Why do informal proofs conform to formal
norms?" Foundations of Science 14: 9-26.
||"Empty de re attitudes about numbers,"
Philosophia Mathematica (III) 17:2, 163-188.
||Alternative logics and the role of truth in the interpretation of languages. In
Douglas Patterson, ed., New essays on Tarski and philosophy.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 390-429.
||A cause for concern: Standard abstracta and causation. Philosophia
Mathematica (III) 16, 397-401.
||(With Otavio Bueno.) On what it takes for there to be no fact of the matter. Noûs
||The inconsistency of natural languages: How we live with it. Inquiry
||Ontological commitment in the vernacular. Noûs 41:2, 204-226.
||How and why mathematics is unique as a social practice. In Reuben Hersh,
ed., 18 unconventional essays on the nature of mathematics.
Springer Science+Business Media, Inc.
||How to nominalize formalism. Philosophia Mathematica (III) 13: 135-159.
||Anaphorically unrestricted quantifiers and paradoxes. In J. C. Beall and
Bradley Armour-Garb, eds., Deflationism and Paradox,
250-273. Oxford University Press.
||(With Bradley Armour-Garb.) Standing on common ground. Journal of
Philosophy CII (10): 532-544.
||(With Otavio Bueno.) Review of Donald MacKenzie's Mechanizing Proof: Computing,
Risk, and Trust. Philosophia Mathematica (III) 13:
||Proof and ontology in Euclidean mathematics. In Tinne Hoff Kjeldsen, Stig Andur
Pedersen, Lise Mariane Sonne-Hanse, eds., New trends in the
history and philosophy of mathematics. Denmark: University
Press of Southern Denmark, 117-33.
||The derivation-indicator view of mathematical practice.
Philosophia Mathematica 3, 12: 81-105.
||Theory, observation and scientific realism. British Journal for the
Philosophy of Science 55: 371-92.
||Tarski, Quine, and the transcendence of the vernacular "true". Synthese 142:
||Individuation, causal relations and Quine. In Mark Richard, ed., Meaning.
Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 197-219.
||The strengthened liar, the expressive strength of natural languages, and
regimentation. The Philosophical Forum, 34, 3&4: 329-50.
||Truth via anaphorically restricted quantifiers. The Journal of
Philosophical Logic 30: 329-54.
||Applying mathematics: An attempt to design a philosophical problem.
The Monist 82, 2: 209-27.
||Stipulation, logic, and ontological independence. Philosophia Mathematica
3, 8: 225-54.
||Review of Michael D. Resnik's Mathematics as a science of patterns.
Journal of Symbolic Logic 64, 2: 922-3.
||Comments on Shapiro. The Journal of Philosophy 96: 541-44.
||On "On what there is". Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79, 1-18.
||Thick epistemic access: Distinguishing the mathematical from the empirical.
The Journal of Philosophy 94: 472-84.
||Applied mathematics, existential commitment and the Quine-Putnam
indispensability thesis. Philosophia Mathematica 5, 3:
||Review of Aladdin M. Yaqub's The Liar Speaks the Truth. Mind 104,
||A priori truth. Erkenntnis 37, 327-46.
||A simple axiomatizable theory of truth. Notre Dame Journal of Formal
Logic, 32, 3: 458-93.
||Truth and convention. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 71, 81-102.