Changes in the global income distribution and their political consequences

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Leontief Awards
Structure of the talk

• Uniqueness of the current period: Capitalism rules alone + the reemergence of Asia (bringing the distribution of economic activity within Eurasia to the way it looked around 1500)
• Emergence of the global “middle/median class” and shrinkage of national middle classes
• Political/philosophical issues brought up by looking at global, as opposed to only national, inequalities
• Global inequality of opportunity
• “Optimal” global income distribution
• Can “national vices produce global virtue”? 
Long run
Estimated global income inequality over the past two centuries, 1820-2013 (using 2011 PPPs)

- IR and the rise of the West
- WW1 and the Great Depression
- WW2 and US dominance
- The rise of Asia

1820-1980 recalculation of Bourguignon-Morrisson; 1992-2013: Lakner and Milanovic with extensions
La longue durée: From Karl Marx to Frantz Fanon and back to Marx?
China's and India's GDP per capita as percent of British GDPpc from the Industrial Revolution to today (Indonesia vs. the Netherlands)
Going beyond the averages: Convergence of Chinese incomes

US and Chinese income distributions around 2002

US and Chinese income distributions in 2013
• In the *long-run* inequality is determined by the spread of the technological revolutions: the West in the 19th century, Asia today

• In the *medium-run* global inequality is determined by:
  • What happens to within-country income distributions?
  • Is there a catching up of poor countries?
  • Are mean incomes of populous & large countries (China, India) growing faster or slower that the rich world?
Past twenty-five years
The emergence of the “global middle/median class”

Figure 3. Global income distribution in 1988 and 2011

Emerging global “middle class” between $3 and $16
Real income growth at various percentiles of global income distribution, 1988-2008 (in 2005 PPPs)

From twenty_years\final\summary_data

Estimated at mean-over-mean

“China’s middle class”

“US lower middle class”

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PPP2

PPP 180

PPP4.5

PPP12

Real PPP income change (in percent)

Percentile of global income distribution
Real income growth over 1988-2008 and 1988-2011 (based on 2011 PPPs)
Mean and median annual growth rate of global per capita income

Median global income

World GDP per capita

Mean global income from HH surveys

Data2011_and_08_11.xls in c:/...twenty-five
Cumulative real growth rates (1988-2011) of the same deciles in Thailand and the USA, pinned at their original 1988 positions in global income distribution

Deciles 2, 3, 5, and 10 at their original (1988) global income positions
There was no “elephant” in the previous (pre-globalization) period.
Global political or philosophical implications

• Does global equality of opportunity matter? Is “citizenship rent” morally acceptable?
• What is the “optimal” global income distribution?
• Can something “good” (global middle class) be the result of something “bad” (shrinking of national middle classes and rising income inequality)? Are we back to Mandeville?
Position of national income percentiles in global distribution

All countries with income data; year 2013; preliminary data (i.e. not a full sample of countries)
Quasi impossibility of having regressive transfers from very rich and egalitarian countries to very poor countries
1. Is citizenship a rent?

- If between 2/3 and ¾ of our lifetime income is determined by citizenship, then there is little equality of opportunity _globally_ and citizenship is a rent (unrelated to individual desert, effort).
- Key issue: Is global equality of opportunity something that we ought to be concerned or not?
- Does national self-determination dispenses with the need to worry about GEO? Rawls’ and statist’s point.
- Migration is an attempt to “dilute” or share the rent/premium => implication for migration policies.
2. Optimal global distribution: the Rawlsian world

• For Rawls, global optimum distribution of income is simply a sum of national optimal income distributions

• Why Rawlsian world will remain unequal?
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mean country incomes</th>
<th>All equal</th>
<th>Different (as now)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Individual incomes within country</td>
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<tr>
<td>All equal</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>54 (all country Theils=0; all mean incomes as now)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Different (as now)</td>
<td>23 (all mean incomes equalized; all country Ginis as now)</td>
<td>77</td>
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3. Back to Mandeville

• Possible crowding out of national middle classes, and the creation of a global one

• But the middle class is presumably a force for stability when there is a political community. There is no political community at the global level. What does global middle class mean?

• Would global middle class create a global polity?

• Or, global plutocracy: in the longer-term, reversal to the pre World War I situation

• Can something that is bad nationally (increased inequality) be good globally (decreased inequality)?

• Can national vices produce global virtue?
Extras
Past twenty-five years: the rich world
Income stagnation and shrinkage in the size of the western middle classes

**Income share of the middle four deciles 1980-2013 in percent**

- **USA**
- **UK**
- **Germany**
- **Canada**

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The middle class defined as population with income between +/-25% of national median income (all in per capita basis; disposable income; LIS data)
Increased inequality of both labor and capital incomes

Gini coefficients of capital and labor income: US

UK income inequality 1969-2013
China

All-China estimated Gini (1985-2015)

1985-2002 Wu and Perloff
2003-2015 NSB official estimates
Income inequality around year 2011 (household per capita income or NSS consumption)

- India (NSS): 36
- Russia: 42
- USA: 48
- China: 48
- Brazil: 50
- India: 51
- South Africa: 67
(another) Trilemma of globalization

• You cannot have (A) large differences in mean country incomes, (B) globalization and (C) no structural migration.
• If A + B as today then migration.
• If A + C then no globalization.
• If B + C then you have to have homogeneous countries like EU15.
• EU, because of significant East-West and North-South income differences is, in a very modest way, a replica of the world
• EU migration problems stem from moving, as result of enlargement, from B+C to B+A.
Trade-off between citizenship rights and extent of migration

* People who would like to migrate according to a world-wide Gallup poll

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Why tools from the 20\textsuperscript{th} century will not work?

• Education in quantitative sense will have much less of a “bang for a buck” and will not by itself reduce the skill premium

• Trade unions are on the decline because the nature of work, in service-oriented and globalized economy has changes

• Increases in taxation of current income are unlikely because the trust in the government is less

• New transfers cannot be financed; aging of the population and anti-migrant feelings further limit what can be done

• And one unlikely danger: more meritocratic capitalism where top wage earners are also top K earners (and the reverse)
What could possibly be done?

• Improved quality of education and much easier access to education for all—that is, investing for stronger public education rather than the opposite trend of ever stronger private education
• Deconcentraton of ownership and income from capital through the use of tax incentives; a long and arduous process
• Employee-stock ownership plans
• Higher taxation of inheritance (not current income)
• Change in the rules re. financing of political campaigns (especially in the United States)
Ok, what are the messages?

• Maintain globalization, but do not expect that it will help everybody
• Improve domestic redistribution precisely because globalization is not good for all
• Expect that the shift of relative economic power to Asia will continue
• Improve quality and access to education
• Broaden ownership of capital
• Tax inheritance
• Do not “kill” migration but make it politically more palatable (by reducing migrants’ rights)
• Realize that Europe is also part of the Greater Middle East
• Reform the funding of political parties and elections