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Current Course Descriptions (Fall 2012)
Introduction to Philosophy
Philosophy 001-Section 01 / Introduction to Philosophy
Jeff McConnell / G+MW / Monday, Wednesday 1:30-2:45
This section is an introduction to
philosophy by way of a close reading of several philosophical classics. We will
read Plato's Meno, Descartes's
Meditations, parts of Hobbes's
Leviathan, several works by Galileo,
Locke's Letter Concerning Toleration,
and parts of his Essay and his
Second Treatise. Along the way, we will examine some central problems of
philosophy, such as these: What is the relation between the mind and the body?
Do we have free will? Are our actions causally determined? Why is there
something rather than nothing? What is the origin of the order and of the
complexity in the world? What makes us the same persons over time? How can we
know if there is a world outside our minds? Can we know whether or not there is
a God? What is the nature of right and wrong? There will be regular writing
assignments and perhaps a final take-home examination.
Philosophy 001-Section 02 / Introduction to Philosophy
Jeff McConnell / K+MW / Monday, Wednesday 4:30-5:45
Metaphysics is the philosophical study of the
ultimate character of reality. This section is an introduction to metaphysics.
We will also consider certain questions in epistemology, the philosophical study
of knowledge. We will often be concerned with how these two areas of philosophy
are connected -- what limitations our various conceptions of knowledge impose on
how much of the world we can know, and what our various metaphysical conceptions
have to say about knowledge. In the process, we will examine some central
metaphysical problems: What is the relation between the mind and the body? What
is the nature of alienation? Do we have free will? Are our actions causally
determined? Why is there something rather than nothing? What is the origin of
the order and of the complexity in the world? What makes us the same persons
over time? Several readings may be drawn from classical texts, but most readings
will come from the last hundred years. There will be regular writing
assignments, and occasionally, during times arranged outside the time block,
students may be asked to view films related to the readings.
Philosophy 001-Section 03 / Introduction to Philosophy
Susan Russinoff / F+TR / Tuesday, Thursday 12:00-1:15
This is an introduction to philosophy through an
examination of some of the classical problems in the history of Western
Philosophy. We start by investigating various kinds of reasoning used by
philosophers and then take a careful look at questions concerning belief,
knowledge, and reality. We also explore how humans ought to make decisions, and
investigate questions that arise when we think about whether an act is right or
wrong. This is done, in part, by considering and evaluating answers given by
various philosophers and their reasons for giving them. The course introduces
you to several areas of philosophy and helps to develop both your analytic
skills and your ability to express your own views and thoughts clearly. Readings
will include selections by Descartes, Berkeley, Hume, Goodman, Pascal, Mill, and
Kant. Students will write five short essays and will be given the opportunity to
write several drafts of each.
Philosophy 001-Section 04 / Introduction to Philosophy
Valentina Urbanek / D+TR / Tuesday, Thursday 10:30-11:45
In this course, we will ask and attempt to
answer big metaphysical questions: What are we -- are we immaterial things,
bodily things, some complicated combination? What happens to us when we
die? Does God exist? Do we have free will?
We will also ask and attempt to answer big
epistemological questions: How could we ever come to know the answers to these
important metaphysical questions? What is knowledge and how do we get it
-- via our senses, by reasoning alone? Is knowledge even attainable?
Throughout our examination of these metaphysical
and epistemological questions, we will discuss questions about values and what
we should do. What attitude should we take toward death? Is suicide
immoral? If we don't have free will, does that mean that everything that
we do is pointless? If we can't prove that some of our most fundamental
beliefs are true, would it matter -- how should we go on with life?
Great philosophers have proposed sophisticated
answers to these questions. We will read their works, consider their
theories, analyze their arguments, and grapple with our own answers, however
tentative, to these big questions.
Philosophy 001-Section 05 / Introduction to Philosophy
Valentina Urbanek / H+TR / Tuesday, Thursday 1:30-2:45
In this course, we will ask and attempt to
answer big metaphysical questions: What are we -- are we immaterial things,
bodily things, some complicated combination? What happens to us when we
die? Does God exist? Do we have free will?
We will also ask and attempt to answer big
epistemological questions: How could we ever come to know the answers to these
important metaphysical questions? What is knowledge and how do we get it
-- via our senses, by reasoning alone? Is knowledge even attainable?
Throughout our examination of these metaphysical
and epistemological questions, we will discuss questions about values and what
we should do. What attitude should we take toward death? Is suicide
immoral? If we don't have free will, does that mean that everything that
we do is pointless? If we can't prove that some of our most fundamental
beliefs are true, would it matter -- how should we go on with life?
Great philosophers have proposed sophisticated
answers to these questions. We will read their works, consider their
theories, analyze their arguments, and grapple with our own answers, however
tentative, to these big questions.
Philosophy 001-Section 06 / Introduction to Philosophy
Christopher Phillips / E+MW / Monday, Wednesday 10:30-11:45
As an introduction to philosophy, we will be covering a variety of topics in
Epistemology, Metaphysics, and Ethics, philosophy's three
"main" topical areas of study. Pulling from
sources both contemporary and ancient, we will consider a variety of
philosophical issues beginning with the nature of philosophy itself.
From there, we will consider the differences between belief, opinion, and
knowledge (and whether the latter is even possible).
Following (and paraphrasing) Descartes, perhaps all we know is that "I
exist as a thinking thing" ... but what does this mean?
What is it to so exist? What is our fundamental nature as a
"thinking thing"? Indeed, what is it to exist at all?
And if we are – essentially – a Will, is ours a free will?
And what does that mean? What about God: does
God exist? Finally, how do these issues bear on our moral
status, our ethical responsibilities? How do these
considerations inform our understanding of moral obligations, how
we understand what we ought to do (if anything)?
But as an introduction to philosophy, you will learn more than
just what philosophers study, more even than how to engage with a philosophical
issue yourself. Here, you will be doing some philosophy. And in so doing,
you will be writing: to process hard, abstract thoughts; to clearly
and cogently express what you've processed; and – in what might be
paradigmatically philosophical – to argue a position and defend it
against possible critics.
Note: it is this focus on clear, cogent, critical writing that allows
Philosophy 001 to substitute for the otherwise required English 002.
Philosophy 001-Section 07 / Introduction to Philosophy
Monica Link / I+MW / Monday, Wednesday 3:00-4:15
In this course we will take up three broad philosophical topics.
The first topic is the nature and structure of morality.
How should we treat other human beings?
What principles ought we to use in deciding when an action is right or
wrong?
Next we will turn to questions
about knowledge and reality. Can we
be certain that we exist? That the
external world exists? That God
exists? Are the mind and the brain
identical? If they are two separate
entities, how are they related?
Lastly, we will discuss free will.
What is it, and do we have it?
Is it compatible with the idea that everything in the universe is
determined? Is free will a
necessary condition for holding people morally responsible for their actions?
Readings will be drawn from both classic and contemporary philosophers.
Philosophy 001-Section 08 / Introduction to Philosophy
Charles Oliver / J+TR/ Tuesday, Thursday 3:00-4:15
In this course, we examine some of the ethical, religious, and scientific
ideas developed by philosophers in the Western tradition. Our effort begins with
the Greeks. First, we consider traditional views on the gods and morality and
the Pre-Socratic and Sophistic attack on them. Then we see how philosophy
emerged as a way to address these criticisms. We look, in particular, at Plato
and Aristotle's attempts to create more rational accounts of the divine and of
human action. From there, our inquiry moves to the modern world. We start with
Descartes, who rejected the ideas received from antiquity and attempted to put
science and philosophy on a new, more certain foundation. We then consider Hume
and Kant's efforts to extend this project and find new, non-religious grounds
for morality. The course closes with Nietzsche, who attacks both the ancient and
modern outlooks and suggests a return to the insights of the pre-philosophic
Greek world. We emphasize throughout the connection between these thinkers'
ideas and the cultural and historical circumstances, from which they emerged.
Philosophy 001-Section 09 / Introduction to Philosophy
Charles Oliver / L+TR / Tuesday, Thursday 4:30-5:45
In this course, we examine some of the ethical, religious, and scientific
ideas developed by philosophers in the Western tradition. Our effort begins with
the Greeks. First, we consider traditional views on the gods and morality and
the Pre-Socratic and Sophistic attack on them. Then we see how philosophy
emerged as a way to address these criticisms. We look, in particular, at Plato
and Aristotle's attempts to create more rational accounts of the divine and of
human action. From there, our inquiry moves to the modern world. We start with
Descartes, who rejected the ideas received from antiquity and attempted to put
science and philosophy on a new, more certain foundation. We then consider Hume
and Kant's efforts to extend this project and find new, non-religious grounds
for morality. The course closes with Nietzsche, who attacks both the ancient and
modern outlooks and suggests a return to the insights of the pre-philosophic
Greek world. We emphasize throughout the connection between these thinkers'
ideas and the cultural and historical circumstances, from which they emerged.
Philosophy 001-Section 10 / Introduction to Philosophy
Christopher Phillips / G+MW / Monday, Wednesday 1:30-2:45
As an introduction to philosophy, we will be covering a variety of topics in
Epistemology, Metaphysics, and Ethics, philosophy's three
"main" topical areas of study. Pulling from
sources both contemporary and ancient, we will consider a variety of
philosophical issues beginning with the nature of philosophy itself.
From there, we will consider the differences between belief, opinion, and
knowledge (and whether the latter is even possible).
Following (and paraphrasing) Descartes, perhaps all we know is that "I
exist as a thinking thing" ... but what does this mean?
What is it to so exist? What is our fundamental nature as a
"thinking thing"? Indeed, what is it to exist at all?
And if we are – essentially – a Will, is ours a free will?
And what does that mean? What about God: does
God exist? Finally, how do these issues bear on our moral
status, our ethical responsibilities? How do these
considerations inform our understanding of moral obligations, how
we understand what we ought to do (if anything)?
But as an introduction to philosophy, you will learn more than
just what philosophers study, more even than how to engage with a philosophical
issue yourself. Here, you will be doing some philosophy. And in so doing,
you will be writing: to process hard, abstract thoughts; to clearly
and cogently express what you've processed; and – in what might be
paradigmatically philosophical – to argue a position and defend it
against possible critics.
Note: it is this focus on clear, cogent, critical writing that allows
Philosophy 001 to substitute for the otherwise required English 002.
Philosophy 001-Section 11 / Introduction to Philosophy
Monica Link / M+MW / Monday, Wednesday 6:00-7:15
In this course we will take up
three broad philosophical topics.
The first topic is the nature and structure of morality.
How should we treat other human beings?
What principles ought we to use in deciding when an action is right or
wrong?
Next we will turn to questions
about knowledge and reality. Can we
be certain that we exist? That the
external world exists? That God
exists? Are the mind and the brain
identical? If they are two separate
entities, how are they related?
Lastly, we will discuss free will.
What is it, and do we have it?
Is it compatible with the idea that everything in the universe is
determined? Is free will a
necessary condition for holding people morally responsible for their actions?
Readings will be drawn from both
classic and contemporary philosophers.
Philosophy 001-Section 12 / Introduction to Philosophy
David Denby / I+MW / Monday, Wednesday 3:00-4:15
The readings
for the course come from ancient, modern, and contemporary sources. We will read
Plato's Apology and Meno in full and most of Descartes' Meditations and Hume's
Enquiry. We will also read selections from Sextus Empiricus, Anselm, Leibniz,
Locke, Berkeley, Ryle, Ayer, Chisholm, Jackson, Nagel and Armstrong. Although we
will look at these in their approximate chronological order, the approach in
this course will be problem-centered rather than historical; we will concentrate
on live philosophical problems rather than studying intellectual history.
The focus will be on four sets of issues: the mind-body problem and the nature
of a person; the nature and existence of God; knowledge and skepticism; and the
problem of free will and determinism. Other issues will also arise.
The aims of this course are fourfold. First, to develop a sense of how puzzling,
fascinating, and problematic some of these traditional issues in philosophy
really are. Second, to gain some acquaintance with and understanding of the
various positions taken and the methods employed by some of the great
philosophers. Third, to develop the ability to think rigorously and critically
both in philosophy and beyond. Finally something that is often thought to be
impossible in introductory courses to really do some philosophy ourselves. Text:
Classics of Western Philosophy, Steven M. Cahn (ed).
Undergraduate-only Courses
Philosophy 15 / Intro to Linguistics
Anastasia Smirnova / G+MW / Monday, Wednesday 1:30-2:45
The contemporary science of linguistics is concerned with how humans encode
their language in their brains, so that they can produce and understand an
unlimited variety of utterances in context. This course will begin with a
discussion of general properties of language: its cultural and political context
and how it contrasts with other forms of communication.
It then will turn to the problem of how children learn language and the
possibility of a biological basis for the ability to learn language, often
termed Universal Grammar. From this background, the course will work out some
aspects of the structure of language: morphology (word structure), syntax
(sentence structure), phonology (sound structure), and semantics (meaning),
making use of problem sets involving English and other languages of the world.
Philosophy 24 / Introduction to Ethics
Christiana Olfert / D+TR / Tuesday, Thursday 10:30-11:45
Ethical philosophy attempts to answer some of
the most important questions about how we should live. Many of us want to
know: How can I lead a good and worthwhile life? What sort of person
should I be, and what is the right way to act? To what extent am I allowed
to pursue my own happiness, and to what extent should I promote the happiness
and well-being of others? And, importantly, are there timeless, objectively
true answers to these questions, or does each of us have to decide for ourselves
what is right and good? In this course, we will begin by examining the
answers given by some of history's greatest philosophers – figures like Plato,
Aristotle, Immanuel Kant, and John Stuart Mill. Then we will see how
contemporary philosophers have criticized, defended, and added fresh
perspectives to these traditional answers.
Philosophy 33 / Logic
Susan Russinoff / J / M 4:30-5:20; Tuesday, Thursday 3:00-3:50
*Satisfies Tufts Mathematical Sciences
Distribution Requirement
How can one tell whether a deductive argument
succeeds in establishing its
conclusion? What distinguishes good deductive arguments from bad ones? Questions
such as these will be addressed in this course. We will discuss what a formal
language is, how arguments in English are to be expressed in various formal
languages, and what is gained from so
expressing them. In the jargon of the field, we will cover sentential
logic, first-order predicate logic, identity theory, definite
descriptions, and topics in metatheory. The course requires no specific
background and no special ability in mathematics.
Philosophy 39 / Knowing & Being
David Denby / G+MW / Monday, Wednesday 1:30-2:45
This is a lower-level
introduction to epistemology and metaphysics. It presupposes no previous
acquaintance with philosophy.
I've tried to choose topics that are diverse,
fundamental and of contemporary interest.
We will concentrate on three or four
metaphysical topics – universals, freewill,
change (maybe also modality) – followed by three epistemological topics –
skepticism, the analysis of knowledge, justification.
Other issues may well come up.
Our approach will be problem-centered rather
than historical, and the emphasis will be on clarity and rigor rather than on
scholarship or sensitivity to historical context.
Philosophy 41 / Western Political Thought I
Ioannis Evrigenis / D+TR / Tuesday, Thursday 10:30-11:45
"Central concepts of ancient, medieval, and
early modern political thought. Ideas of Thucydides, Plato, and Aristotle
during the rise and fall of Athens. Subsequent transformations of
political philosophy, related to the decline of the Roman empire and the origins
and development of Christian political doctrine, and the new political outlook
of those who challenge the hegemony of Christianity. Analysis of how
pre-modern political thought helped structure future political debate."
Philosophy 48 / Feminist Philosophy
Erin Kelly / J+TR / Monday, Tuesday, Thursday 3:00-4:15
Not Available
Philosophy 55 / Making of the Modern Mind
Mario DeCaro / E+MW / Monday, Wednesday 10:30-11:45
A survey of key writings in Western thought since the Renaissance. In the
meetings we will discuss: (i) the meaning of historical phenomena such as the
Renaissance, the scientific revolution, the birth of capitalism, the
Enlightenment, and the rise of Darwinism; (ii) the cultural and social impact of
philosophical discussions such as: Is free will possible in the world of nature?
Why does God tolerate evil? Does a standard of taste exist? Are just wars
possible? Is equality compatible with freedom? The readings will include works
by Luther, Machiavelli, Descartes, Hume, Kant, Goethe, Poe, Dostoevsky, Darwin,
Marx, and Wittgenstein.
Movie and music clips will be shown in class.
Philosophy 091-02 / Reality & Subjectivity
Dilip Ninan / L+TR / Tuesday, Thursday 4:30-5:45
A traditional concern of philosophy is to disentangle those aspects of our
thought and talk that concern a genuinely objective, mind-independent reality
from those that are, in some sense, constituted by our subjective points of view
or our social practices. This course will serve as an introduction to this broad
issue by examining how it arises in connection with a number areas of
traditional philosophical concern, including ethics, aesthetics, secondary
qualities (e.g. colors, tastes), and causation.
Readings will be drawn from a variety of historical and contemporary
sources.
Philosophy 091-03 / Science & Pseudoscience
Patrick Forber / H+TR / Tuesday, Thursday 1:30-2:45
What makes a theory, study, discipline, or
explanation scientific? That is, can we distinguish real science from
pseudoscience? While science strikes us as intuitively distinctive, it turns out
to be challenging to say exactly what sets science apart from other kinds of
inquiry. In this introductory seminar we will explore what science is and
related issues about the rationality of science, the nature of scientific
observation, how science changes over time, and whether society affects science.
We will use our philosophical analysis to investigate the role of science in
shaping our thinking about contemporary issues, including climate change,
measuring personality traits, evolution vs. intelligent design, and altruistic
behavior.
Courses for Undergraduates and Graduate Students
Philosophy 103 / Logic
Brian Epstein / I+MW / Monday, Wednesday 3:00-4:15
How can one tell whether a deductive argument
succeeds in establishing its conclusion? What distinguishes good deductive
arguments from bad ones? Questions like these will be addressed in this course.
We will discuss what a formal language is, how arguments in English are to be
expressed in various formal languages, and what is gained from so expressing
them. In the jargon of the field, we will cover sentential logic, first order
predicate logic, identity theory, and definite descriptions.
We will also look briefly at the limitations of first
order logic and the basics of modal logic.
The course requires no specific background and
no special ability in mathematics. We will be using a new edition of
Language, Proof, and Logic, a textbook that includes good software for
working with proofs and with logical models of the world.
Philosophy 118 / Philosophy of Biology
Patrick Forber / L+TR / Tuesday, Thursday 4:30-5:45
We will examine the conceptual foundations of
evolutionary biology, with special attention to outstanding philosophical
problems. The course begins with Darwin, and his original presentation of
natural selection in the Origin of Species. We will then look at
two very different "big picture" views on evolutionary biology and the
importance of natural selection, the first defended by Richard Dawkins and the
second, by Richard Lewontin. The course continues by discussing specific
philosophical and theoretical controversies, including those on fitness,
function, the units of selection, the nature of evolutionary causation, and what
natural selection explains. Students require some exposure to philosophy
or biological science, preferably both.
Philosophy 121 / Ethical Theory
Avner Baz / F+TR / Tuesday, Thursday 12:00-1:15
This course focuses on some of the most important works in moral theory
in modern Western philosophy. In the first part of the course, we will read
and discuss David Hume's Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, Immanuel
Kant's Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, and John Stewart Mill's Utilitarianism.
In the second part of the course, we will read several contemporary articles that
discuss the question of whether all of us, who could be doing more for other people
than we are doing, are acting morally badly, and other contemporary articles that
are critical of modern moral theories and seek to promote some version of Aristotelian
'virtue ethics' (we will not read Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics itself, for reasons
that will be explained in class).
Our first aim will be to understand the above texts and to engage with them critically.
In part, we shall do so by considering how these texts may be understood as critically
responding to each other, both directly and indirectly. We will think not only about
what each of the above philosophers says about morality, but also about what he or
she does—about the conception of philosophical work that guides his or her work,
whether implicitly or explicitly. (It should then be difficult for us to ignore
the question of what we are doing in this course. What, if anything, can (should)
the learning, and teaching, of philosophy be?)
Through these questions, the question of what exactly ethical or moral theory is a
theory of will no doubt come to occupy us in various ways. More specific questions
will be: What makes a judgment, or a conversation, or a moment in life, moral
(or ethical)? Is there a useful distinction to be drawn between what may be called
'morality' and what may be called 'ethics'? What's the right way to conceive of the
relation between the character of an agent and her actions? Is moral assessment
first and foremost an assessment of individual actions or of character (or perhaps
of something else altogether)? What, if anything, might moral knowledge or truth be?
What might be the data, or evidence, for philosophical theories of morality? Is it
anything like the data or evidence for theories in the natural sciences, for example?
More generally, what exactly is, and what ought to be, the relation between philosophical
theories and their purported subject matter? Should our moral theories, for example,
only attempt to describe and explain, or give the foundations of, our present judgments
and practices, or should they strive to also improve them (whatever improving them
might mean)? Can they do both at once? Should moral theories themselves, and their
production, be assessed morally?
Philosophy 125 / Racism & Social Inequality
Lionel Mc Pherson / D+TR / Tuesday, Thursday 10:30-11:45
This course will divide its focus between conceptual and practical issues
concerning race and racial identity. We will begin by exploring whether races
are real and what difference this might make. These conceptual questions then
will be set in a more practical context, with an emphasis on the function of
race in the United States. Some attention will be paid to current policy debates
surrounding affirmative action, reparations, and racial/ethnic group
recognition. Readings will include W.E.B. Du Bois, Anthony Appiah, Glenn Loury,
and Cornel West.
Philosophy 130 / Moral Psychology
Stephen White / G+MW / Monday, Wednesday 1:30-2:45
Metaethics concerns the meanings of our moral
and evaluative terms and the character of our evaluative discourse, and moral
psychology involves the character of our moral and evaluative experience.
For example, we have a coherent discourse of evaluation, where the values
purport to be objective. That is,
we talk as though things were valuable not just in the sense of being desired,
but of being desirable--being such as to justify the desire of any rational
subject. (We say, for example, not
just that we desire compassion in ourselves and others, but that it is desirable
and valuable).
Whether or not such claims that some things are
objectively valuable are accurate, they seem coherent--we can advance or reject
arguments for such claims, recognize better and worse reason for them, and so
forth. Moreover, we experience a
world in which things are objectively valuable (think of our human
relationships), even if there are no such things (even if the experiences are
nonveridical).
Such claims about our value discourse and our
value experience are generally acknowledged even by value skeptics.
Such skeptics (for example J. L. Mackie) go on to deny that anything
objectively valuable exists. They
hold, often following Hume, an error theory of value according to which our
beliefs that things are genuinely valuable are false and our experiences that
purport to give us a world of things that are genuinely valuable are illusory.
But such a theory raises the following question:
What would the world be like if our value beliefs were true and our value
experiences were veridical? Error
theorists such as Mackie have no answer, because on their views the notion of an
objective value is incoherent. It
seems, then, that they cannot explain the coherence of our value discourse or
the nature of our value experience.
Compare this problem in value theory to the
problem of agency. Just as it seems
that there is no room in the objective world for values--that there could not be
nothing that could both motivate us to pursue it and to do so merely in virtue
of our rational capacities (and so rationally justify our being so
motivated)--it seems that there is no room in the objective world for actions.
If our actions are determined it seems that we cannot be genuine agents,
and no amount of randomness in the genesis of our actions seems to help.
Again the conclusion is that our discourse regarding agency is false and
our experience of ourselves as agents is illusory.
Again we can ask what the world would be like if the discourse were
accurate and the experience veridical, and again the skeptic has no answer.
In this course we will take up the (metaethical)
question of how our value discourse could be coherent given the powerful
arguments to the contrary and the analogous question for our talk regarding
agency. The recurring comparison
between the two domains will be useful in part because no one would deny that we
have an apparently coherent discourse regarding agency and a powerful experience
of ourselves as active subjects.
Although traditionally metaethics has focused on
language, our emphasis will be on experience.
We will be particularly concerned with questions about the limits to what
we can be given in perception. (Can
we, for example, actually perceive things as valuable?)
We will draw on evidence from the philosophy of language and perception,
including phenomenology, philosophy of science (particularly as it regards
theory laden perception and incommensurability), experimental and clinical
psychology, decision theory and game theory, and the literary and artistic
treatments of our agential and value experience.
Philosophy 131 / Epistemology
Jody Azzouni / E+MW / Monday, Wednesday 10:30-11:45
Sometimes we know something, and sometimes we
have just made a good guess. Can we tell the difference? Is there a method for
recognizing that we know something? We usually can supply evidence for what we
know. Must we always be able to do so for us to rightly claim that we know
something? Evidence for a belief is usually something we know. Do we need
evidence for our evidence? If so, how do we
ever manage to know anything? Some philosophers, called skeptics, don't think we
do know anything. In this course, we'll try to answer these questions,
or at least explore them
further. Readings will be from articles, both contemporary and classic.
Requirements: Two 5-7 page papers, and weekly
write-ups on the readings.
Prequisite: Prior completion one course in
philosophy or permission of the instructor.
Philosophy 134 / Philosophy of Social Science
Brian Epstein / 12 / Wednesday 6:30-9:00
What is a nation? What is an economy? What is a
social class? Individualists argue that the social world is made up of
individual people, and try to build models in the social sciences by modeling
people and the interactions between them.
Holists, on the other hand, argue that the
social world cannot be sliced up into individual people as its parts. They argue
that social science should not try to model society as a large aggregate of
individuals. Some even say that individuals are constituted by society, as much
as society is constituted by individuals.
This course is an in-depth examination of the
nature of the social world. We will read classic texts as well as new arguments.
The course has no prerequisites, but is designed for advanced undergraduate and
master's students, and at least one prior course in philosophy is strongly
recommended. For majors, it can count either for metaphysics and epistemology
credit or for seminar credit.
Philosophy 151 / Ancient Philosophy
Christiana Olfert / J+TR / Tuesday, Thursday 3:00-4:15
This course will introduce you to
some of the greatest philosophers of Ancient Greece and Rome. Starting
with the Classical philosophers – Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle – we will
examine their distinctive answers to enduring questions like the following: What
does it mean to be happy? What are the fundamental constituents of
reality? What is knowledge, and how do we come to have it? And, What
makes for a just and healthy society? As we will see in texts like Plato's
Protagoras and Republic, and
Aristotle's Metaphysics and Nicomachean Ethics, all three
Classical thinkers believe that these questions hold the key to what it means to
live well as a human being. After a look back to the Pre-Socratics and
their influence on the Classical thinkers, we will then move on to the
Hellenistic period and the debate between the Stoics and the Ancient Skeptics.
We will find that these later thinkers deliberately revive the original,
Socratic answers to our central questions, but with some new and surprising
results.
Philosophy 186 / Phenomenology & Existentialism
Avner Baz / 10+M / Monday 6:00-9:00
Presenting a radical critique of the over-intellectualization of human experience
in western philosophy—in the works of both rationalists and empiricists, as well as
in Kant's transcendental philosophy—Maurice Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception
is an attempt to recover our experience of experience, as it were, and thereby to
recover our 'being-in-the-world' on its many facets: sense-perception, motility, moods,
sexuality and being with others more generally, speech and expression, spatiality,
temporality, agency and freedom. Like Husserl and Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty argues that
both rationalist and empiricist accounts of perception have gone fundamentally wrong in
taking as their starting point the objective-scientific perspective—both parties forgetting
that this perspective is itself rooted in, and made possible by, a 'pre-reflective' relation
to the world in which neither we nor what we perceive function, or feature, as objects of
scientific knowledge. As he puts it: 'The whole universe of science is built upon the
world as directly experienced, and if we want to subject science itself to rigorous scrutiny,
and arrive at a precise assessment of its meaning and scope, we must begin by reawakening
the basic experience of the world, of which science is the second-order expression'.
Merleau-Ponty's method of inquiry and argumentation in the Phenomenology is unique in
that he often takes his bearings from the findings of empirical studies of perception,
and develops on their basis a critique of science from within its own perspective. 'Taking
objective thought on its own terms, not asking any questions which it does not ask itself',
Merleau-Ponty argues that those empirical findings reveal the fundamental inadequacy of the
ontology to which modern science is committed, insofar as we wish to understand perception.
Merleau-Ponty also goes much farther than either Husserl or Heidegger in revealing and
working out the significance of the embodied nature of human perception—the way in which
what we perceive is inseparable from the possibilities it affords, and the particular ways
in which it calls, for being interrogated with our gaze, handled, used, manipulated, overcome,
responded to in gesture or speech, etc. More than any other philosopher in the tradition
of western philosophy, Merleau-Ponty places the human body—not as an object of mechanistic
science, but as lived, as a medium of significant engagement with the world and of
expression—at the center of his reflection.
The course will mostly consist of a close reading and discussion of the Phenomenology
of Perception, with references to the tradition of western philosophy on the one hand,
and to contemporary analytic philosophy on the other hand. Attention will be give to how
Merleau-Ponty's work is situated within the history of continental philosophy. Some readings
from Descartes, Kant, Husserl, Heidegger, and Sarte may be included.
Philosophy 191-01 / Transcendental Arguments, Skepticism & the A-Priori
Stephen White / K+MW / Monday, Wednesday 4:30-5:45
Transcendental arguments purport to establish on a priori grounds that X is a condition
of the possibility of Y, where (typically) X is some condition that the skeptic has
called into question and Y something the skeptic could not seriously doubt (e.g. that
he or she has experience, speaks a meaningful language, etc.). If such an arguments
works, it underwrites an inference from a premise that any skeptic would grant, and
thereby confronts the skeptic on his or her own terrain. But could such an argument work?
In a famous paper, Barry Stroud argued that it could not. It is a noteworthy fact,
however, that although most contemporary analytic philosophers who have weighed in
on the question whether such arguments could work have rejected the possibility, many
of the most prominent have offered such arguments. The list includes Putnam, Searle,
Davidson, McDowell, Burge, and Peacocke, among others. (Were we to include philosophers
who appeal to transcendental arguments in the ethical domain, the list would be
significantly longer.)
In this course we will consider whether such arguments could work with regard to five
subject domains: the external world, other minds, agency, value, and the grasp of
rules or meanings. As Stroud has recommended, we will be particularly concerned to
consider in detail what kinds of skepticism (if any) are effectively addressed by such
arguments. We will also consider Stroud's distinction between modest and ambitious
uses of transcendental arguments and the claims of those (such as Robert Stern) who
hold that Stroud's modest arguments are far more effective against various skeptics
than he is willing to allow. Finally, though this will not be our main concern, we will
look at some of the attempts to reconstruct in analytic terms Kant's appeal to
transcendental considerations at various points in his work.
Philosophy 191-02 / History of Analytic Philosophy
Dilip Ninan / 7 / Wednesday 1:30-4:00
Philosophy in the English-speaking world has come to be dominated by
analytic philosophy, an approach to
the subject developed in the late 19th and early 20th century by Gottlob Frege,
Bertrand Russell, and Ludwig Wittgenstein, among others. This course will focus
on the early history of analytic philosophy, examining both the substantive
views and the methodological presuppositions of some of the major figures in the
analytic tradition. The course will
cover issues in logic, the philosophy of language, metaphysics, and the theory
of knowledge.
Philosophy 191-03 / Objects
Jody Azzouni / 11+ / Tuesday 6:00-9:00
Ontology is the study of what there is. It is,
perhaps, the most fundamental of all philosophical subject areas. Closely
related is the study of how people
indicate what they take to exist. Contemporary philosophy, ever since Quine,
has wedded questions of someone's professed ontology to the semantic
interpretation of existential quantifier of first-order logic, once what that
someone has said is translated into a first-order formal language. According to
this kind of view, what someone is committed to is what their existential
quantifiers range over (once their sincere utterances have been formalized).
This is called Quine's criterion for what a discourse is committed to. In recent
years, Quine's criterion has been challenged by philosophers who have questioned
whether there is any sort of relationship at all between the semantics of an
artificial formalism and what someone is really committed to, ontologically
speaking. But other philosophers, while granting Quine's essential clai / X /
Monday, Wednesdayorry
about what it means. They worry about how reading someone's ontological claims
off of their existential quantifiers bears on what we take there to be, and they
worry about whether this approach to someone's ontology leads to a fundamental
metaphysical relativity: that in certain respects what is out there is relative
to how we talk about it. "Quantifier-variance" is the suggestion that people
with different ontological commitments may (implicitly) use quantifiers that
mean different things. This in turn can imply that their ontological
disagreements are irresolvable. If I try to interpret what you mean by the use
of my quantifiers, I translate your quantifiers into mine, and thereby distort
what you are claiming. But I have no other way of interpreting you other than in
terms of how I put things.
We will explore some of the classical and
contemporary work on these topic areas. Among the philosophers we'll be reading
are Carnap, Hirst, Quine, Sider, and Azzouni.
Requirements: One 15 page paper, and weekly
write-ups on the readings.
Prequisites: Prior completion of logic 33 or an
equivalent and one other course in philosophy or permission of the instructor.
Philosophy 191-04 / Foundations of Cognitive Science
Daniel Dennett / 6 / Tuesday 1:30-4:00
Cognitive models of perception, memory, control and many more specific mental
phenomena typically postulate systems of representation, but there is so far no
uncontroversial theory of mental (or cerebral) representation, or of
information-processing in the brain. This course will look at the philosophical
background of work on minds and mental processes, including the topics of
intentionality, functionalism, computationalism, and reductionism, and the issue
of how explanation in cognitive science compares with explanations in the other
sciences. This course is designed
for graduate students in the disciplines comprising cognitive science, and for
advanced undergraduate majors in brain and cognitive science or philosophy.
Philosophy 191-05 / Nature & Norms: Hume to Putnam
Mario DeCaro / 1 / Tuesday 9:00-11:30 am
According to a long philosophical tradition, naturalism is the view that reality
is exhausted by nature. In this light, Aristotle, Epicurus, Machiavelli,
Spinoza, Hume, and Dewey have been considered naturalist philosophers. Today,
however, under Quine's influence, the term tend to be used in a narrower way, to
cover the view that natural science alone tells us what exists and gives us the
methods to know it. A consequence of this view is that all non-scientific forms
of understanding are either reducible in principle to scientific knowledge or
eliminable altogether. Some issues with regard to which this view seems
problematic will be discussed, including free will, consciousness, morality,
normativity, and meaning. Finally, an alternative, more inclusive form of
naturalism will be explored. Readings will include work by classic philosophers
and by Quine, Churchland, McDowell, Rorty, Dennett, Putnam, and others.
Some invited speakers will intervene in the course.
Philosophy 197-01 / Ethics, Law and Society
Lionel McPherson / H+TR / Tuesday, Thursday 1:30-2:45
This course forms the core
of a certificate program in Ethics, Law and Society, administered through the
philosophy department. The goal of the program is to use philosophy to prepare
students to be active citizens in leadership positions in government, NGOs and
the private sector. Students will learn about how moral and political philosophy
relate to questions of public importance.
The seminar will study a range of practical ethical questions concerning such
themes as: (1) morality across boundaries; (2) criminal justice, moral
responsibility, and the aims of punishment; (3) terrorism
and just war; (4) multiculturalism and religious toleration; (5) marriage and
the family; (6) ethics and animals.
We will approach these questions by considering case studies and by evaluating
moral principles for resolving ethical dilemmas. We will be especially concerned
with the challenges to ethical thought posed by ethnic, religious, and political
diversity.
Requirements for the course include several short papers and a longer term
paper.
Philosophy 297-01 / Graduate Writing Seminar
Denby/Russinoff / M / 10:00-12:30
The Graduate Writing Seminar (GWS), offered every term, is required of all students
entering the MA program in Philosophy in Fall 2009 or later and open to graduate
students who started the program before Fall 2009. In addition to fulfilling all
other requirements for the MA in Philosophy, students who enter the program in Fall 2009
or later must earn a grade of SATISFACTORY in the GWS. Letter grades will not be given.
Students are eligible to take the course after completion of one successful term in the
MA program. Students who wish to audit the seminar must commit to being full participants
in the class, which means attending all sessions and completing all assignments. Auditing
may be appropriate for students who have already taken the course for credit or for first-semester
students who are not used to writing in English.
Prospective members of the GWS, including auditors, must come to the first session
of the seminar with the following materials: a draft of a potential writing sample;
a term paper that might be expanded or polished; or a detailed outline of a writing
project that has already been well thought-out. The paper/outline should be accompanied
by a brief abstract and any comments the student wishes to make, such as that he or she
intends to turn the paper into a writing sample for PhD program applications.
To receive a grade of SAT in the GWS, a student must have a strong attendance record;
participate faithfully; and, by the end of the term, produce a solid writing sample or
the equivalent thereof. A student who does not meet these requirements will ordinarily
be granted a grade of INC; making up the work will involve not only producing the final
paper but also sitting through the course again.
Topics of instruction will include: how to determine the necessary extent of a
literature review; how to narrow down a topic; how to make sure that your paper is
philosophical, and not just expository; how to write an introduction to a philosophy
paper; how to handle transitions between sections of a paper; how to anticipate and
address objections to your view; how to write a conclusion; when to ask a faculty member
for criticism. The course will involve intensive peer review of papers. We will use
contemporary papers in the philosophical literature as examples of how (and perhaps how not)
to write a philosophy paper.
Students will be given frequent but brief out-of-class writing assignments,
sometimes general exercises and sometimes term paper work.
Prerequisites: At least one successfully completed semester in the Tufts MA program in
Philosophy. Exceptions to these restrictions may be made in unusual cases.
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