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BUSH OFFICIALS OVERSTATED FINDINGS
OF RISK STUDY
by Jim Barnett
Article re-printed from The Oregonian
January 27, 2004
When Agriculture Secretary Ann Veneman met a House
panel last week to defend her response to mad cow
disease, she cited a Harvard University study concluding
the risk to public health is minimal.
"As you know, USDA requested Harvard University
to conduct an independent risk assessment to evaluate
preventive measures already in place and to identify
additional actions that should be taken to minimize
the risk of BSE," Veneman said.
One problem: Harvard never told Veneman what to do.
The Harvard study, released two years ago, has become
a universal defense for Bush administration officials
as they have responded to the first cases of bovine
spongiform encephalopathy in Canada and then in the
United States.
But in their rush to embrace "sound science,"
Veneman and others at times mischaracterized the study's
purpose, recommendations or conclusions, according
to a review by The Oregonian.
From the day it was released by the Harvard Center
for Risk Analysis, the study has been portrayed by
Veneman and others as more comprehensive and conclusive
than its authors intended. For example, it doesn't
say what to do.
"We specifically didn't do 'shoulds,' "
George Gray, the study's lead author, said in an interview.
"Because 'should' implies you know all those
other things you want to know -- essentially all the
costs and benefits. And we didn't know that."
In fact, the study contains numerous caveats. Foremost,
its conclusions are based on hypothetical scenarios
rather than data that can be confirmed. The authors
note their model "is not amenable to formal validation."
Unsubstantiated conclusion Veneman first overstated
the study's conclusions on Nov. 30, 2001, in an agency
announcement of the study's release. Veneman said
the study "clearly shows" that existing
precautions, including a ban on recycling cow meat
into animal feed,
"have helped keep BSE (mad cow) from entering
the United States."
The study made no such conclusion, Gray told The
Oregonian. Rather, it assumed that U.S. cattle --
up to 500 head in one scenario -- already had become
infected. From that assumption, Gray and his team
concluded the feed ban and other steps would make
widespread contamination "extremely unlikely."
The study concluded: "If BSE has been introduced
into the U.S., as has been suggested by some observers,
the course of the disease has been arrested and it
is destined for eradication by the measures currently
in place."
But Veneman repeated her broader interpretation of
the study's conclusion four months later in a verbal
duel with the General Accounting Office, the investigative
arm of Congress.
GAO report disputed On Jan. 25, 2002, the GAO released
a report concluding the feed ban and other steps taken
by federal officials "do not sufficiently ensure"
that mad cow "would be detected promptly and
not spread to other cattle through animal feed or
enter the human food
supply."
Veneman responded in a statement on Feb. 26, 2002.
The GAO report "fails to appropriately recognize
the conclusions and recommendations" of the Harvard
study, she said. The study, she added, found that
"early government protection systems have been
largely responsible for keeping BSE out of the United
States."
Other top officials at the U.S. Department of Agriculture
have invoked the Harvard study in a more oblique fashion
to justify actions that in fact raise risks to the
U.S. herd and by extension to human health.
Undersecretary Bill Hawks cited the Harvard study
on Oct. 31, 2003, as he announced the agency would
reopen the border to Canadian cattle. The border had
been closed since Canada disclosed its first case
of mad cow in May.
"I think it's in all our best interests to resume
normal trade, if that is based by, as I said, good,
solid science," Hawks told reporters.
Theoretical risk acknowledged But Hawks failed to
mention that the agency had come to its own conclusion
that reopening the border would raise risk, even if
it remained within what officials regarded as an acceptable,
if undefined, limit.
In the Nov. 4 Federal Register, the agency said it
"acknowledges a theoretical increased risk of
BSE introduction into the United States because of
this rule. However, we conclude, this risk is extremely
small."
With the discovery of an infected cow in Washington
state in December 2003, claims made by agency officials
have come under closer scrutiny from Congress, industry
and the public. Nevertheless, a spokesman for the
risk-analysis center said it had received no complaints
about officials' portrayal of the study.
"It seems like it's not a dramatic stretching
of the truth, although it is technically not my understanding
of what we were charged to do," said David Ropeik,
communications manager for the Harvard risk center.
"The heart of how it's being characterized seems
fair."
Credibility underminded But when officials misstate
conclusions of the Harvard study or any scientific
work -- they undermine their own credibility, said
Frank Ackerman, a Tufts University
economics professor, author and critic of the Bush
administration's selective use
of science in rule-making.
"If you tilt entirely toward saying that a study
with a zillion caveats has made definitive proof of
a conclusion which can't be found in the study, then
it looks like you made up your mind beforehand,"
Ackerman said.
When asked for the basis of the department's use
of the Harvard study, a spokeswoman had no direct
response but referred a reporter to passages that
discussed assumptions made in the study.
Veneman is scheduled to return to Capitol Hill today
to face a Senate panel. The spokeswoman said it is
possible that Veneman might cite the Harvard study
again during a question-and-answer session.
Jim Barnett: jim.barnett@newhouse.com ; 503-294-7604.
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