In understanding contemporary Greek history, one must first grant the visage of a land, populated, since ancient times, by a group of individuals whose lineage claimed for themselves vast geographical and cultural boundaries in Asia Minor, being witnesses to the mace of Alexander the Great and inheritors of Eastern Rome. "Classical Greece had no frontiers, for it was not a state but a collection of city states sharing certain things in common."1  One of the first areas which "the Greeks penetrated as colonizers, explorers, and exploiters was the Ionian coast of Asia Minor."2  Found deep within the collective memory of the Greek peoples is the splendor of great empires and the striving for days past.

Applied in its simplest connotation, the Megali Idea is the goal of reestablishing a Greek state as a homeland for all the Greeks of the Mediterranean and the Balkan world. When Constantinople fell to the Ottoman Turks in 1453, the Byzantine Empire tasted its demise. It is a pervading sentiment of nationalism, manifest in the expression, "the Great Idea," which echoes in its ardor, "...an amalgamation of Greece’s ancient glories and the grandeur of Byzantium..."3  The Ottomans, through the millet system, ensured that Greek influence would remain strong through the agency of the Greek Orthodox Church; in addition, the Patriarchy, given power alike the viziers, kept alive visions of a revived Greek state. Both from within and from outside of the Ottoman yoke, Greeks reclaimed their antiquity, stimulating Western European interest in ancient Greece and, with it, Phil-Hellenic sentiments.

Indeed, the Megali Idea is married to Great Power support, relegating a people to the entrustment of powerful European countries. It can be stated that since her independence in 1829, Greece "has been dominated by a clearly identifiable theme, her almost complete dependence on one or more of the Great Powers... her domestic development was consistently subordinated to a foreign policy growing out of the exigencies"4  of international situations. Greek history carries with it the faint cry of the Ottoman invasion; it is a history which reverberates hope, an aegis of faith, to return to Constantinople, the great city.

The history of Greek irredentia is, essentially, the history of the Great Idea. It was the recovery of Constantinople and the establishment, once more, of a universal Christian Byzantium that remained of paramount importance for Greeks. In October 1797, Rigas Velestinlis (‘Fereos’), from the printing-house of Markidis-Poulios, issued copies of a revolutionary manifesto, calling for Christian Balkans to free themselves of Ottoman captivity. Rigas’ declaration of nationalism carried profound implications and placed, on paper, what many Greeks had already felt. While the Megali Idea carried, with it, a nationalist flavor, it was not merely a sentimental outgrowth of nationalist tendencies; "it was, in one of its aspects, centuries old and deeply rooted in the Greeks’ national and religious consciousness."5 

Consequently, while capturing the romantic sentiments of a revival of the Byzantine-Greek Empire centered on Constantinople, the Megali Idea took other shapes, as well. Less strictly, "it was the aspiration for Greek cultural and economic dominance within the Ottoman Empire, leading to its gradual subversion from within by a natural process which need not entail a violent clash between the rival Greek and Turkish nations.6  The Phenariots, a merchant class of Greeks educated at Constantinople, acquired great political and economic power "within the administrative structure of the Ottoman Empire.7  Thus, through their ascendancy Greek nationalism intensified. The economic and cultural strength of Hellenism in Western Anatolia was lead by the Greek merchant-bourgeoisie; it was both "assisted and accelerated," however, "by the growing interest of western capital in the possibilities of exploitation of Anatolia."8 

It was precisely this sentiment which came to be the inspiration of the Philike Hetairia, the secret society formed by Greek merchants in Odessa, organized in 1814, planning for the long-awaited Greek Revolution. It was an idea, ultimately, that was infectious. "By 1821, the society [Philike Hetairia]... had branches among Greeks throughout the Ottoman Empire and had used its extensive organizational apparatus to propagate the Great Idea."9  The intractable connection of the Great Idea’s precepts to the Greek populace, in fact, could be observed early on in the Greek nation-state. While political parties reflected the differences, both cultural and in world views, "parties tended not to argue over ultimate objectives."10  Thus, the parties, espousing goals that, at various times, might prove to be incompatible, "formally ... shared a common set of values, such as espousal of the Great Idea," the "ultimate goal" that bridged, "with unanimity" the national sentiment in early nineteenth century Greece.11  The parties disagreed how the realization of the Great Idea was to reach procurement; peaceful resolves with the Ottomans and critiques of Greek "administrative inefficiency and economic nonviability" were ideas that circulated.12 

The psychological impetus this belief in a "Great Idea" afforded was evidenced in Greece’s mercurial political motives during the later half of the nineteenth century; its expansionist goals "...constituted…the salient characteristics, but for a few brief lapses, of Greek Policy."13  The Megali Idea essentially led to the subordination of domestic political and socioeconomic development to foreign policy, and the raison d’être of the nation-state became not so much the welfare of its citizens, as the liberation of the unredeemed Greeks still under Turkey’s yoke."14  Such a suffusing emotion was not limited to the political leadership but in the countless tendrils of the nation’s citizenry. As noted, Greece, as a smaller state, conducted itself in the court of a European arena, whose actions were dictated by the Great Powers. Metternich’s balance of European power had remained, for the powers, a pivotal axis from which foreign relations were procured. Indeed, the Megali Idea was a uniquely Greek attitude and even amidst times of Greek sympathy, it often conflicted with the interests of the European Concert as well as with Greece’s Balkan neighbors.

Such can be seen in the rebellion which ousted King Otho due to his incompetence in realizing Greek aspirations. The Greek rebels, aware that Greek Republicanism would be equated in the European community, with French Jacobinism, shrewdly chose the services of monarchical government. After choosing Prince Alfred of Great Britain, there was a rearrangement of dealings with Great Britain that lead to the selection of Prince William, son of Prince Christian, heir to the Danish throne.15  "The Greece of the mid-nineteenth century was stirred by an awakening conviction of the historic inevitability of the expansion of the kingdom to embrace the unredeemed portion of the Greek nation."16  As a dowry of sorts, the young king brought with him the British-held Ionian Islands. When King George I, member of the House of Schleswig-Holstein, acceded the throne in 1863, he was given the title "King of the Hellenes," not "King of Greece." The implication was rich in the symbolic idea that Greece was "…not just the kingdom but the whole area inhabited by the Greek nation."17 

On August 2, 1868, a son was born to King George I and his Russian wife Olga. Crowds in Athens shouted the name Constantine, an appellative rich in nationalist aspirations, and the King and Queen obliged. It was a Constantine who had founded Constantinople, "the great city which symbolized the illusory golden age and summoned up the inextinguishable nostalgia of the Greek race," and, similarly, a Constantine "who died defending the Byzantine city against the invading Ottoman Turks... a heroic and unavailing defense of Christendom against what the Greeks believed to be the encroaching tide of barbarism."18  The heir to the Schleswig-Holstein-Sonderburg-Glücksburg throne, the first Greek-born king in centuries, was born amidst the awakening of nationalist dreams.19  The implications of these dreams ultimately led to their own martyrdom; Constantine’s great popularity among the people would one day remain amidst Great Power aversion.

During the twentieth century, the Megali Idea ultimately found its applications around the concept of the nation-state. It served, chiefly, as the aspiration for the "progressive redemption of the Greek irridentia by their incorporation in the Greek kingdom."20  Such cravings necessitated conflict in political, but chiefly in military, arenas against the Ottoman Turks. The argument can be made that the Greeks, in Southeastern Europe, were the first people to find their natural character roused and renewed through the memory of their great culture.

On June 28, 1914, on St. Vitas Day, Gavrillo Princip, a student, assassinated the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, kindling the Great War whose flare would sear the lives of untold millions. It was "a war to end all wars" though, in the end, it only lead to more fighting for the Turks and the Greeks. During the Great War, both the Entente and the Central Powers were acute in using the nationalist ambitions of the Balkan states to their advantage in various diplomatic discussions. While the argument can be advanced that "[t]he Allies failed to understand and place in its proper perspective the ethnocentrism of these small states whose aspirations did not correspond to their power,"21  both the British and the French were, in fact, aware that each nation-state would act only in its best interest and it was precisely this fact that allowed the Entente to bargain so effectively with the smaller states. The Great War infused a vortex of pandemonium which spiraled Balkan countries towards its core whether or not they aligned themselves, ideologically, with their "protector" states; it was, rather, an opportunity to see the realization of their goals, the impetus (perhaps with the exception of Rumania22 ) to expand their possessions. The Allies did, however mistakenly, feel that they could assemble a solidified Balkan coalition against the Central Powers; such proved to be an unrealistic policy, accentuating their inability to "reconcile the irreconcilable interests"23  of the Balkan states. Nevertheless, as the Kaiser, Wilhelm II, had proclaimed, "God has called us to civilize the world... we are missionaries of progress,"24  the Great War composed a litany of tears. Diplomatic discussions immediately took place between the British and the Greeks, with Lloyd George ardently trying to find favor from Venizelos in joining the Allies’ Dardanelles operation. However, at the time, Greece was wholly consumed by the fears of a Bulgarian attack. Venizelos had maintained that Greece’s entrance in the war was contingent upon Rumania’s guarantee against a Bulgarian assault. The Allies’ precarious situation in the Eastern Theatre hinged, it appeared, on Rumania’s active participation in conjunction with Greek aid. In terms of diplomacy, Great Britain did not have time to spare. News of the British naval attack on the Straits reached Athens and left "a deep impression on the Balkan peoples,"25  As for the Greeks, they were thoroughly engaged, "...dreaming of the Byzantine eagle... their hearts burning with great expectations."26  Thus, Greece had held onto the Megali Idea, which inundated her early twentieth-century convictions. Venizelos remained convinced that Allied operations were not simply the destruction of the Ottoman Empire; implicit in the Allied attack was the great fear of Russia’s domination of the East. Venizelos shrewdly reasoned that a British foothold in Anatolia could, pragmatically, remain secured through the promotion of a Greek expansion in Asia Minor. Lloyd George told the Greek Minister to Great Britain, John Gennadius, "England was not seeking any advantages in the East;" her "only desire," Lloyd George affirmed, "was to maintain the independence of the Balkan States, and, above all, to see Greece... established on the other side of [the] Aegean in Smyrna."27  This was characteristic of British fear of Russian predominance in the East. Nevertheless, Great Britain’s enticement exhibited attentiveness to Greek interests centered on the Great idea.28 

Queen Sophia nervously telegraphed her brother, Kaiser Wilhelm II, on the day of the attack on the Dardanelles, that public opinion had been worked up so much that it was difficult for King Constantine to remain neutral. Though Constantine did remain decidedly neutral, Venizelos’ impacts on the King’s mentality can be seen in the way Sophia documented her husband’s disposition: "[Constantine] is completely possessed by the specter of Byzantium."29  Constantine’s dream of "marching into the great city of St. Sophia at the head of the Greek army" was still "in his heart" and it appeared as if the King was ready to enter the war against Turkey. The conditions, however, were clear; the occupation of Constantinople had to be feasible without great dangers to Greeks. Constantine "went along with Venizelos’ plan of discussing the matter with the Allies on the conditions that Greece not spontaneously offer her cooperation to the Entente Powers..."30  Constantine was placed in the most precarious position of deciding the fate of his country at a time of European war. Being the nephew of the "Dowager Queen Alexandra of England,"31  the British had hoped, that Constantine’s sympathies might be persuaded to the Allied cause. In addition, ever since the fall of Constantinople in 1453 "the recovery of St. Sophia and the city had been handed down from generation to generation as the destiny and aspiration of the Greek Orthodox."32  Constantine was a Greek in aspiration; his sentiments, however, lay with Germany.

Constantine, though he showed signs of his intention to join the Entente and, indeed, gave a tentative promise to that effect, made no subsequent steps. "His promise was equal to refusal,"33  and tensions flared; on September 1, 1916, two of Venizelos’ most prominent supporters, Argyropoulos and Colonel Zymbrakakes, established a Committee of National Defense in Salonika in a revolt against the Crown. Indeed, there were those who felt that the king appeared to be "leaning toward Germany."34  King Constantine’s affiliation with Germany was profound; he had studied at the Prussian Army Staff College in Berlin, acquiring, while at the Military Academy, "a lifelong admiration for the German military tradition and way of life."35  In addition, his link to Germany was strengthened by his marriage to Kaiser Wilhelm II’s sister, Sophia in 1889.36  The incident of Ft. Rupel, his marriage to the sister of the Kaiser, and his self-proclaimed admiration of Germany exacerbated the delicate situation and, ultimately, undermined his position of authority.

In June of 1917 the Allies dispatched Zonnart, a French senator, to Greece as Commissioner of the Protecting Powers; Zonnart delivered a note to the Greek Government demanding the abdication of King Constantine. French troops, stationed at Corinth, were prepared to back the demands while Constantine, choosing his second son, Prince Alexander as successor, left for Switzerland. Struggling to keep Greece neutral, King Constantine had been outmaneuvered by his pro-Entente Prime Minister, Eleutherios Venizelos, who brought Greece into the war on the side of the Allies. Constantine was forced to abdicate himself and also for his eldest son, George.37  On June 26, "amidst scenes of unprecedented enthusiasm, from which even his erstwhile opponents to his regime did not dare abstain,"38  Venizelos made his return to Athens. Both as the new Minister of War and of Foreign Affairs, Venizelos was aptly prepared to aid the Allies and the Greek cause. Following on the heels of King Alexander’s installation, Greece took her oath of allegiance to the Entente and, two days later, entered the war.

Venizelos now employed the role of international diplomat without the restrictions of the Constantine Government. He impressed upon the Allies the importance the newly forming Greek divisions would have, pressing both for munitions and equipment. Furthermore, "he enlisted moral and to an extent material support for Greece," explicating "the decisive part the Greek army had to play in the Eastern campaign."39  While Greek soldiers, "in spite of the campaigns of 1912-1913, were considered by military strategists to be of poor quality,"40  the Greek force soon won the acclaim of the Allies for their courage and steady advances, favorably impressing foreign military attachés. Venizelos’ planning was conducive to Greek acclamation; Venizelos stubbornly coerced General Franchet d’Esperey, commander of the Allied forces in Macedonia, to place the Greek army in five different points on the line of attack, allowing them to play a more important part in the Macedonian offensive. In the final offensive, "which made the first breach in the iron ring of the Germanic coalition," the Greek troops did, in fact, play a decisive role; "wherever a big break was effected there was a Greek division (placed there by Venizelos’ foresight) to march forward with the Allies into the liberated territories."41 

Joining the Allied side was a gamble that Venizelos was eager to take; Venizelos, least of all, would "shun the grave risks for the realization of Hellenism’s great dream," the Megali Idea.42  However, with the decision came a great price. "The diplomatic machinations that accompanied the entrance of the smaller nations into World War"43  had now nearly destroyed the Greek royal family. The people’s loyalty to their monarch was an affirmation of their belief in the Megali Idea; when Venizelos’ visions seemed to offer its fruition, Greece braced itself as the Byzantine eagle soared overhead.

At the end of World War I, the Great Powers remained committed to carving up the three fallen empires of 1918: Germany, Austria-Hungary, and the Ottoman lands. Self-determination had been championed as one of the principles of peacemaking and alongside this ideology came the various promises, by treaty or declaration, to subject peoples and to each other. While the Americans, the British, the French, and the Italians all had interests in the conquered areas, "Greece was the only one who could advance the additional claim that in the regions she coveted there was a large population which was Greek Orthodox; within that population a large proportion existed which spoke the Greek language, living in communities that had their own schools and a Greek way of life."44  In addition, Greece, Venizelos could argue, was "contiguous to the regions in which she hoped to expand."45 

Venizelos secured for Greece a good position at the Paris Peace Conference as a result of bringing the Greeks to fight on the Macedonian front. Thus, his case was based on the services rendered to the Allies by the Greek army; it was also grounded in one of President Woodrow Wilson’s fourteen points that minorities of the Ottoman empire should "be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development..."46  While Venizelos went to the Great Power bargaining table there were some in Greece who pointed out the difficulties inherent in maintaining a Greek empire.47 

In Paris, before the Supreme Council of the Allies, Venizelos and the Greek delegation argued the country’s claims for the internalization of Constantinople and the Greek annexation of Thrace and Smyrna, with a substantial part of its hinterland. Venizelos was shrewd enough not to request Constantinople and the Straits; a Greek mandate, "owing to Italian opposition ... was entirely out of the question…"48  However, Venizelos demanded the vilayet of Aidin, including a corridor reaching to the south coast of the Marmara River, but not including the sanjak of Denizli. Such an assertion was not out of the question; the substantial Christian populations before and during the war had been mistreated. In addition, Greece was in possession of the offshore islands and, should necessity dictate she would be able to defend the region. In his determination to realize the Megali Idea, Venizelos presented bold Greek claims. Such requests, however, "were not any more fantastic than those of Poles, Romanians, Czechs, Yugoslavs, and Italians."49  In addition, the international situation was decidedly propitious for Hellenic aspirations. Eleutherios Venizelos left the table confident in the Greek objective; he remarked, "[a]t the conclusion of today’s sitting, Orlando expressed himself sympathetically about ‘the noble nation represented by Venizelos,’ believing, he said, that the nation ‘will receive satisfaction of its righteous claims.’" Venizelos continued, "…differences between ourselves and Italy would be [according to Orlando’s statement] composed in a friendly spirit."50  One month later, Venizelos noted the change of atmosphere, particularly from the Italian delegation.

The Italian diplomats asserted that at the conference of Saint Jean-de-Maurienne, in April of 1917, Italian interest in Smyrna was safeguarded by Great Britain. At the Paris Conference, however, Lloyd George argued that such an argument was dependent upon Russian agreement, which was never forthcoming, and "a considerable Italian military effort against the Turks."51  Italy’s challenge of her rights to Smyrna embodied a diplomatic hostility that threatened the Anglo-Greek agreement.52  Furthermore, Italian interests clashed, once more, regarding the fate of Northern Epiros. Italy, that wanted an independent Albania, now had ample persuasion over the area upon the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

Before the Treaty of Sèvres was officially drawn-up, Italian forces moved towards Smyrna after occupying Adalia. Lloyd George, greatly alarmed, called for the Supreme Council to take action. President Wilson strongly backed Lloyd George’s proposition that Greek troops land at Smyrna in order to protect the Christians who, Lloyd George contended, Italians had provoked the Turks to attack. Clemenceau concurred and the Greeks, covered by allied warships, readied themselves. Venizelos landed Greek troops at Smyrna, on May 14, 1919, to oppose the Kemalists and to take formal occupation of the city. "The die was cast" and the issues were now clear; "peace for Greece had brought war and a Greek war for the destruction of Turkey."53  While the loss of life on both sides was considerable, it can be argued that the diplomatic arena provided the greatest obstruction.

Prior to the signing of the Treaty of Sèvres, Mustapha Kemal (who would later become Atatürk), placed himself as the head of a national movement centered at Angora, becoming the "defacto ruler of Asia Minor, while Mohammed VI, who had succeeded the feeble Mohammed V in 1918, retained the shadow of power at Constantinople."54  The Allied occupation of Constantinople, in March of 1920, and the subsequent Greek seizure of Eastern Thrace and Western Anatolia further divided the schism between Turkish nationalists and those loyal to the sultan. The Greeks, whose goal "was no less than the rejuvenation of Hellenism in Asia Minor,"55  threatened to permanently alter the demographic character of the peninsula. However, Greek’s directive for the destruction of Turkey "was the only thing that would weld together and invigorate Turkey."56  The armistice with Turkey had made very incomplete provisions for Turkish disarmament and if the Greeks planned to push beyond Smyrna into the Anatolian interior, a considerable number of Turkish regulars remained prepared.

On August 10, 1920, the Treaty of Sèvres was signed, ceding to Greece Thrace, up to the Chatalja lines. More importantly for the Greek Kingdom, however, Turkey, in accordance with the Treaty, renounced to Greece all rights over Imbros and Tenedos, retaining the small territories of Constantinople, the islands of Marmara, and "a tiny strip of European territory."57  Turkey was furthermore subjected to the indignity of transferring to Greece "the exercise of her rights of sovereignty" over Smyrna in addition to "a considerable Hinterland, merely retaining a ‘flag over an outer fort.’"58  Though Greece administered the Smyrna enclave, its sovereignty remained, nominally, with the Sultan. According to the stipulations of the Treaty, Smyrna was to maintain a local parliament and, if within five years time she asked to be incorporated within the Kingdom of Greece, the provision was made that the League of Nations would hold a plébiscite to decide on such matters.

The Treaty of Sèvres had debilitated the Turkish Empire, forcing the absolvement of any claims that it was a European Power. The Straits were placed under an International Commission, as they were now open to all. The disintegration of the Turkish empire continued further in Asia with the sovereignty of the Armenian Republic of Erivan, the Kingdom of the Hedjaz, an autonomous Kurdistan, and the custodianship by the Great Powers over Syria, Mesopotamia, and Palestine.59  The Treaty legalized the British hold over Cyprus and Egypt, allowing Great Britain to consolidate its primacy in the Arabian Peninsula. Turkey officially retained less territory than had the Byzantine Empire on its deathbed. On the same day as the Treaty of Sèvres, a Tripartite Agreement on Anatolia between the British, French, and Italians was signed, recognizing Cilicia as a French interest and granting southwestern Anatolia as a sphere of Italian interest. Greece signed a separate agreement with Italy in which the Dodekánesos islands, minus Rhodes, were renounced by Italy in favor of Greece. The transfer was not to occur until fifteen years after the signing of the agreement with the British handing over of Cyprus.60  Essentially, the Treaty of Sèvres, with an avidity devoid of encumbrance, had retrenched the Ottoman Empire into "a rump of an inland state."61  Venizelos, through the territorial acquisition implicit in Sèvres, had created "a Great Greece of 171,163 square kilometers and 6,539,903 inhabitants."62  It was, for all intents and purposes, a crowning of years of diligent diplomatic exertion; Greece had emerged not as a trivial Balkan state but as a Mediterranean Power.

The Greek occupation of Smyrna witnessed skirmishes between Turks and Greeks followed by lurid stories, disseminated by Turkish propaganda, of Greek brutality. Rather than allowing the stories to suggest the incapacity of the Greeks to rule over mixed populations, Venizelos expeditiously invited proceedings to begin at once. An inter-Allied Commission was sent to investigate the purported savagery at Smyrna. But the report was never published. Though recommended, the Supreme Council did not include any Greek officers in the commission. On March 22, 1920, Lloyd George remarked in the House of Commons that it was imprudent "to allow the Report of the Commission in question to be published owing to the conditions under which the, enquiry was conducted... the Commission ... decided not to allow any Greek representatives to be present on the grounds that Turkish witnesses might be afraid of giving evidence." He continued, "[t]he Supreme Council were of opinion that M. Venizelos’ protest was justified" and the "enquiry was completed." The British Government, he concluded, "thinks it inadvisable and unfair to publish the Report itself."63 

For the British Conservative pro-Turkish elements , the suppression of the report became a vital issue. If it disclosed patterns of Greek administrative incompetence "it would enable them to rebuff Venizelos and throw out Lloyd George."64  Such a desire remained farfetched. Becoming more outspoken, the pro-Turkish sentiments in Great Britain began to be heard more. Venizelos himself noted the damage the investigation had incurred for Greece; now, amidst Conservatives and even "well-meaning intellectuals," Greek ascendancy came under a barrage of attack. Professor A. J. Toynbee sardonically remarked, "[w]hat had happened to Mr. Venizelos? Before the formal presentation of his claims to the Council of Ten, he expressed unlimited optimism about the practicability of carrying them out. He refused to admit that in opening the Anatolian question he was implicitly reopening the question of the islands; he maintained that the Greek army could hold his projected Anatolian frontier on a peace footing..."65  It is doubtful whether, in writing his scathing critique, Toynbee was considering the fate of the million and a half Greeks living under Turkish rule. "Turkish policy was bent on the extermination of that unfortunate multitude."66 

In many ways, Greece witnessed a backlash in the pro-Greek sympathies that, during and immediately following the Great War, had been lavished against the Greek palate. Lloyd George remained indubitably supportive to Venizelos and the Greek claims; seeing Greece as a conduit through which Great Britain would exercise greater influence and prestige. In addition, "by assisting Greece he would have a strong friend in the Levant against both France and Turkey."67  The British Statesman faced the opposition of the Allies, his Cabinet, and the Conservative Party- not too long ago Disraeli’s pro-Turkish lionizing orations were heard on the House floor.

The Greek government finally lost the support of France, and even its own constituents when Venizelos was deposed at the elections of November 14, 1920. While Venizelos’ political savvy had won Greece triumphs at the European "Council-board,"68  the Greek people had grown tired of prolonged mobilization, which was associated with his long tenure in office. Perhaps the greatest determinant was that Venizelos was away at Paris for a good deal of his time; in his absence, and in his name, unpopular subordinates governed, fashioning the growth of political enemies. During the last four years, Greece had amassed both great stress and great strains. Venizelos, away in Paris, did not realize "how far factional strife had eaten into the vitals of the nation." His opposition "consisted of sixteen distinct groups united only by their common hostility to the Cretan."69  Whether or not the vote was, indeed, against Venizelos, there can be no doubt that it deeply affirmed a vote for peace. Distressed in his self-imposed exile, Venizelos was forced to watch the foundation of his diplomacy crumble due to the restoration of King Constantine I.

The recall of Constantine to the throne crippled the effectiveness of Greek military forces as a function of Greece’s weakened international position. In the Paris meeting of the Supreme Council, "it was decided to warn the Greek people that if, at their ... plébiscite, they voted for the return of Constantine they must expect thereafter no further support from their late Allies."70  This was dictated by French and Italian diplomats with great alacrity. Yet though Constantine was bitterly detested in the Allied community since the Great War, the French and Italians saw his election as "a heaven sent opportunity of ridding themselves of that irksome moral obligation which they had incurred in regard to Greece."71  There is an expression, "the friend of my enemy is my enemy;" before Venizelos was defeated at the November 1920 elections, the French were esuriently awaiting the end of their "contract." With Constantine as king, the British, short of breaking all diplomatic negotiations with Greece, embargoed all financial support and war supplies to Greece. The monarch whom Britain and, indeed, all the Allies, branded as Germanophile had sired an anomalous relationship to the British Crown. In the end, the Greeks were left with an inimical hand that history and, indeed, a war-wearied populace had dealt. Now, "a small weak state, facing tremendous undertakings, was to have the additional handicap of being divided against itself."72 

Perhaps not quite moribund, the "Sick man of Europe" was desperate to secure foreign aid and to sharpen Turkish diplomacy. If the Turks could fracture the fragile Allied solidarity, they could isolate Greece from her Allies, rendering her virtually ineffective against a concentrated attack. For Kemal, the timing proved to be ripe. The Bolsheviks publicized that "the secret treaties of the deposed Tsar as to the annexation of Constantinople, confirmed by the Kerensky Government,"73  were to be null and void. In September 1920, the Soviets met with Turkish representatives at the Congress of the Peoples of the East, denouncing Western powers, colonial activities and promising the Turks Soviet aid. Russia grew tired of Allied intervention through the Straits. A Russo-Turkish entente developed as the two governments settled disputes regarding the Armenians. The first diplomat of nationalist Turkey, Ali Fuad, was posted in Moscow. On March 16, 1921, Russia and Turkey signed the Treaty of Friendship. Russia recognized the territorial integrity of Turkey and relinquished various northeastern Anatolian territories. The Turkish nationalist forces, in turn, were invigorated by Russian military and economic aid. Lenin ominously warned that the Soviet Government would "group around all the awakening people of the East and fight together with them against international imperialism."74 

In conjunction with the Russian treaties, Turkey was strengthened by the splintering of Allied unity. Greek ambitions prompted pro-Turkish elements in Britain and in France to come out of the woodwork once again. In addition, France and Italy, suspicious of Britain’s already powerful position in the Near East, reacted unfavorably to a greater Greece spanning across the Aegean Sea. Italy, specifically, felt that Greece’s territorial appetite threatened the Balkan power arrangement. The Greek territorial ambitions conflicted with those of Italy. It is in remembering that Italy, during the Balkan Wars, was hostile to Greeks in Northern Epirus and the Aegean islands, that Italian-Greek antagonism does not seem peculiar. "In Italy, Mr. Lloyd George was bitterly denounced as having selected Greece to be the vessel and instrument of British policy in the Levant in order to put an obstacle in the way of Italian expansion, and Mr. Venizelos was execrated for offering himself as a political mercenary and a tool of British hegemony."75  While Venizelos, indeed, was a tool of British hegemony, there was a symbiotic relationship that existed between Britain and Greece; in securing British interests, Greece was also securing its own.

In London on February 21, 1921, the Supreme Council, amid increased agitation in the Near East, called for an Allied Conference. While the meeting did not significantly alter the Sèvres Treaty or mollify Turkish antagonism, France and Italy privately engaged the Turks in independent negotiations. The treaties, though rendered defunct, still succeeded in attaining the cessation of hostilities of Italy and France as well as the withdrawal of their troops from Anatolia. On October 20, 1921, the French signed the Franklin-Bouillon Agreement, evacuating Cilicia and Syria in favor of capitalist concessions within Turkey.76  "French capitalists would have an opportunity to extend their activities in Turkish banks, ports, waterways, and railways."77  The British, upon hearing of the treaty, became incensed; the treaty, which was the first between the Turkish provisional government and a Western power, "...marked a definite line of cleavage in the politics of the two countries in the Levant."78 

The Greeks were left significantly weakened by the French and Italian alienation at the hands of British exploitative interests. The Greeks resumed their offensive against the Turks in June 1921. By August, the Supreme Council dictated a policy of "strict neutrality" regarding the Greek-Turkish conflict. French and Italian neutrality, however, proved to be a farce as both governments remained eager to reach friendly understandings with the Turks. The Italians supplied Mustapha Kemal arms to fight the Greeks, paid for with the money supplied by Moscow. France, negotiating a secret treaty, without Great Britain’s knowledge, enabled Kemal "to withdraw all his forces from the Armenian and Syrian front and fling them against the Greeks."79  The Italian and French objective was to defeat Great Britain by helping Kemal defeat the Greeks. Most disturbingly, however, France, with blatant disregard, ignored both her signature on the peace treaty and her declarations of good faith. In doing so, France put her bondholders and her concessionaires above all else, including, tragically, the lives of both Greek and Armenian Christians. Turkish diplomacy had made strange bedfellows. After securing a large flow of munitions and money from the Soviets, French, and Italians, and after isolating Greece from a unified Allied support, the invigorated Turkish national force met with the Greek army.

Venizelos, upon signing the Treaty of Sèvres, "worked on the assumption that the principal frontiers of his Greek Empire of ‘two continents and five seas’ would run along the disarmed Bulgaria and the European-controlled Turkey."80  In addition, "it was not envisaged that Greece would be called upon to fight, and fight alone, to hold the gains that the Treaty gave her."81  In considering Venizelos’ action towards Smyrna, one must wonder if, choosing this tragic step, he truly felt that Britain and France, while urging him on, would stick with the Greek troops in times of adversity. In 1911, as Premier, Venizelos remarked, "international morality does not exist;"82  indeed, if you were not strong enough to secure both your rights and your victories you could scantily count on the gentility of anybody else. Perhaps Venizelos did place too much confidence in his allies. While the opportunity afforded him coincided with his plans, he lacked the guarantee of committed agency. For Greece, the taking of Smyrna was "an inevitable stage towards the destruction of the Ottoman Empire and the liberation of Greece" while, to the Allies, Smyrna was merely "a square in the military-political chessboard of the Conference."83 

The carnage in Asia Minor reached vast proportion. Nevertheless, the Great Idea goaded hope. In Athens, Greek Royalists affirmed intentions to magnify Greek forces in Asia Minor. The public was lead to believe that, almost one hundred years after Greek Independence, the fulfillment of the Megali Idea was within reach. "Patriotic broadsheets pictured the king as a modem St. George riding over the corpse of a Turkish dragon and through the fabled Golden Gate of Constantinople, with his namesake the last Byzantine emperor at his side."85 

The Battle of the Sakkaria River, started on August 23, 1921, became the bloodiest engagement between Greek and Turkish troops since the taking of Smyrna. It also was the turning point in the Greco-Turkish War as the final effort of Greece for victory "melted away into a feeling of unrelievable gloom."86  On August 26, 1922, the Battle of Afion Kara-Hissar witnessed a thunderous artillery barrage from 325 Turkish guns shattering the predawn stillness in the air. "By the fourth day of the battle of Afion Kara-Hissar, nearly half the Greek army of occupation in Anatolia had either been slaughtered or taken prisoner."87  The Greeks were soon pushed to the coast of Smyrna. Winston Churchill observed, "the Greeks had involved themselves in a politico-strategic situation where anything short of decisive victory was defeat."88  At this point in the war, however, decisive victory was no longer an option.

The Greek Coalition Cabinet of Protopapadákes, Goúnares, and Strátos informed the Great Powers that peace for the Greek Kingdom could be found only through the acquisition of Constantinople. Such a request had fallen on hostile ears and the Powers replied that they would simply use force to prevent it. Greek succor lay parched. Greece was undermined by Great Britain’s lack of support, the abandonment of the pro-Turkish French, and the defeatist propaganda simmering within its home front. Removed from all support, the Greeks faced a strong Turkish attack. On September 10, 1922, the Turks, incensed with retribution, entered Smyrna. "The burning of the Greek quarter and the murder of the Metropolitan recalled the massacre of Chios exactly a century earlier, with the difference that they aroused no indignation in a war-weary world."89  In flames lay Greek hegemony and the hope for the annihilation of the Turks. Turkey had "suffered but not subdued."90  The press fed the public a mortuary diet rich with lurid discovery. Newspaper headlines flashed international horror and reporters, aghast, wrote, "bands of Turks are killing the helpless Christians and the whole city is in the throes of terror."91  Aside from the great many deaths tolled, it was noted that "several thousand disarmed Greek soldiers still remain on the peninsula west of Smyrna."92  Panic, like death, was rampant.

A representative of the Near East Relief at Smyrna wrote the New York Times, "[m]y estimate of the financial loss to the Greeks in devastation in the Hinterland and the configuration of Smyrna is above $200,000,000... I walked through a large area of the burned section and noted the complete destruction."93  The French Foreign Office defended the Turks, issuing an official report that the Turks did not set fire to the buildings and that there was "no evidence that the Turks were in any way responsible for the damage [at Smyrna]."94  Conspicuously, however, the damage incurred was all Greek; "[t]he Turkish residential district is undamaged."95  Lloyd George, representing the Great Powers, wrote a note to Kemal, promising Eastern Thrace to Turkey through the invitation of a peace conference. In addition, the Treaty of Sèvres was now officially annulled. The letter noted that "the allied Governments are convinced that their appeal will be listened to and that they will be able to collaborate with the Turkish Government and their allies to establish peace, for which the whole civilized world is longing."96  This, above all, was true for greater Europe. Weary of the Balkan Wars, and especially of the Great War, the Great Powers were tired of fighting. The terror at Smyrna was an abhorrence to all of Europe- an ancient city that was purported to be "the cradle of Greek legends"97  now, tragically, was destroyed. Perhaps equally as frightful was the return of Turkey. "The Crescent comes back to Europe,"98  a reporter noted.

The Coalition Cabinet resigned and Constantine, amid rumors of civil war, abdicated the Greek throne in favor of his son, George II. As refugees, alongside troops, flooded Greece with stories of the atrocities of Smyrna, a "vengeance was demanded upon the authors of the catastrophe." To this task, the services of General Pángalos, a harsh individual, were rendered. Pángalos, as president of the committee, was given the task of determining culpability. He sentenced the Commander-in-Chief, General Hajjianéstes, as well as the five ex-Ministers, Protopapadákes, Goúnares, Strátos, Baltatzês, and Nicholas Theotókes to death. William Miller notes, "[t]he execution of ‘the Six’ was both a crime and a blunder. One of ‘the Six’ was scarcely responsible for his actions, another was dragged from a sick-bed to execution, a third was an amiable linguist unlikely to initiate a policy."99  Furthermore, Greek alienation in the European arena was deepened, the executions providing another reason for diminishment of foreign sympathies. The British Government withdrawing its Minister from Greece evidenced this.100  For the next four years, Greek public opinion remained divided.

It was a time of agitation for the Greek community; Prince Andrew, banished for life, was transported away from Greece via a British vessel. Briefly, Greece had tasted the near fulfillment of the Megali Idea; her arms had swept across Anatolian lands, once emblazoned by the crest of Byzantium, now by Turkish fire. The Treaty of Lausanne, on July 24, 1923, fixed the Maritza River as the frontier between Greece and Turkey. While the island at Maritza’s mouth eventually came under Greek dominion, Turkey had regained all of Greece’s postwar possessions in Asia Minor and Europe. Greece remained impotent as Italy acquired from Turkey rights to the Dodekánesos islands. Agreed upon was the compulsory exchange of the Greek population of Turkey with the Moslem population of Greece. The stipulation excepted those Greeks "established" in Constantinople before October 30, 1918, the Moslems of Western Thrace and those of Albanian race. "No recent event is likely to have a greater effect upon the future of Greece," it was believed by some, "than this wholesale emigration and immigration,"101  consisting of at least 1,400,000 refugees.

David Lloyd George had failed "to understand the war-weary mood of his countrymen’ and remained ignorant to the fact that "his personal views ran counter to a growing isolationist trend in postwar Britain."102  The damage had occurred. Greece had been stunningly defeated by the Turks against the backdrop of international isolation. Greece’s loss of Anatolia, through staggering defeat, poisoned the politics of the land. The war, directed by Venizelos, took place in 1922-1923 under a Royalist administration. Greece grieved for the Megali Idea during the 1920’s and 1920’s, amid a destructive current of political rivalries and dictatorships.

Two and a half years before Sevres, the British Foreign Minister, Sir Edward Grey, suggested to Venizelos, "the most important territorial concessions for Greece on the coast of Asia Minor,"103  around Izmir (Smyrna), as a possible reward for Greek involvement in the Great War. "Unfortunately for Greece, the Cretan statesman [Venizelos] would remember only too well this Allied appeal to Hellenic irredentist sentiment."104  Lloyd George had come to see Hellenism as loyal to British interests and pushed for the purposeful Sèvres accord. Ultimately, however, the ‘Draconian Treaty"105  imposed on the Ottoman government was not to be ratified. Three years later at Lausanne the Allies negotiated a fresh settlement.

1 Smith, 2 1.

 2 Ibid., 2 1.

 3 Leon, 1.

 4 Ibid., 1.

 5 Smith, 3.

 6 Ibid., 4.

 7 Ibid., 3.

 8 Ibid., 24.

 9 Petropulos, 23.

 10 Ibid., 506.

 11 Ibid., 507.

 12 Ibid., 508.

 13 Leon, 2.

 14 Ibid., 2.

 15 Great Britain, in can be noted, was more interested in keeping Russia off the Greek throne than putting an Englishman on it.

 16 Smith, 2.

 17 Ibid., 3.

 18 Ibid., 1-2.

 19 This fact is further evidenced in the urging, by some, for Constantine to have the Roman Number XII after his name. Finefrock, D1049.

 20 Smith, 4.

 21 Leon, preface.

 22 King Carol 1, of Rumania, was placed in the inauspicious position of choosing a path for his country that was not in-keeping with his country’s wishes. A devout loyalty to the Hohenzollerns and a deep conviction that Germany was headed for an immediate and total victory encouraged the king to, nervously, proclaim Rumanian allegiance to the Central powers. Carol’s declaration was met by his countrymen, "with disapproving silence;" allegiance to the Hungarians was antithetic to incorporating her Transylvanian brethren into the Rumanian state. The king, his health ailing and his spirits rankled, was urged by Queen Elisabeth to abdicate and "shake the dust of his ungrateful country from his feet." Pakula, 177.

 23 Leon, preface.

 24 Pakula, 173.

 25 Ibid., 122.

 26 Ibid., 122.

 27 Ibid., 122.

 28 The unwavering Greek desire for Constantinople, however, was widely known. When the British began the naval battle of Gallipoli, it was Russia who denied Venizelos’ offer to help; Russia, aware of Greek ambitions, feared that Greek participation in the Gallipoli endeavor would result in Greek possession of the largely-contested city.

 29 Leon, 128.

 30 Ibid., 126.

 31 Pakula, 304.

 32 Smith, 3.

 33 Alastos, 170.

 34 Pakula, 192.

 35 Smith, 5.

 36 Though Constantine’s association to Germany proved egregiously injurious for Greece’s relations with the Entente, it is interesting to note that many in Greece took Constantine’s marriage to Sophia as a good omen for the future since the great church of Constantinople was that of St. Sophia.

 37 Pakula,304.

 38 Alastos, 177.

 39 Ibid., 184.

 40 Ibid., 184.

 41 Ibid., 185.

 42 Leon, 122.

 43 Pakula, 304.

 44 Dakin, 221.

 45 Ibid., 222.

 46 Ibid., 221.

 47 Ibid., 221.

 48 Ibid., 223.

 49 Ibid., 233.

 50 Alastos, 188.

 51 Dakin, 222.

 52 "...though the Italians had no such racial and historic claim [to Smyrna] as the Greeks, they were naturally irritated at the loss of a valuable port and its hinterland, as well as fearful that British economic interests would swallow up all Anatolia if the British-Greek combination retained its military supremacy."

 53 Alastos, 192.

 54 Miller, 542.

 55 Psomiades, 31.

 56 Alastos, 192.

 57 Ibid., 541.

 58 Ibid., 541.

 59 Ibid., 541.

 60 Psomiades, 29.

 61 Ibid., 30.

 62 Miller, 542.

 63 Alastos, 193.

 64 Ibid., 194.

 65 Ibid., 194.

 66 Ibid., 196.

 67 Ibid., 196.

 68 Miller, 543.

 69 Alastos, 204.

 70 Psomiades, 34.

 71 Ibid., 34.

 72 Alastos, 170.

 73 Psomiades, 32.

 74 Ibid., 33.

 75 Ibid., 33.

 76 "The Issue in Turkey," editorial, The New York Times 24 September 1922.

 77 Psomiades, 35.

 78 Ibid., 33.

 79 Ibid., 35.

 80 Dakin, 227.

 81 Ibid., 227-228.

 82 Alastos, 191.

 83 Alastos, 191.

 84 Indeed, the morning of September 30, 1920 proved to be most unfortuitous for Greece; the King, while trying to free a Spanish monkey from the teeth of his wolfhound, Fritz, was bitten on the calf by the monkey’s mate. King Alexander died of blood poisoning on the 25th of October, his grandmother, Queen Olga, arriving just too late.

 85 Finefrock, D1053.

 86 Alastos, 215.

 87 Finefrock, D1047.

 88 Ibid., D1054.

 89 Miller, 546.

 90 Alastos, 215.

 91 "Britain Prepares to Fight For Straits; Calls On Dominions To Send Troops; Smyrna Wiped Out, Killings Continue," The New York Times 17 September 1922.

 92 "Russia Demands Straits Go To Turks," The New York Times 14 September, 1922.

 93 Mark O. Prentiss, "20,000 Greek Refugees in Smyrna Camps: Evidence Destroyed as American Gets Permission to Investigate Massacre Reports," The New York Times 24 September 1922.

 94 "Responsibility at Smyrna," editorial, The New York Times 30 September 1922.

 95 Mark O. Prentiss, "20,000 Greek Refugees in Smyrna Camps: Evidence Destroyed as American Gets Permission to Investigate Massacre Reports," The New York Times 24 September 1922.

 96 "Text of the Note of Allies to Kemal Pasha, Stating Their Conditional Offer to Turks," The New York Times 24 September 1922.

 97 Dobkin, 21.

 98 Edwin L. James, "Joint Note Sent to Kemal: Paris Conferees Present Formal Invitation to Conference," The New York Times 24 September 1922, 1.

 99 Miller, 547.

 100 Ibid., 547.

 101 Miller, 548.

 102 Finefrock, D1048.

 103 Ibid., D1050.

 104 Ibid., D1050.

 105 Psomiades, 30.