Courses

Course Descriptions (Fall 2009)

Philosophy 001 / Introduction to Philosophy

Each semester, we offer several sections of Philosophy 001. In all sections an enrollment maximum is strictly enforced. The sections are taught as independent classes, each with separate reading lists, assignments, and examination policies, but the following features are common to all:

  1. The classes are small and designed to introduce students to philosophical thinking through the reading of a few great texts.
  2. They stress the development of good habits of writing, reading, and thinking by encouraging critical analysis, philosophical debate and discussion, and clear, rigorous writing.
  3. Each section requires at least five short papers, which are carefully criticized and graded, with attention paid both to philosophical cogency and style.
  4. Students having credit for English 001 may use Philosophy 001 to satisfy the second half of the College Writing Requirement as well as the Humanities Requirement.

Philosophy 001-01 / Introduction to Philosophy

Gal Kober / L+TR / Tuesday, Thursday 4:30 – 5:45
What is knowledge? What can we know? This course is an introduction to philosophy through seminal questions concerning knowledge. We will investigate such questions as how we acquire knowledge, what kinds of knowledge we may have, the ability to articulate our knowledge, the relation between theoretical and practical knowledge, and especially the relation between reality and what we can know of it. We will explore these issues through the writings of major figures in the history of Western philosophy, such as Plato, Descartes, Hume, Kant, Wittgenstein, and Moore.

Philosophy 001-02 / Introduction to Philosophy

Gal Kober / N+TR / Tuesday, Thursday 6:00 – 7:15
What is knowledge? What can we know? This course is an introduction to philosophy through seminal questions concerning knowledge. We will investigate such questions as how we acquire knowledge, what kinds of knowledge we may have, the ability to articulate our knowledge, the relation between theoretical and practical knowledge, and especially the relation between reality and what we can know of it. We will explore these issues through the writings of major figures in the history of Western philosophy, such as Plato, Descartes, Hume, Kant, Wittgenstein, and Moore.

Philosophy 001-03 / Introduction to Philosophy

Jeff McConnell / H+TR / Tuesday, Thursday 1:30 – 2:45
Epistemology is the philosophical study of knowledge. Metaphysics is the philosophical study of the ultimate character of reality. What can we know about the ultimate character of reality? This section is an introduction to epistemology and to metaphysics through the close reading of important texts from throughout the history of philosophy. We will examine some central metaphysical problems: What is the relation between the mind and the body? Do we have free will? Are our actions causally determined? Why is there something rather than nothing? What is the origin of the order and of the complexity in the world? What makes us the same persons over time? What is truth? How can we know if there is a world outside our minds? Can we know whether or not there is a God? Throughout the course, we will be concerned with the relation between metaphysics and epistemology. In particular, we will be worried about whether there is a connection between what we can know and what the world is like. Readings will be drawn from Plato, Aquinas, Descartes, Hume, Kant, Nietzsche and Russell, but we will also read several contemporary authors to see how these same questions are treated today. There will be weekly writing assignments and a final take-home examination.

Philosophy 001-04 / Introduction to Philosophy

Jeff McConnell / L+TR / Tuesday, Thursday 4:30 – 5:45
Description TBA

Philosophy 001-04R / Mandatory Film Section

Thursday 7:30 – 9:30
This section is an introduction to philosophy by way of film. In a sense, films create their own “reality.” What is this thing they create—“reality”? How do they create it? Do they, in fact, “really” create it? Philosophers have not until very recently been much concerned with film, but they have had a longstanding concern with “reality”—about what it is and about how we can know anything about it. We will discuss a variety of films, mostly cinema classics made after 1950, which raise questions about how film itself can “create a reality.” The films will raise questions as well about some related philosophical problems: the relation between mind and body, the existence of the soul and of God, and the nature of existence itself, of truth and of possibility. The classic status of many of the films we discuss will be connected to the philosophical questions they raise; so often we will discuss what these connections are and why these connections makes them film classics.

Throughout, we will read and discuss classical and contemporary texts by philosophers that are related to the films. There will be regular showings of the films to be discussed. Since this is a writing course, students will be expected to do regular writing assignments in conjunction with their viewing and reading, and there will be a final take-home examination.

NOTE: It is required that you attend the film screenings on Thursdays.

Philosophy 001-05 / Introduction to Philosophy

Indrani Bhattacharjee / J+TR / Tuesday, Thursday 3:00-4:15
Description TBA

Philosophy 001-06 / Introduction to Philosophy

Neil Van Leeuwen / K+MW / Monday, Wednesday 4:30 – 5:45
Description TBA.

Philosophy 001-07 / Introduction to Philosophy

Benjamin Allen / G+MW / Monday, Wednesday 1:30-2:45
Evil. Beauty. Death. Time. Infinity.  We will examine five philosophically perplexing topics, topics that many of us have wondered about at one time or another. In each case, we'll start from scratch, trying to survey the range of questions that might confront a philosophical investigator. Then we'll proceed to read a series of writings by philosophers on the given theme.  The goal is to learn to think and write philosophically about ideas that we have already encountered, but may not have examined.

Philosophy 001-09 / Introduction to Philosophy

Indrani Bhattacharjee / F+TR / Tuesday, Thursday 12:00 – 1:15
Description TBA

Philosophy 001-10 / Introduction to Philosophy

Benjamin Allen / I+MW / Monday, Wednesday 3:00 – 4:15
Evil. Beauty. Death. Time. Infinity.  We will examine five philosophically perplexing topics, topics that many of us have wondered about at one time or another. In each case, we'll start from scratch, trying to survey the range of questions that might confront a philosophical investigator. Then we'll proceed to read a series of writings by philosophers on the given theme.  The goal is to learn to think and write philosophically about ideas that we have already encountered, but may not have examined.

Philosophy 001-11 / Introduction to Philosophy

Valentina Urbanek / E+MW / Monday, Wednesday 10:30-11:45
Description TBA

Philosophy 003 / Language and Mind

Daniel Dennett / GMW / Monday, Wednesday 1:30 – 2:20
Are we the only species with minds? Do animals--dolphins, chimpanzees, birds, spiders--have minds, or do they just have brains? We are the only species with language. Some animals have what might be called proto-languages, much simpler signaling systems, but these do not seem to give those species the spectacular boost in intelligence that language gives us. It is generally agreed that language makes our minds very different from animal minds, but how, and why? Are we the only conscious species? Are we the only self-conscious species? What is it like to be a bat? Is it like anything to be a spider?

In the first half of the course we will develop a method of measuring and testing the minds (if that is what they are) of other species. (The method also works on human beings, but that will not be our concentration.) We will explore the empirical research, both in the field and the laboratory, that has recently shed new light on the questions about animal minds, while sharpening philosophical questions about the nature of minds in general.

In the second half of the course, we will look at human language, its structure and evolution, and the effects it has on our minds. We will look at the traditional philosophical questions about meaning in language and its relation to mental events, and will eventually explore the question of the relation of language to human consciousness.

The course has no prerequisites, and is particularly appropriate for students who are not likely to major in philosophy but want to get a substantial introduction to the specific philosophical issues surrounding the mind-body problem and its relation to language.

Two lectures a week, plus one section (the class will divide into sections for a Thursday or Friday meeting). Weekly comments pages on the readings, two problem sets on elementary computer demonstrations, a midterm examination, a final examination, and a term paper will be required. Readings will include classic philosophical essays by Turing, Searle, Nagel, Putnam and others, and a short book, Daniel Dennett's Kinds of Minds, together with recent articles and chapters by psychologists, ethologists, linguists and other researchers. No prerequisites.

Philosophy 006 / Reasoning & Critical Thinking

Susan Russinoff / J+TR / Tuesday, Thursday 3:00-4:15
Reasoning and Critical Thinking is an introductory course intended for all students, regardless of academic major or interests. The skills learned and reinforced in Philosophy 006 are crucial for anyone who wants to think clearly, read carefully, speak effectively, and argue convincingly. You will develop a sensitivity to language, become better able to uncover arguments, and learn to distinguish good argumentation from bad. Your ability to recognize and evaluate your own assumptions and those of others will improve, and you’ll come away better able to provide compelling reasons for your own views and to evaluate critically the views of others. You will learn to reason about various subjects, including science, ethics, philosophy, and the law and have the opportunity to evaluate and closely analyze articles from a variety of texts and editorials from leading newspapers and periodicals. In addition to regular written exercises, the class will engage in oral debate. The tools you will develop in this course are important to all the disciplines.

Note: Philosophy 006 cannot be taken for credit by those who have already taken Philosophy 033. You may take Philosophy 006 and then take Philosophy 033 for credit. Unlike Philosophy 033, this course does not satisfy the mathematical sciences requirement.

Philosophy 015 / Introduction to Linguistics

Ariel Goldberg / C / Tuesday, Thursday, Friday 9:30-10:20
This course focuses on the fundamental question of contemporary linguistics: How do humans encode language in their brains, so that they can produce and understand an unlimited variety of utterances in context. Topics include language and other forms of communication, how children acquire language, the biological basis of language, and the structure of language -- phonology (sound structure), syntax (grammatical structure), and semantics (meaning).

Philosophy 016 / Philosophy of Religion

Elizabeth Lemons / F+TR / Tuesday, Thursday, Friday 12:00 – 12:50
This course offers an introduction to the philosophical analysis of major religious issues. We will explore such topics as the nature of religion, religious experience, an ultimate reality, the problem of evil or suffering, and the relationship between faith and reason and between religion and science. By exploring different philosophical approaches to the study of religion – including existential, phenomenological, linguistic and comparative, students will develop constructive responses to the variety of ways in which philosophers analyze religious beliefs and practices in diverse world religions.

Philosophy 033 / Logic

Susan Russinoff / F / Monday, Wednesday 10:30 – 11:45
*Satisfies Tufts Mathematical Sciences Distribution Requirement
How can one tell whether a deductive argument succeeds in establishing its conclusion? What distinguishes good deductive arguments from bad ones? Questions such as these will be addressed in this course. We will discuss what a formal language is, how arguments in English are to be expressed in various formal languages, and what is gained from so expressing them. In the jargon of the field, we will cover sentential logic, first-order predicate logic, identity theory, definite descriptions, and topics in metatheory. The course requires no specific background and no special ability in mathematics.

Philosophy 039 / Knowing and Being

David Denby / H+TR / Tuesday, Thursday 1:30-2:45
This is a lower-level introduction to epistemology and metaphysics. It presupposes no previous acquaintance with philosophy.
I've tried to choose topics that are diverse, fundamental and of contemporary interest. We will concentrate on three or four metaphysical topics – universals, freewill, change (maybe also modality) – followed by three epistemological topics – skepticism, the analysis of knowledge, justification. Other issues may well come up. Our approach will be problem-centered rather than historical, and the emphasis will be on clarity and rigor rather than on scholarship or sensitivity to historical context.

Philosophy 041 / Western Political Thought I

Ioannis Evrigenis / G+MW / Monday, Wednesday 1:30-2:45
Central concepts of ancient, medieval, and early modern political thought. Ideas of Thucydides, Plato, and Aristotle during the rise and fall of Athens. Subsequent transformations of political philosophy related to the decline of the Roman Empire and the origins and development of Christian political doctrine, and the new political outlook of those who challenged the hegemony of Christianity. Analysis of how pre-modern political thought helped structure future political debate.

Philosophy 043 / Justice, Equality and Liberty

David Denby / D+TR / Tuesday, Thursday 10:30-11:45
This is a lower-level introduction to political philosophy. It presupposes no previous acquaintance with philosophy.
We will focus on five topics: the state of nature; the justification, if any, for state power; utilitarianism; distributive justice; liberalism and its critics. A number of other topics will come up along the way, including the nature and justification of free speech, free markets, and private property. All these topics are linked, and many bear on one of the fundamental questions of political philosophy: how should a state distribute power and material goods?  Our approach will be problem-centered rather than historical, and the emphasis will be on clarity and rigor rather than on scholarship or sensitivity to historical context. Our discussions will concern fundamental principles more often than particular issues of contemporary concern. The reading is drawn from early modern, nineteenth century, and contemporary sources and is moderate to heavy in quantity. It will include selections from Hobbes, Locke, Mill, Marx, Berlin, Rawls, Nozick, Dworkin, Sandel, Cohen, and others.

Philosophy 048 / Feminist Philosophy

Nancy Bauer / K+MW / Monday, Wednesday 4:30-5:45
*Core Course in the Women's Studies Department
The purpose of this course is to ask whether "feminist philosophy" is possible and, if so, what it can do and what it is good for. Any number of prominent feminists believe that in its commitment to what it calls "objectivity," "universality," and "reason," philosophy inveterately and insidiously serves the interests of men and is inherently an enemy of feminism. On the other hand, mainstream philosophers, who see objectivity, universality, and reason as paradigmatically neutral values, often worry that political movements such as feminism, while they may serve lofty purposes, cannot, by definition, count as philosophy.

The guiding concern of this course will be to explore whether in fact feminism has any good reason to take an interest in philosophy -- or traditional philosophy in feminism. We will focus on the following sorts of questions: Does philosophy have anything special to offer feminism? Can philosophy be feminist and remain philosophy? Why can't we, if indeed we can't, explore feminist concerns -- such as the very possibility of an inherent masculinist bias in some of our basic practices and concepts -- within traditional philosophical inquiry? Is there anything philosophically special about oppression based on gender? Is gender a natural subject for philosophy? What is gender? What, if anything, does it have to do with people's bodies? What rides, for feminism andfor philosophy, on the answers to these sorts of questions?

The syllabus for the course will juxtapose, week by week, contemporary feminist writings with traditional philosophical texts. The feminist writings, by such authors as Simone de Beauvoir, Catharine MacKinnon, Luce Irigaray, Margaret Urban Walker, and Judith Butler, implicitly or explicitly offer themselves as examples of or commentaries on the possibility of feminist philosophy. The traditional philosophical material criticized and appropriated by our feminist writers will include texts by Descartes, Kant, Hegel, Marx, Rousseau, Nietzsche, and Freud -- authors who, ironically in this context, understood themselves to be working generally in service of human liberation.

Prerequisites: No previous experience with any of the authors mentioned above, or with philosophy or feminist theory in general, is necessary or will be presupposed.

Philosophy 103 / Logic

George Smith / J / Monday 4:30-5:20; Tuesday, Thursday, Friday 3:00-3:50
How can one tell whether a deductive argument succeeds in establishing its conclusion? What distinguishes good deductive arguments from bad ones? Questions like these will be addressed in this course. The principal text will be Richard Jeffrey's Formal Logic, though it will be supplemented by other texts and by notes from the instructor. The accent will be as much on coming to understand what the word ‘formal' means in the title of Jeffrey's book as on what ‘logic' means. We will discuss what a formal language is, how arguments in English are to be expressed in various formal languages, and what is gained from so expressing them. In the jargon of the field, we will cover sentential logic, first order predicate logic, identity theory, and definite descriptions. We will also look briefly at the history of logic.

The course requires no specific background and no special ability in mathematics. Understanding why formal methods work will be as important as manipulating them. The course will require six written homework assignments and an open-book final exam. The homework assignments, which students are expected to work on in groups, form the core of the course. Students should anticipate spending an average of eight hours per week outside of class in this course.

Philosophy 111 / Semantics

Ray Jackendoff / G+MW / Monday, Wednesday 1:30 – 2:45
This course concerns the structure of meaning as it is encoded in human language and processed by the human brain. Topics include: mentalistic theories of sense and reference, word meanings, combining word meanings into phrasal meanings, aspects of meaning not conveyed by words. Prerequisite: Phil 15 or consent.

Philosophy 121 / Ethical Theory

Erin Kelly / D+TR / Tuesday, Thursday 10:30-11:45
The course will examine a range of philosophical views about the nature and content of morality. The main theoretical approaches we will study are consequentialism, Kantianism, virtue ethics, and constructivism. Generally, we will explore the relation between morality and self-interest, and between morality and values with which it may conflict (e.g. friendship, integrity).

Questions to be considered include: Why be moral? Should the rightness of actions be judged by their results or by noninstrumental principles? Does morality depend on social conventions or are certain values universal? Course readings will be drawn from Mill, Kant, Williams, Rawls, and others.

Philosophy 125 / Racism and Social Inequality

Lionel McPherson / F+TR / Tuesday, Thursday 12:00 – 1:15
This course will divide its focus between conceptual and practical issues concerning race. We will begin by asking whether race is essentially a biological category and what difference this might make. We will then set the conceptual questions in a more practical context, with an emphasis on the function of race and ethnicity in the U.S. Some attention will be paid to current policy debates surrounding affirmative action, reparations, and racial/ethnic group recognition. Readings will include DuBois, Gould, Appiah, West, and Loury.

Prerequisite: 1 Phil Course, or 1 Political Science Course.

Philosophy 131 / Epistemology

Stephen White / I+MW / Monday, Wednesday 3:00 – 4:15
It seems plausible to suppose that all of our substantive information about the external world comes from the senses. But the connection between events in the external world and our perceptual experiences is causal and contingent. Thus we could have exactly the same perceptual experience even if the world were radically different--even if, for example, we were brains in vats or were dreaming. Indeed, it seems, we could have the same perceptual experience even if the external world did not exist. Furthermore, it seems that any principle that could take us from what we are given in perception to the nature of the external world would simply beg the question against a certain kind of radical skeptic. That is, it would beg the question against a skeptic who claimed that we could never have any rational justification for preferring any hypothesis about the external causal source of our perceptual experience over any other. For to suppose that any such principle were justified would be to suppose that we were already justified in believing something about the world beyond our perceptual experience.

Many contemporary philosophers (the so-called new Humeans – e.g., Stroud, Nagel, and Strawson) find this kind of argument impossible to answer. Moreover, they hold that in considering skeptical possibilities we are doing nothing different from what we do in our ordinary epistemic assessments. Such philosophers claim, however, that skepticism has no practical implications. But how could these three claims all be true? Certainly our ordinary assessments about what we know and what we are justified in believing are directly relevant to what we do and what we take ourselves to be justified in doing. How, then, can our philosophical reflections fail to have such consequences if we are doing what we ordinarily do and not arbitrarily raising the standards for what we consider knowledge or justification?

Now consider a radically different form of skepticism. Imagine someone who (perhaps after suffering some extreme trauma) suddenly finds the concept of action unintelligible. Such a person might agree with us about all the objective facts about the world--what has happened, is happening, will happen--but utterly fail to make sense of the idea of anyone doing anything. This form of skepticism, which we might call agential skepticism, is extremely practical in its implications. We can in fact imagine the person in question paralyzed not by nerve or tissue damage, but by his or her sheer incapacity to comprehend the idea of intervening to change the course of events (as opposed merely to being a passive part of the mechanism through which the causal forces of the universe flow).

Finally, imagine a third form of skepticism according to which nothing is really valuable. On this view there are no genuinely valuable objects or events in the world, merely our desires, projections, illusions of value, and so forth. (This may seem to some like obvious common sense rather than skepticism.) In this case the practical implications of skepticism are not clear. Would it make a difference if we believed that some things were not merely desired but were desirable (i.e., were such as to justify desire)?

In this course we will examine a range of standard epistemological topics from the perspective of the new Humean response to skepticism, as well as some skeptical issues normally treated outside the epistemological context. Topics will include our knowledge of the external world, of the past and the future, of meaning, and of other minds. We will also consider the problems raised by foundationalism and coherentism, and internalism and externalism. As regards these latter two concepts expecially, we will consider the issues they raise in epistemology in part by comparison with the issues they raise in a variety of other philosophical contexts.

Philosophy 134 / Philosophy of Social Science

Brian Epstein / I+MW / Monday, Wednesday 3:00 – 4:15
This course is an introduction to the philosophy of social science. The course will consider central problems in the nature and methods of the social sciences, focusing in particular on how the social sciences (like economics, sociology, psychology, political science, and history) differ from the natural sciences (like physics, chemistry, and biology). We will begin with some of the historical debates that accompanied the founding of the social sciences, and then turn to contemporary questions having to do with explanation, objectivity and values, and the nature of social groups.

Philosophy 151 / Ancient Philosophy

Benjamin Allen / F+TR / Tuesday, Thursday 12:00-1:15
We'll begin with the presocratic philosophers, who sought to find order in a changing cosmos. We'll pay particular attention to the ways in which each philosopher responds to his predecessors. Then it's on to Socrates and Plato. We'll focus on life, death, and love. In doing so, we'll take a close look at philosophical methodology and at Plato's vision of an unchanging reality. Finally we'll consider Aristotle, who sought a coherent view of the cosmos and the human place within it. We'll consider how the disparate pieces of his philosophy fit together to form a systematic whole.  In examining Greek philosophy, we will focus on the past and the present, seeking to understand the ancient philosophers within their own historical context, while also thinking for ourselves about their viability even today.

Philosophy 167 / Science Before Newton

George Smith / 11 / Tuesday 6:30 – 9:00
This is the first part of a two-course sequence focusing on Newton's Principia, the book that first showed the world how to do science in the modern sense of the term. In Philosophy 168 in the spring semester we will read the Principia itself. The revolution produced by the Principia is undoubtedly the most important single event in the history of science, ending controversies begun by the Copernican model of the planetary system and leading over the next 60 years to what we now call Newtonian mechanics. It produced no less of a revolution in scientific method by illustrating a way of marshalling evidence that stood in sharp contrast to both the narrow empiricist line then prevalent in England and the rationalist line prevalent on the continent. Because of this, the Principia is as important to philosophy of science as it is to history of science. It is the perfect work to focus on in investigating how science at its best succeeds in turning data into decisive evidence.

The Principia is accessible to a wide range of students. It requires no background in physics or calculus. It does, however, require historical knowledge of the scientific context in which it was written. Thus, the goal of the fall semester is to cover the background needed to grasp the force of the evidential arguments in the Principia. We will review the work on planetary orbits by Kepler and those after him; Galileo’s efforts toward a science of motion; Descartes’ theory of planetary motion; and studies of curvilinear motion by Huygens and Newton that led directly into the Principia. Three 6 to 8 page papers will be required during the fall semester. In the spring semester we will examine the evidential argument developed throughout the Principia and responses to it. The sole written requirement will be a term paper dealing with one of the major historical or philosophical issues surrounding the work.

Studying the Principia can be of value to a wide range of students. Besides offering an ideal way of studying the philosophy of science, it gives history students a vehicle for getting into the history of science. It offers students in the physical sciences and engineering an opportunity to learn how the foundations of their disciplines were secured. And it offers students in the humanities a way of studying what science is like from the inside, where the fundamental problem is not to obtain data, but to find ways of turning data into evidence. Science distribution credit is given for the spring semester.

Prerequisites: Junior standing or consent.

Philosophy 191-01 / Seminar: Ordinary Language

Avner Baz / 13 / Thursday 6:30 – 9:00
There was a time, a little more than 50 years ago, when a new form of philosophizing -- generally referred to as "ordinary language philosophy" -- was taken to hold the promise of a fresh start, or turn, in philosophy, and of a way out of debates that, though typically presenting themselves as in the business of making philosophical progress, have come to be seen, by some at least, as leading nowhere. The new philosophical approach was associated mainly with the names of John Austin and Ludwig Wittgenstein.

Ordinary Language Philosophy (OLP) involves a critique of the tradition of western philosophy that proceeds from a consideration of the normal and ordinary use of philosophically troublesome words like ‘know’, ‘understand’, ‘mean’, ‘see’, ‘true’, ‘free" ... And it has an ethical, existentialist, dimension that was just as alien to the spirit of the Anglo-American philosophy of mid 20th century as it is alien to the spirit of contemporary mainstream analytic philosophy.

Nowadays ordinary language philosophy (hereafter OLP), whether in its Wittgensteinian form or in its Austinian form, is widely taken—especially in the United States—to have somehow been brought to disrepute. Many philosophers who work within the mainstream of analytic philosophy take it that OLP may safely be ignored.

The premise of this seminar will be that those who dismiss OLP have not (yet) entitled themselves to that dismissal. This is partly due to the fact that it is very difficult to say what exactly OLP is (about).

We will begin by reading and discussing John Austin’s ‘Other Minds’ and Peter Strawson’s ‘Truth’, with the aim of forming an initial sense of OLP’s approach to the resolution of philosophical difficulties. We will then look closely at, and assess, the main lines of argument that have been brought against OLP.

In the second part of the course we will reverse direction. Instead of assessing the prevailing arguments against OLP, we will consider how its approach might be brought to bear on two central debates in contemporary analytic philosophy: The debate concerning the reliance on ‘intuitions’ in philosophical theorizing, and the debate between ‘contextualists’ and ‘anti-contextualists’ with respect to our concept of propositional knowledge.

In addition to the papers by Austin and Strawson we shall read texts by Wittgenstein, Geach, Grice, Searle, Soames, Stanley, Stich, Cummins, Williamson, Travis, Recanati, Lewis, DeRose, Cohen, Hawthorne, and Kant, among others.

Philosophy 191-02 / Seminar: Metaphysics of Material Objects

Brian Epstein / 10 / Monday 6:30 - 9:00
This seminar will focus on a central issue in contemporary metaphysics: the nature of material objects. We will examine in detail theories of the relation between an object and its parts, the essential properties of material objects, and the persistence of objects over time.

Philosophy 191-03 / Seminar: Contemporary Relativism

Mark Richard / 8 / Thursday 1:30 – 4:00
After a long dry spell, relativism is fashionable in analytic philosophy. Driven in good part by issues in semantics and the philosophy of language, philosophers have recently argued that we must give relativistic accounts of the way we talk about knowledge, matters of taste, possibility, and much more.

In this seminar we will first look at the background of contemporary relativism in the work of David Kaplan and David Lewis in the 1980s. We will then look closely at three test cases for relativistic accounts of thought and talk: Tense (Can what we say change truth value over time, and so be true-for-me today but false-for-you tomorrow?), matters of taste (Can we disagree about whether Mr. X is handsome, yet both be right?), and epistemic relativism (Do claims of knowledge and justification, as philosophers like Richard Rorty argue, make sense only relative to more or less arbitrary criteria?).

Because what drives contemporary relativism are considerations from semantics and philosophy of language, some background in logic is required. (Some knowledge of linguistics wouldn’t hurt, but none will be assumed.) Readings will include work by Boghossian, Cappelen and Hawthorne, MacFarland, Recanati, and Richard. The course requires a five page paper, a brief presentation, and a final ten page paper. Prerequisites are two courses in philosophy, including a logic course.

Philosophy 195-01 / Topics: Aesthetic Psychology

Stephen White / M+MW / Monday, Wednesday 6:00 – 7:15
The term 'aesthetic psychology' bears the same relation to modern aesthetic theory that the expression 'moral psychology' bears to first order moral theories. In both cases we refer to a meta-level investigation--in moral psychology the investigation of the psychological conditions of our meaningful use of normative and evaluative language, in aesthetic psychology of our meaningful use of terms such as 'beautiful' or 'sublime.'

In this course, we will focus on the psychological presuppositions of modern aesthetic theory, including that of Romanticism, Modernism, and Postmodernism. And the central psychological issue in all three cases is that of the productive imagination. This, according to romantic theory, is the creative power of the mind that grounds our notion of reality and gives us our vocation--as artists and non-artists alike--to transform what we are given in experience. This means, as Charles Larmore has written, "making whole what has been broken asunder," and "pursuing correspondences where divisions were thought to exist."

This romantic conception of the productive imagination gives us the conception of a vocation of art in a very strong sense--a conception according to which art plays a (or the) fundamental role in human existence and one which among all human activities it is uniquely qualified to play. And despite the fundamental differences between the romantic, modernist, and postmodernist perspectives, some such conception of the productive imagination runs through all three.

It is inevitable that we should ask, then, what sense we can make (in the context of analytical philosophy and contemporary psychology) of such a conception of the imagination. How is such conception related to such notions as theory-laden perception in philosophy of science, contemporary work in experimental psychology in the traditions established by Michotte and J. J. Gibson, the neurophysiologically informed clinical observations of Oliver Sacks, the continental traditions of phenomenology associated with Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty, or the Freudian and Lacanian conceptions of the development of the self.

We will pursue these questions by reference in connection with a wide range of works of art, many of them deeply influenced by romantic and post-romantic aesthetic theory, including works of filmmakers Ridley Scott, Terrence Malick, Nicholas Roeg, and Park Chan Wook, novelists Dostoyevsky and Paul Auster, and multi-media and performance artists Joseph Beuys and Matthew Barney.

Philosophy 197 / Ethics, Law and Society

Erin Kelly and Lionel McPherson / J+TR / Tuesday, Thursday 3:00-4:15
This course forms the core of a new certificate program in Ethics, Law and Society, administered through the philosophy department. The goal of the program is to use philosophy to prepare students to be active citizens in leadership positions in government, NGOs and the private sector. Students will learn about how moral and political philosophy relate to questions of public importance.

The seminar will study a range of practical ethical questions concerning three basic themes: (1) morality across boundaries; (2) criminal justice, moral responsibility, and the aims of punishment; (3) terrorism and just war; (4) multiculturalism and religious toleration.

We will approach these questions by considering case studies and by evaluating moral principles for resolving ethical dilemmas. We will be especially concerned with the challenges to ethical thought posed by ethnic, religious, and political diversity.

Requirements for the course include several short papers and an individual research project.
 


The Student Services website provides a search for a complete list of course descriptions.  Please note that this is a comprehensive list; not all of the courses will be offered in any one semester.

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